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P R E F AC K 
I n d i a and Pak is tan have gone through very uneasy 
r e l a t i o n s h i p £ioro t h e i r very i n c e p t i o n . Being c l o s e s t 
neighbour* they a r e mi les a p a r t in showing t h e i r f r i e n d l i -
n e s s . 
In my d i s s e r t a t i o n , I have given t h e bsKSkground 
of P a k i s t a n ' s c r e a t i o n and some major d i s p u t e s between 
I n d i a and Pakis tan which r e s u l t e d i n two major wars and 
culKdnated in t h e d i v i s i o n o£ P a k i s t a n . 
The emphasis i s mainly pu t on t h e even t s a f t e r t h e 
c r e a t i o n of Bangladesh, d i s c u s s i n g i n d e t a i l t h e p r o c e s s 
of n o r m a l i s a t i o n of r e l a t i o n s between Paikistan and I n d i a . 
STWDARD FOLLOWED 
The Ind ian S tandards recommended f o r b i b l i o g r a p h i -
c a l r e f e r e n c e s and c l a s s i f i e d c a t a l o g u e code of Or. S.R. 
Ranganathan have been fo l lowed. In some cases where IS I 
do n o t g ive any guidance , I have taken a p p r o p r i a t e d e c i s i o n . 
30BJBCT HBADIHG3 
I have t r i e d my b e s t t o g ive c o - e x t e n s i v e s u b j e c t 
h e a d i n g s , ta e f f o r t has been made t o fo l low p o s t u l a t e s 
and p r i n c i p l e s given by S.R. Ranganathan in t h e formation 
of s u b j e c t Headings. 
ARRWGBMSHT 
The e n t r i e s are arranged under subject headings 
which are arranged a lphabet ica l ly fo l lowing l e t t e r by 
l e t t e r method. The ENTRY BLSMEMT of the author(s) i s 
in c a p i t a l s fo l lowed by the Secondary Element in paran-
t h e s i s us ing c a p i t a l and small l e t t e r s and then the t i t l e 
of the a r t i c l e s * s u b - t i t l e ( i f any) their, name of the 
per iod ica l being underl ined in abbreviated or f u l l form. 
I t i s fo l lowed by the volume nunber, i s s u e nuoiser, the 
year, month and date ( i f any) given by using i n c l u s i v e 
notat ion of the pages of the a r t i c l e . Each c i t a t i o n i s 
fo l lowed by an abstract . 
The items of b ib l iographica l reference f o r each 
entry of a per iod ica l art ic le /arranged as f o l l o w s t -
a) Name (s) of the author(s) 
b) Pu l l Stop (•) 
d T i t l e of contribution including s u b * t i t l e , i f any 
d) Pull Stop (.) 
e) Title of the periodical in abbreviated/full form 
f) Pul l Stop (.) 
g) Volume nunibers 
h) Coma (,) 
i ) I ssue nunber 
j) Semi colon (;) 
k) Year of publication 
1) Coma (,) 
m) Dat^ of publ icat ion 
n) Semi colon (;) 
o) Inc lus ive pages of the a r t i c l e . 
8PBCIMBK ENTRY 
INDO-PAK RELATIONS, FOREIGN POLICIES 
SMtAMAT ALI. Bade t o t h e o l d r e f r a i n s I n d o - P a k i s t a n i 
r e l a t i o n s worsen y e t aga in . F a r Eas t Econ Review 134, 
411 1986, 11, 20; 52. 
Las t y e a r s high hopes o£ a thaw in indo-Pa)d.8tani 
r e l a t i o n s have faded away a t l a s t . The two c o u n t r i e s a re 
t h e i r u sua l no-war-no-peace r e l a t i o n s h i p New Delhi seems 
r e c o n c i l e d t o t h e view t h a t i t has managed t o g e t along 
wi thou t no rma l i s a t i on wi th Islamabad so f a r and can con-
t i n u e t o do so f a r t h e f o r e a b l e f u t u r e . The hopes of 
b reak through i n b i l a t e r a l t i e s had reached t h e i r h e i g h t 
a t t h e end of l a s t y e t fo l lowing a s e r i e s of e v e n t s . How-
eve r , even as t h e mutual r e c r i m i n a t i o n s con t inue unaba ted 
Pak i s t an a l s o has i t s long l i t a n y of c o n ^ l a i n t s — fo re ign 
a n a l y s t do no t expec t on outbreak of major armed h o s t i l i t i e s . 
Two s e p a r a t e indexes namely Author Index and T i t l e 
Index have been given in the t h i r d p a r t f o r convenience of 
t h e u s e r s . A l i s t of abbrev ia t ed j o u r n a l s has been given 
along wi th t h e i r p l a c e of p u b l i c a t i o n and f requency. 
Another l i s t c o n s i s t i n g of the names of months and season 
i n abb rev ia t ed form t o g e t h e r wi th t h e i r f u l l form i s 
a l s o p rov ided . 
No subject index has been provided as bibliography 
i t s e l f arranged a lphabet ica l ly through subject headings. 
The l i b r a r i e s v i s i t ed^consu l t ing the Primary 
source are as £o l l owss -
1. Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Mjsliin Univers i ty 
Aligarh. 
2 . Centre of West Asian Studies Library, Aligarh 
Maslim Univers i ty , Aligarh. 
3 . Centre f o r s t r a t e f i c s t u d i e s , Aligarh Maslim 
Univers i ty , Aligarh. 
4 . Seminar Library of P o l i t i c a l Science Department, 
Aligarh Maslim Univers i ty , Aligarh. 
5. Indian Council of World Affairs Library, Sapru 
House, New Delh i . 
6. American centra Library, Kasturba Gandhi Marg, 
New Delhi . 
7 . B r i t i s h Council , Rafi Marg, New Delhi . 
8 . Nehru Library, Teen Hirt i House, New Delhi . 
The secondary sources consulted in Maulana Azad 
Library, A M.U., Aligarh to f ind the locat ion of a r t i c l e s 
a r e t -
1. Index India (Rajasthan Univers i ty Jaipur) , 
2 . Indian Press Index (Indian Documentation serv ice , 
Gu rgaon) 
3 . Internat ional Studies . 
4. Guide to Indian Periodical l i t e r a t u r e (Delhi 
Library Association) 
5. Social Science Index 
6. Time Index. 
PART ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
gl r r • ' - I •, 'S 3 < z U • 
^\ X i t si ; 
' ' " C A M • 
o 
Uj 
tt 
UJ 
UJ 
X 
(/I 
UJ 
o 
< £ 3 
-J < < 1-
u < 
X < 
I " 
a: H 
. (D 
X < 

X M T R O O U C T I O H 
HISTORICAL ACCOUNT 
South Asia contains a tremendous assortment of 
racial groups and subgroups, their ditributions appear-
ing to bear t i t t l e relationsto present national bounda-
of 
r i e s . The whole region i s the c luster/different countries, 
different in culture, traditions and languages , but 
sharing a common post; at h i s tor ica l experience of colonial 
rule. 
The f i r s t major breach in walls of co lonic . 
domination cane with peaceful ending of British rule in 
India in 1947 and the creation of the union of India the 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan as successor s t a t e s . 
Pakistan came into existence under quite unfavoura-
ble conditions. Circumstances that created the feel ings 
of mistrust between India and Pakistan were mostly due to 
the events %d)ich took place immediately after the partition, 
India's attitude towards Pakistan remained harsh and 
unsympathetic, ihey not only with held Pakistan's share 
of military supplies* but also denied Pakistan i t s share 
of cash balances. Ihe la t ter was released when Gandhi 
threatened to go on an indef inite fa s t . 
Relations between India and Pakistan became tense 
In 1949 t^en following the devaluation of the British 
pound s ter l ing v i s -a -v i s the American dollar* India 
similarly devalued her rupee and Pakistan did not. India 
was shocked with this decision of Pakistan and refused 
to pay the 30 percent higher price for Pakistan jute, 
cotton and food grains. 
RELATIONS BETHBEN any two sovereign countrL«s, 
especial ly tiiose between India and Pakistan %«hlch were 
bound together for cectdries by common history, cultural 
heritage and above a l l by inter-dependence of economy, 
could have become a model for good neighbourly relat ions . 
That this did not happen after India and Pakistan came Into 
being In 1947, after the British rulers had to handover 
power to the people of these t%#o covntries, i s in I t s e l f 
quite a disturbing fact of history. On the contrary «A)at 
has happeaed Isthat Indo-Pak relations have never been 
on an even keel except for a short period after the Simla 
Agreement had been signed in 1971. One abvlous explana-
tion for this i s that IndO-Pak relations did not and 
perhaps could not develop in the direction in which ttiey 
should have in the larger interests of the people of 
the two countries becavise the United India had been 
divided on the basis of the "two oaticxi" theory, n i l s 
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explanation, however* does not £ully eiqplaln the exist ing 
s tate of Indo-Pak relatldns, though this Is an Important 
factor. 
Relations between two Independent and sovereign 
countries are l ike sensit ive plants . They need constant 
care and have to be nurtured assiduously. What Is impor-
tant to note inthls connection i s that India and i t s top 
leaders acc^ted the partition of united India without 
any mental reservations because i t was realised that i t 
was not possibleto coerce# even with force* unwilling 
parts to remain within India* Such an action would lead 
s t r i f e 
to continiied internal/and turmoil and bring the progress 
of India to a s tands t i l l . On the other hand* the rulers 
of Pakistan had entert<alned further terr i tor ia l ambitions. 
In the mid^f ort ies the la te Sardar Abdur Rab Nlshtar, then 
president of the Pakistan Muslim league said* ** Pakistan 
botindaries are not what they r l ^ t l y ought to have bean. 
Halt a decade later , Chaudhry Mohammed Al l , Prime Minister 
of Pakistan, was reported by the Times of Karachi as 
having told a public meeting that* the freedom of 
Pakistan would not be complete tflthout Kashmir" and that 
i f * we avoid an open clash with Baharat on the Kashnlr 
issue, we wi l l have to resort to this unhappy measxures 
«rtien Bharat stops the supply of canal water to us from 
1951, If %»ar i s inevitable after three years, why not 
fight i t now. The open clash witii Bharat may occure 
in one, two or at the most three years. 
TRADB AND ECONOMIC 
Indo-Pak political and economic relations are 
characterised by a long series o£ accords and discords. 
The reasons for such a state of affairs can be traced 
to vize, geographical proximity, economic base, human 
race and military rlvalxy, besides other intangibles 
like the past history, ideological legacy, national 
interests and objectives, identity, image and status 
of conflict. The correlation ofthese forces provides 
a proper focus for understanding of relations between 
thetwo countries. 
As a geographical area, India is bigger than 
Pakistan by more ^an four times and terms of popula-
tion, it is by eight times. Because of her size, 
population and economic potentiatities, India is 
conscious of her strategic importance in Asia in 
Pedicular and in the world in general. India's economic 
structure is certainly sv^erior to that of Pakistan. 
However, Pakistan is better placed in agriculture, raw 
materials and food. Besides, a nuaber of other factors 
indicate that Pakistan is potentially a weaker nation 
than India. 
The mutual faith and trust has never appeared. 
However, one needs to note that the Indo-Pak relations 
were not alvrays a record of continued retrogression. 
In this process* Pakistan secured some coicessions form 
India with regard to canal waters settlement, evacuee 
property and financial issues. In such a hostile rela-
tionship, the economic issues remained subservient to 
the political objectives and goals. Trends in economic 
relationship closely followed those of political under-
standing. Therefore, there has been a see-saw in the 
economic relationship too. This backdrop %fill help us 
to analyse the economic relationship in its proper 
perspective. 
Economic relationship between India and Pakistan 
has been largely confined to trade interaction. The 
circumstances in v^ich Pakistan and India became inde-
pendent did not prove conducive to any harmonious 
ecoaomic and political relations between the two countries. 
Ho%iever, trade did exist between the two nations and 
continued till 1964-65, after which the trade relations 
were severely restricted because of the 1965 war. 
The Simla Agreement of 1972, tA)ich constituted 
on an enduring basis the normalisation of relations 
betifeen the two coxmtires, provided that * trade and 
G 
cooperation In economic and other agreed f ie lds wi l l be 
resuned as far as possible and that to this end delega-
tion from tiie two countires wi l l meet from time to time 
to work out the necessary detai l s" . The Indo^Pak trade 
linkstAiich were snapped abruptly in 1965 were re-estab-
lished in 1974, following the Simla Agreement Thereafter« 
a trade agreement was signed in January 1975 for three 
years. This agreeneit envisaged trade on a govemmoit-
to-govemmeit basis through s ta te trading agencies. 
The trade agreoaent signed in 1975 expired in 
1978. Since then, efforts to reach a new trade agreement 
were made but without much success. After the resumption 
of trade between the two countries from 1975-76 to 
1982-83, India did esqperience a surplus in the balance 
thrice and Pakistan f ive times. Mhen India constantly 
showed surplus in b i lateral trade for three successive 
year8« Pakistan government unilaterally stopped i t s 
private sector to import from India. This particular 
action swung the trade balance continuously in favour 
of Pakistan. The present exchange of commodities i s 
limited to a few items, India's exports to Pakistan 
largely consist of * 
Bidi Leaves, Medicinal herbs. Iron and Steel 
products, engineering items, Tyers and Tubes 
Iron Ore/ Metal Han\i£acture8# Stone and sand gravel* 
Cotton fabrics , Glass virare. 
During the 1983* some of the additional items that 
were exported included betel leaves^ seamless. Latex, 
valve bladder, aluminium phosphate tablets, fresh ginger, 
onions and tea. 
India*s imports from Pakistan comprise largely t 
Naphtha, Furnace oil. Rock salt. Pig iron. Fruits and 
vegetables, crude fertilisers and crude minerals, crude 
vegetable materials. 
An efforts have been made by the Indian private 
sector as well as the government to nozmalise trade 
relation %fith Pakistan. It has been identified that 
India can offer as many items as covered in the free list 
of iRqports by Pakistan. These include t 
Artificial limbs, hearing aids and parts thereof. 
Ball-point pens and refills thereof and parts, 
and fountain pen nibs. Carbon ribbon for electric 
typewriters, Da^ iture powder. Drugs and medicines. 
Dry battery cells. Duplicating stencils. Electric 
lamps (bulbs only). Journal magazines, periodicals 
and daily newspapers. Locks, Musical instruments. 
Painter's material. Shaving soap. Record players 
and records. Safety helmets of fiber glass/pla«itic. 
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shoe laces . Stationery, Watches and Clocks, X-ray 
films and plates , Bidl leaves. Book binding cloth. 
Chemicals, Egg trays of paper. Pood colours, 
flavours and essences. Glass bot t l e s . Jute goods, 
Leatherand products thereof, Uinbrella f i t t i n g s . 
Maintenance spares for domestic and car a ir -
conditioners. Needles, Tyres and Txibes, Air-
conditioners (Demestic). 
a!he Pakistan Delegation vAiich v i s i ted India in 
November 1981 evinced Interest in exports to India for 
the following products s Naphtha, Cotton (short s tep le ) ; 
Dry dates; Medicinal herbs; Rock s l a t ; Furnace o i l , 
SteAl, particularly reinforced for general use; Stainless 
s tee l utens i l s ; switch boards. 
India and Pakistan could also e f fect ive ly coqperate 
in trade in t e x t i l e s in the %#orld market. The t e x t i l e 
trade of the two countries at the global level i s governed 
by Multi-Fibre Arrangements, The industrial cooperation 
may also take place betweoi India and Pakistani firms in 
tyres andtubes, casting and forgings, machine- tools . 
Chemicals electronic goodsand automobile spare parts . 
Dialogues between India and Pakistan both of the 
government and at the business level are afoot. But i t 
i s the shedding of natural suspicion, distrust and 
y 
recrimination Which will pave the way for a gmentlng 
trade exchanges between the two neighbouring countries. 
Ihe Indo-Pak bilateral trade can grow with a sense o£ 
objactivity and commonality of interests witiiin the 
frame work of national priorities. If trade relations 
have to be normalised« both the countries should adhere 
to the principles of non-discrimination and mutual gains. 
The adoption of trade deflection to the Indo-Pak commer-
cial reality is one major possibility. Both the count-
ries should arrange trade fairs to project the image 
of their products ^idh they would like to sell in eaCh 
others' market. 
FOREIGN POLIOf 
Pakistan's policy towards India over the years 
has passed through a number of phases. However* it has 
all along been guided by suspicion. Jealousy and hatred 
towards India this vitiated outlook of Pakistan's rulers 
naturally gave them %^ich have determined theforeign 
policy of Pakistan* especially its attitude towards India, 
are the need to maintain a dictatorship or semi-indepen-
dence of thecountry fed no foreign aid, which almost 
entirely cfGimes from the Western caa^* the bulk coming 
from the J^. This peculiar feature of Pakistani, unlike 
•0 
India's, can be \mdierstood i f one keeps In mind that the 
departiire ofthe British rulers l e f t a p o l i t i c a l vac jn 
in the terr i tor ies i4ilch now comprise Pakistan, particu-
larly those areas which provide the p o l i t i c a l e l i t e to 
the country* that i s , Punjab. The areas tAiich constitute 
Pakistan now or even before the ^ ration of -die Bangla-
desh %#ere predominantly agrarian. 
Nonetheless, i t i s s ignif icant that .%d. thin three 
to four months after Pakistan had come into being, a 
struggle between anti- imperial ist and secular minded 
people on one hand and pro-imperialist and fundamenta-
l i s t forces on the other hand begun. Jinnah's dilemma 
arose out o€ this contradiction. Jinnah seriously considered 
at one stage the poss ib i l i ty of declaring the Muslim 
League a secular party and changing i t s nameto the 
Pakistan National League. Ihe fact was disclosed by 
the then left-wing d ^ l y , Pakistan Times, Later th i s 
fact %ias corroborated by Mian Iftekhar-ud-din, founder 
of Pakistan Times andthe \irdu daily Imroz. However, the 
secular and anti- imperial ist trend in Pakistan's pol i ty 
was too weak to assert i t s e l f . 
Ttie period between 1947 and 1953 was characterised 
by a foxmative stage in the evolution of Pakistan's 
power structure. Though Pakistan's Leaders claimed 
during this period that they were following a policy of 
nonallgnra«it, the descr ipt ion was nisLeading. I t i s 
txue tha t in t h i s period Pakistan «ras not l inked %fith 
mi l i t a ry blocs through mi l i t a ry a l l i a n c e s . At a meeting 
in West Pakistan in Hgrch 1951, Liaguat Al l Khan s t a t ed 
t h a t Pakistan was not t i e d to the apron s t r i n g s of the 
Anglo-American b loc , nor vras she a caoip follower of the 
communist b loc , Pakistan, he claimed had voted in the 
United Nations sometime with the na s t em bloc and a t 
o thers Mitti the conmtmist b loc . A c lose r look i n to t ha t 
per iod however* reveals t h a t the pol icy of Pakistan was 
f a r from «^at no alignment connotes, This was the period 
lihen Pakistan was waging a war to wrest Kashmir from India. 
After the J innah 's death and Liaquat A l l ' s asssa-
ss lna t ion , Pak is tan ' s foreign pol icy and i t s r e l a t i o n s 
with India under-went a dramatic change. 
In the pos t Jlnnah and pos t Liaquat per iod a 
nvnber of changes took place in Pakistan t h a t gradually 
drew Pakistan c lose r to the United S t a t e s , In 1954, a 
m i l i t a r y agreement between Pakistan and USA was signed. 
This was followed by a mi l i t a ry a l l i ances between Pakis-
tan and Turkey the l a t t e r having already become one of 
the s igna tor ies ofthe SSATO. In fac t , the US s t a t e 
department was not averse to giving Pakistan a long rope 
and allowing in to f launt the Chinese ' a l l i a n c e * . I t 
was f e l t in Washington tha t t h i s might, on the one hand. 
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have the wholesome effect of knocking sense into India 
v^ile on the other i t was calculated to help USA to sake 
inroads into such regions of Africa and Asia as were 
res ist ing US pressure. 
In the mid-sixties Pakistan had taken great pains 
to publicise i t s sympathies for other Muslim countries, 
with the exception of Turkey and Iran \i^ich were raenibers 
of CS^ TTO, did not favourably respondto Pakistani approaches. 
However, the hypooricy and doiible dealing whic^ made of 
Pakistan's attitude towards India from the midfift ies to 
the early s i x t i e s was exposed in a well reasoned govern-
molt of India publication ent i t led s "Aggression on 
Kashmir". I t i s relevant to quote from this document 
because i t s basic thesis holds good even today, in the 
mid-eighties perhaps with greater vigour than when i t 
had been written. This also wi l l enable us to analyse 
why Pakistani aggression on India took place in 1965 and 
how i t was direct ly related to the new emerging axis 
betwen Pakistan and America on the one hand and Pakistan 
and Qiina al l iance on the other. 
Dealing with Indo-Pakistan talks h&ld at the end 
of 1962 and the beginning of 1963 i t says % 
"During these talks , pakistan l ike China, tried to 
make a virture of aggression and demanded tjhat t^e Kashmir 
"S 
i s s u e should be so lved on the b a s i s of the cornplete 
surrender by India . Unmindful of the r e a l i t i e s of the 
s i tuat ion^ l e g a l or cons t i tu t iona l r ight s and any sense 
of equity , the Pakistan delegat ion claimed the whole of 
Jamnu and Kashmir, except f o r a small packet of about 
3,000 square miles in the southern Part of the s t a t e . 
I t i s not surpris ing that the patent absurdity of the 
claim and the unusual axguments pat forward t o sustain 
i t should eventual ly have wrecked the t a l k s . 
KASHMIR 
Of a l l the i s s u e s div iding India and Palcistan, 
the Kashmir dispute has proved to be the most tenac ious . 
Kashmir has prompted three wars between the two countr ies 
and s t i l l remains the major obs tac l e t o a peace s e t t l e -
ment in the sub-continent* 
After the Indian government had announced in 
Deceiriber 1947 that i t would place i t s dispute with Pak-
i s t a n before the U.N. Security counc i l . The U.N. arran-
ged a tenuous c e a s e f i r e between the b e l l i g e e n t s , but by 
that time the t e r r i t o r y of Kashmir had inf act been 
divided i n t o Indian and Pakistani contro l l ed port ions . 
In defending t h e i r version of the United Nations de l ibera -
t i o n s and dec i s ions both India and Pakistan tend to s t r e s s 
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different p a ^ s of the relevant 1948-1949 docutoents. Since 
the resolutions comadt both nations on specif ic matters^r 
various conditions have to be met by both of the interes-
ted parties before the confl ict can be se t t l ed . 
The interest of Pakistan in Kashmir i s not only 
ideological . I t has other interests too* one of which i s 
economic. Economically speaking, Pakistan depends on the 
waters of the Indus for i t s irr igat ion. I t has been a 
constant fear to Pakistani leaders that India would exploit 
t h i s potontial and their fear were confirmed in the times 
of c r i s i s in 1948 and 1965. Religious and cultural a f f i -
n i ty i s also one of the factors that has injected a strong 
fee l ing of emotionalism among the people. 
Another equally iirportant factor i s the strategic 
position of Kashmir for Pakistan in i t s relations with 
India. Afghanistan and China. During the f i r s t war in 
Kashmir, Pakistan fought desperately to retain the nor-
theim areas in order to prevent India from gaining 
territory which would provide a link with Afghanistan. 
Pakistan, disturbed by i t s a l l y ' s attitude, which was 
acting in opposition to her national interests began to 
change her national po l ic ies infavour of China fearing 
that both the USSR and US would support India's p o l i t i -
cal and military needs while undermining her own, Pakistan 
0 
recognizad Chinese claims t o northern Ladakh. In return, 
she received from China the acknowledgement the other 
parts o£ Kashmir irightfully belonged t o Pakistan. 
Thus p o l i t i c a l forces vrithin and outs ide of India, 
Pakistan and uni ted Nations have made any l e g a l o r p o l i t i -
ca l sett lement of the manifold Kashmir dispute even more 
d i f f i c u l t to r e a l i z e . Noless than three major wars (1948 
1965, 1971) involving Kashmir and innumerable skirmishes 
and c e a s e f i r e v i o l a t i o n s have kept a l i v e the Pakis tani -
Indian h o s t i l i t i e s . India and Pakistan have t r i e d to 
s e t t l e the dispute through negot ia t ions but these f a i l e d 
t o o . 
CREATION OP EAST PAKISTAN 
Pakistan d i f f e r s from most o ther Asian s t a t e s which 
a t ta ined independence a f t er the second world war in that 
i t i s not merely a cblonial successor s t a t e but the portion 
of a co lon ia l successor s t a t e . B r i t a i n ' s India empire was 
par t i t ioned in such a way that the Muslim majority areas 
in and contiguous t o Punjab and Bengal were joined t o g e -
ther in one p o l i t i c a l e n t i t y , Pakistan#west Pakistan and 
East Pakistan, apart from Islam, had very l i t t l e in common 
with each other . The union between the two parts was an 
uneasy one from the beginning. The ? a s t Pakistan had 
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complaints about the unequal d i s t r ibut ion of economic 
resources between the two wings of Pakistan. They 
accuiad the west Pakistani of e x p l o i t a t i o n . The cap i ta l 
of the country was in western part . Most government 
o f f i c i a l s came from the west . The army was made up of 
west Pakistani9#the major portion comprised of the Pub-
Jabis yet a majority of Pakistanis (55 percent) l i v e d 
in the Bast. 
Despite these d i f f erences , the f r a g i l e union con-
tinued u n t i l 1969 when the government of General Ayub Khan 
co l lapsed as a r e s u l t of a mass movement seeking h i s over 
throw and restorat ion of democracy. Ayub Khan handed over 
power to another mi l i tary general« Yahya Khan. The 1970 
general e lec t ions were the f i r s t ever held in Pakistan on 
the b a s i s of univeraal adult f ranchise . These e l e c t i o n s 
showed that none of the p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s was popular in 
both wings of Pakistan. The At^ ami league hadi mass support 
in both Pakistan and the Pakistan people Party had strong 
support in the West. 
SHEIKH WJIBUR RAHMAN, THE AWAMI LEAGUE, AND TPffi NATIONAL 
MOVEMENT IN EAST PAKISTiW. 
The post e l e c t i o n period in Pakistan brought three 
major powers to the forefront which had to d i c t a t e the 
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course of the events in i t s h i s t o r y . The Yahya Khan 
regime. The Awami League* and the people ' s party were 
t o f ind a so lut ion of the pioblen which became d i f f i c u l t 
due to the divergent and c o n f l i c t i n g nature of t h e i r 
p o l i c i e s . President Yahya Khan tr iggered the c r i s i s when 
he announced the postponement of the National Assenbly*s 
s e s s i o n to be convened in Dacca. The Awami League, p e r c i e -
ving t h i s as a de l iberate attempt to disregard popular 
mandate f o r Bengali autonomy, launched a campaign of c i v i c 
d isobedience . 
Sheikh Hi Jib at t h i s point was under great pressure 
the rad ica l s of h i s own party to declare independence. He 
r e s i s t e d that pressure f o r the time being and decided t o 
adopt a middle course. He launched a non v i o l e n t non-coo-
peration aovement which gave him the opportunity to force 
the regime to accept h i s terms, faced with Ma J i b ' s de 
f a c t o assuaoption of power Yahya Khan came t o Dacca to talk 
with him in order to finalies tiie so lut ion of the c r i s i s . 
After f i v e days of continous t a l k s , Yahya Khan and the 
Awami League agreed on a draft proclamation to be i s sued 
by Yahya Khan f o r an interim arrangement f o r a t rans fer 
of power. Bhutto suggested d irec t negot ia t ions with 
Sheikh Mujib but h i s request did not get any at tent ion 
from the Awami league which was now under heavy pressures 
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to dec lare Independence as the non-cooperation movemebt 
had conpleted I t s one month. The Avaml leagae pressed 
the govemm^it f o r quick acceptance o£ i t s draft proposal . 
He ordered ttoiBHnediate arrest of Awani league l eaders and 
d irec ted the army to crush the s e c e s s i o n i s t movein^it and 
res tore f u l l authority to the c^ i t ra l goTremment. Thus 
was begun the c i v i l war which l e d t o the end of a un i ted 
Pakistan. 
DBTBRIORATION OP THB RBLATIOM BBTWSSN INDIA MID PAKISTNi 
Relations between India and Pakistan, already tense , 
e s c a l a t e d sharply as a re su l t of the c i v i l war in Sast 
Pakistan, I t s tar ted with acrimonious exchange of notes 
between the two countr ies and t o numerous chaurges and 
couhter chaxges by each s i d e . The immediate aftermath 
of the c i v i l war in Bast Pakistan was mass i n f l u x of re fu-
gees was one of the reasons that drew India i n t o the c i v i l 
c o n f l i c t and l e d t o the war. By mid-Jbly, Mrs. Gandhi 
had evidence that a war ti lth Pakistan %fould be cheaper 
than thet economic burden of coping with the refugee 
problem f o r a s i n g l e year, fac ing t h i s s i t u a t i o n , the 
most des irable fore ign po l i cy goal f o r India was t o create 
a 9(kparate s t a t e in Bast Pakistan. Such a s t a t e would be 
able to take back the mi l l i ons of refugees , r e l i e v i n g 
the economic and administrat ive burden they imposed on 
India . Such es ta te would have the addit ional bene f i t f o r 
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India by reducing Pakis tan's power and thus i t s a b i l i t y 
t o threaten India secuirlty. India began a s e r i e s o£ d ip-
lomatic and mi l i tary moves that by themselves might have 
persuaded the Pakis tan' to allow Bangladesh i t s independance, 
but , i f not , would a l so serve as preparations f o r a war with 
Pakistan t o accomplish the sas» goa l . The Indian main 
attack ev ident ly was deUber a te ly delayed u n t i l l a t e f a l l , 
when pz^arat ions were completed and the winter snow had 
c l o s e d the Himalayan passes , preventing any Chinese 
a s s i s t a n c e t o Pakistan. The war i t s e l f began on Deceicber 
3 , 1971, and l a s t e d two weeks u n t i l the cease f i r e on 
Dec, 17, 1971. Indian recognit ion of Bangladesh* provi -
s ional government came on Dec. 6. By t h i s time the 
s i t u a t i o n was o i t i r e l y in the hands of the Indian army. 
The Indian army chief of s t a f f . General Manekshaw, on 
Dec. 7 asked the Pakistan Army in East Pakistan t o surren-
der "before i t was too l a t e . F i n a l l y , on the morning of 
Dec. 16, General Niazi accepted the Indian terms of 
Surrender. 
THE SIMLA MEETING : DEMittiDS AND EXPECTATIONS OF INDIA 
AND PAKISTAN IN THE SIMLA SUMMIT 
The Tashkent Agreement of 1966 and the Simla Agree-
ment of 1972 were the watermark in normalising the r e l a t i o n s 
between thetwo countr ie s . The Simla Agreement of Jlily 1972 
put both India and Pakistan on a path of a gradual normali-
za t ion of t h e i r r e l a t i o n s . 
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Talks with India at Slnda were not expected to 
be easy . Considering the strong Indian pos i t i on at the 
negot ia t ing table« i t was not beyond expectat ions that 
India could conae tip with the idea of s igning a no-war 
pact . This concept to out law the use of war, whi le 
Indo-Pakistan d isputes remained unexpected to be a tough 
point of d iseuss ion at Simla Bhuttos stand on Kashmir 
used t o be gi i i te unbending. 
"We have fought three wars on Kashmir. We cannot 
forge t the Kashmir d ispute . B v ^ i f we forget the Kashmir 
d i spute , the people of Kashmir w i l l not f o r g e t i t ." I t was 
the f i r s t India-PakistaD dialogue at the h ighest l e v e l 
s ince the Tashkent meeting. 
THB SIMLA JCCORD-TBXT OF THE AGRBBMBNT COMPARISON OF THB 
TASHKENT M9D SlfC^A AGREEMENTS. 
The meeting l a s t e d f o r f i v e days. At that time i t 
appeared that the suinnit would end in f a i l u r e . However, 
a f t e r much arguementation on both s i d e s , exchange of 
numerous draf t s , and a l a s t minute pr ivate meeting between 
Bhutto and Mrs. Gandhi an agreement was reached in July 
2, 1972. 
ANALYSIS OF THE AGREEMENT AND ITS COMPARISON WITH THE 
TASHKENT A:X:ORD. 
The Simla agreement was s igned under the circumstances 
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when Pakistan was reduced in i t s s i ze a£ter losing I t s 
East %flng. Under these circumstances* Pakistan was with 
out any ef fect ive bargaining power, India had fu l l 
control of the s i tuat ion. The Tashkent and Simla agree-
ments were signed In ^ i t l re ly different circumstances. 
In 1965, the f ighting was limited to West Pakistan, 
whereas in 1971 the war engulfed both the wings and 
resulted In the separation of the Bastem wing Pakistan, 
and Indian Positions in the two meetings were different. 
NORMilLISATION OF RELATIONS 
If we compare the two agreem«its, the Prime objective 
in the ir problems to be foubd i s the nozmalizatlon of 
relat ions between the two countties. One thing common 
betwe«) both agreements i s that the settlement of basic 
Issues was l e f t for future negotiations between the two 
countries. 
Both these agreements were desciribed as " no war 
pacts * and subjected to strong crit ic ism. 
Kashmir Isthe pivot to India-Pakistan relat ions. 
I t c learly emerges that the two sides agreed to diaagiree 
on Kashmir but resolved to work on a permanent solution 
for the pix>blem. However, neither India nor Pakistan 
formally abandoned the ir claims to Kashmir, which was 
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declared to be a dispated i s s u e . Despite certa in bas i c 
d i f f erences both agremients contain jibout the same mater-
i a l on peace and harmony In the r e l a t i o n s between t%io 
c o u n t r i e s . Both envisage s teps t o be taken t o normalize 
r e l a t i o n s and most c:r l t lcal of a l l* both l eave the 
Kashmir dispute unsolved. 
IMPLBMEKTATIOM OF THB SIMLA AGRBSMEKT 
Signing of the accord was Just a small s tep towards 
the completion of the most d i f f i c u l t task that was yet 
to be dea l t wi th . Thoughthe f o r m a l i t i e s involved in i t s 
r a t i f i c a t i o n were carr ied out quickly* some d i f f i c u l t i e s 
arose at thetime of i t s inplementatlon. Contrary to the 
Simla agreement, India made the withdrawal of f o r c e s 
along the in ternat iona l border condit ional upon agreement 
on the l i n e of control in Kashmir. 
India moved further and emphasized the r«noval 
of UN observers . Removal of UN observers would not only 
have strengthened i t s posit ion* but a l so would have 
thrown the Kashmir question in to co ld s torage . 
Pakistan refused to accept t h i s condi t ion . I t 
seemed that the Simla agreement was Just impossible to 
carry out . There was no f l e x i b i l i t y in the a t t i t u d e s 
of the two countr ies on the matter. 
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The matter was s e t t l e d a f t er long d i scuss ions and as 
l a t e r on declared by both the governments, the diapjite 
was so lved by the s p i r i t of *• g ive and take ". 
The roost important and at the some time very d i f f i -
c u l t problem faced by Pakistan was re la ted to the return 
of i t s prisoners of war. The question of the re l ease of 
the POWs was complicated by three factors* 
(1) While the Indian Government was prepared to exchange 
the prisoners taken on the Western front , Pakistan pressed 
f o r the re l ease of a l l pr isoners , 
(2) As the Pakistani forces in East Pakistan had 
surrendered to a "joint" Indian-Bangladesh command, India 
contended that the prisoners could not be re leased with-
out the concurrence of Bangladesh, and i n s i s t e d that 
Pakistan must s e t t l e the question through t r i l a t e r a l 
n e g o t i a t i o n s a f t er recognizing the new s t a t e , and 
(3) The Bangladesh goventent 's in tent ion to try a 
number of the prisoners f o r a l l eged war crimes. 
RBCOGNITION OF BANGLADESH 
The recognit ion of Bangladesh was a highly emotional 
i s s u e f o r Pa3cistan President Bhutto was personal ly in 
favour of recognit ion yet the took time in explaining the 
pros and cons of tWs action to his country men. Actually he was 
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loolcing f o r some proper time at which the dec i s ion would 
aroase as l i t t l e opposit ion as p o s s i b l e f roin the general 
p a b l i c . The occasion f o r such an action turned out to 
be the Is lamic sununit meeting held at Lahore in February 
1974. 
The accord signed at Simla was not an easy one to 
implement. But a f t e r resolv ing the complicated I s sues 
of troops withdrawal and return of the Prisoners of war, 
i t was esq^ected that other i s s u e s l i k e diplomatic r e l a t i o n s 
resun^tion of trade, and posta l and coinnunication s e r v i c e s 
would not be d i f f i c u l t to t a c k l e , Bven the most cruc ia l 
and emotional i s s u e of the recognit ion of Bangladesh had 
been resolved. Pakistan succes s fu l l y mobilized world 
opinion against nuclear weapons in India and got assurance 
against an Indian nuclear threat . Having done t h i s , Pakis-
tan showed a w i l l i n g n e s s to s t a r t negot ia t ions on implemen-
t a t i o n s of other phases of the Simla accord. 
ResureptloD of trade was a major achievement based 
on the Simla agreement, as the trade r e l a t i o n s had been 
cut off s ince the 1965 war. Though the Tashk^at declarat ion 
provided f o r i t s resumptions, i t never h^pened because of 
I n f l e x i b l e a t t i t u d e s by both s i d e s . 
RELATIONS IN 1970* S 
Since the return of the POWs, the exxhange of t h e i r 
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respec t ive c i t i z e n s between Pakistan and Bangladesh, and 
the recognit ion o f the l a t t e r by Pakistan, Indo-Pakistan 
r e l a t i o n s were qu i te correc t . I n d i a ' s detonation of a 
nuclear device on May 18, 1974, did not a l t e r the in tent ion 
of be t t er ing future r e l a t i o n s , nor did D e l h i ' s dec is ion 
t o make Kashmir an ordinary s t a t e within the Indian union. 
I t i s truethat in both ins tances , Bhutto made statements 
c r i t i c a l of the Indian government. But h i s publ ic dec lara-
t i o n s were meant primarily for donest ic consumption, 
intended to pacify h i s audiences. 
Pakistan under Bhutto's l eadership (1972-77) t r i e d 
t o move with the times* Real iz ing that the o l d m i l i t a n t 
a t t i t u d e towards India would not p r o f i t him or h i s couhtry, 
he onphasized reducing o ld enmities whi le maMng new 
f r i e n d s . For roorethan two decades, Pakistan had haz±>oured 
the notion, that i t was the equal of India, desp i t e that 
country's vast numerical super ior i ty . As a r e s u l t , succ-
e s s i v e Pakistani governments assumed an aggress ive posture 
towards India that made any kind of meaningful accommoda-
t ion d i f f i c u l t . 
Since July 5,1977, Pakistan came under another s p e l l 
of martial law. South Asia saw a brand of population in 
the early 1970s. Prom Colombo to New Delhi and from Islama-
bad to Dacca, regimes were swet>t i n t o o f f i c e and stayed in 
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power by aroaslng the expectat ions of the masses through 
l e f t i s t s logans and progranmes. Aimed f o r c e s of Pakistan, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y the airmy, have played a dominant ro l e in the 
country s ince i t s e x i s t e n c e . They have been engaged in 
four armed c o n f l i c t s with India in 40 years . Normalization 
of r e l a t i o n s i s taking place slowly but s t e a d i l y . The 
process has been s tar ted by the exchange of v i s i t o r s . 
Ef forts have been made by both countries to provide v i s a 
f a c i l i t i e s to people to trave l e a s i l y in both countr i e s . 
To create good w i l l and to ease tens ion , hockey and c r i -
cket teams of India and Pakistan have exchanged v i s i t s . 
On the diplomatic scene, I n d i a ' s External Minister, 
A.M. Vajpayee's v i s i t to Pakistan in February 1978 was 
the most important development. He was t h e f i r s t Indian 
Foreign Minister with a pause of 14 years to come to 
Pakistan to nego t ia t e with h i s PaJcistan counterpart on 
matters of mmtual i n t e r e s t . Besides e3q>loring the p o s s i -
b i l i t i e s of improving trade, both s i d e s showed ke^n i n t e r e s t 
in promoting exchanges in various f i e l d s l i k e cu l ture and 
s p o r t s . An important top ic which came under d iscuss ion 
r e l a t e d to the Salaidam project on the Chenab River in 
Jamimi and Kashmir. The ta lks resu l ted in an agreement. 
The good w i l l generated by the normalization of r e l a t i o n s 
between the two countr ies in mid s event i e s was not allowed 
t o su f f er a setback during that decade which witnessed in ter -
nal changes in governments in both countr i e s . 
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PROSPECTS OF RELATION BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN 
The e v o i t s o£ 1971 culminating In the separation 
of Bast Pakistan from West Pakistan rad ica l ly transformed 
the very character of the Pakistan s t a t e . As a re su l t of 
the l o s s of the East wing» Pakistan f o r the f i r s t time in 
i t s h i s tory i s on the threshold of evolving a v i a b l e 
nat ional i d e n t i t y f o r i t s e l f based on t e r r i t o r i a l terms. 
The s igning of the Simla agreement has ushered in a new 
era of peace through b i l a t e r a l negot ia t ions in t h i s trou-
b led subcontinent. The optimism regarding Indo-Pakistan 
r e l a t i o n s i s a lso due to the es tabl i shnent of a new power 
equil ibrium in South Asia. 
The prospects of an Indo-Pakistan detente , which 
emerged from the Simla agreement in 1972« are reasonably 
good. I t s progress depends primarily on the development 
of p o l i t i c a l t r u s t in each other by the ;rul ing e l i t e of 
India and Pakistan. Unfortunately, t h i s has always been 
lacking in the Indo-Pakistan r e l a t i o n s h i p . 
With Pakistan reduced in s i z e and inroi l i tary power— 
even l e s s of a match f o r India than before—Indians and 
Indian po l i cy makers need not see Pakistan as a threat 
t o t h e i r s e c u r i t y . For the f i r s t time s ince 1947, and 
p a r t i c u l a r l y s ince 1954 when Pakistan's m i l i t a r i e s were 
augmented by i t s mi l i tary a l l i a n c e with the United S t a t e s , 
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the Indian makers can take a r e l a t i v e l y zrelaxed view of 
In do-Pakistani r e l a t i o n s . This assessment means a return 
t o normality in Indian re f l exes towards Pakistani moves. 
DEFENCE RELATIONS AND ATTIIUDE OF BIG POWERS TOWARDS 
INDIA AND PAKISTAN 
After the p a r t i t i o n in 1947 the atmosphere of 
susp ic ion , quarrel and c o n f l i c t between India and Pakistan 
drew the at tent ion of non-regional countr ies t o t h e i r 
develojxnents. The external major power's involvement 
in South Asian region was sometimes re la ted d i r e c t l y to 
t h e i r regional i n t e r e s t s in the Subcontinent* but more 
after they were related to their larger goals of Inter-
national competition and domination. Their interests and 
related moves were further complicated by Indo-Pakistan 
relations and often made the regional cold war very 
b i ^ e r and severe. 
Pakistan also sees a threat to her security in 
foreign military assistance to India. •The only conclusion 
one can draw i s that Pakistan's real aim in opposing the 
supply of aims to India i s to strengthen China's military 
might, whatever the consequences'*. 
An important factor agitating both foreign and 
defence policy in India i s the strong rumour that a 
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rev i sed version of CENTO i s being revived. I t i s in the 
context of such developments in t h i s region that Pakistan 
President General Zia-ul-Haq*s stat^nent that there was 
no p o s s i b i l i t y of b e t t e r r e l a t i o n s between India and 
Pakistan u n t i l l the i r r i t a n t of Kashmir i s out of the 
way^ has to be s e o i , 
Whatever the element of truth in these reports , 
Indian po l i cy makers w i l l have to reso lve many a t r i c k l y 
point in t h e i r future negot ia t ions with Pald.stan« the 
chief among them being Ind ia ' s own national i n t e r e s t s 
and secur i ty problems. In t h i s connection i t i s relevant 
to r e c a l l what Prime Minister India Gandhi t o l d an Ameri-
can Journal is t in early 1982, She had sa id: "The present 
US administration has sa id that the guns can be f i r e d in 
any d i r e c t i o n . We have no doubt that those guns equipment 
are meant to be used against India*. Another in^ortant 
development which has taken place in Pakistan i s that i t 
has embarked on the path of mi l i tary buildup on an unpre-
cedented s c a l e . 
ANALYSIS OP THE ATTITUDE AND INTERESTS OP BIG POWERS IN 
THE REGION 
The c r i t i c a l f a c t o r in the internat ional p o l i t i c s 
of South Asia has been the power balance and the general 
30 
r e l a t ionsh ip between India and Pakistan, Paki starts capacity 
to challenge and attempt to reverse the south Asian United 
S ta tes and China has been reduced grea t ly a f t e r the events 
of 1970-71. Washington has also rea l ized tha t i t cannot 
c u r t i a l soviet influence in South Asia by p i t t i n g a 
h o s t i l e Pakistan against Ind ia . Such an American s t ra tegy 
would only r e su l t as i t had done in the past in driving 
India fur ther towards the Soviet Union in an attempt to 
r e s to re any Indo-Pakistani balance upset by American 
ac t ions . 
Therefore, in the f ina l analys is , while American 
policy towards Pakistan would in par t be shaped by t h i s 
l a t t e r* s proximity to the o i l - r i c h Gulf and i t s capacity 
to enhance American i n t e r e s t s in tha t s t r a t e g i c region 
the American i n t e r e s t in Pakistan i s bound to be l imi ted 
by consideration of the advance ef fec ts at might have on 
American i n t e r e s t s in India and the r e s t of Asia. In 
China has been the main suppl ier of arms to Pakistan 
a f t e r 1971. In addition to tha t , i t s p o l i t i c a l support 
to Islamabad i s not a s ec re t . But China would also be 
cautions in encouraging Pakis tan ' s ant i Indian sentiments 
beyon a cer ta in l i m i t , because t h i s would only push 
India fu r ther i n t o the Soviet "orb i t* . 
As f a r as the t h i r d major power, the U.S.S.R, i s 
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concerned, i t has, s ince the mid-1950s, t r a d i t i o n a l l y as 
adopted a pro-Indian s tance . I t has no reason to prevent 
the emergence of good r e l a t i o n s between India and Pakistan 
i n f a c t , Moscow Would welcome the idea s ince i t may help 
t o when away Pakistan from China and United S t a t e s . 
No war pact i s an important const i tuent of the Simla 
Agreement. The agreement c l e a r l y l a y s i t down that " the 
two countr ies are resolved to s e t t l e t h e i r d i f f erences by 
peaceful means through negot ia t ions and that* the bas ic 
i s s u e s and causes of c o n f l i c t " sha l l be resolved through 
•peaceful means* and that ^he two countr ies "will refrain 
from the threat or use of force against the t e r r i t o r i a l 
i n t e g r i t y or p o l i t i c a l independence of each other . 
PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR CAPABILITY MfD INDIA'S RSSPONSB 
Pakistan has been s t e a d i l y preparing both i t s own 
people and the outs ide world about need to go nuclear. 
The former fore ign Minister Agha Shahi spoke about the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of the Soviet Union deploying nuclear weapons 
in jii^anistan and South West Asia becoming a nuclear b a t t l e 
f i e l d . The Pakistani ambition to go nuclear i s a lso a 
matter of nat ional consensus in that country. ;^art from 
these f a c t o r s there i s the well-known explanation f o r 
c e t t a i n countries going nuclear jxit forward by the American 
s t r a t e g i c coranfiunity. The announcement of reaching 
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enrichment c a p a b i l i t y i t s e l f i s a f i r s t major s tep in 
t h i s s t ra tegy . This s trategy has several ser ious impl i -
c a t i o n s f o r conventional war in Indo-Pakistan context 
and t h i s perhaps i s the most important area deserving of 
a t tent ion by our mi l i tary planners. With a nuclear Pakis-
tan even i f i t i s in possess ion oo3yaE two or three crude 
uranium boRft>s« any conventional super ior i ty of India v i s -
a v i s that country w i l l l o s e rouch of i t s s i g n i f i c a n c e . 
The Indian defence planner has to take i n t o account the 
r i s k s in having h i s forces concentrated e s p e c i a l l y on 
Pakistani s o i l . 
I t i s obviously not in I n d i a ' s i n t e r e s t to become an 
overt nuclear weapon powers in response to Pakistani po l i cy 
of anibivalance f o r that i t s e l f w i l l provide PaScistan a 
J u s t i f i c a t i o n t o declare i t s e l f a nuclear weapon power. 
The Palcistani s trategy of ambivalence and impression that 
i t has reached the s tage of producing a weapon by announ-
cing i t s« enrichment c a p a b i l i t y . 
RELATIONS IN 1980* S 
Last y e a r ' s hopes of a Thaw in Indo-Pakistan r e l a -
t i o n s have faded away at l a s t . The two countr ies are now 
back to t h e i r usual no war-no peace r e l a t i o n s h i p . New Delhi 
se^ns reconci led t o the view that i t has managed to get 
along without normalisation with Islamabad so f a r and can 
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continue to do so for the for seeable future. 
The hopes of a break through in bi lateral t i e s 
had reached Iheir height at the end of l a s t year follow-
ing a series of events. The two sides also agreed to 
hold several meetings of o f f i c i a l s to develop cooperation 
on a series of Issues to pave the way for bi lateral nor-
malization. New Delhi complained that Islamabad was not 
sincere in i t s professed aim to normalise t i e s . For 
instance Indian Finance Minister V.P. Singh and his counter 
part Mahbubul Haq, while discussing trade promotion in 
Jan, 1986, agreed in principle that bi lateral tradeHlmited 
to a mere 41 items, should be expanded to about 200 items 
i n i t i a l l y and a l l restr ict ions should be abolished even-
tual ly . Planned follow up meetings of bureaucrats to 
f a c i l i t a t e trade, however, did not take place. 
Also in January, the Indian defence secretary went 
to Pakistan to discuss a dispute over the Siacha:i glacier 
in northern Kashmir where clashes betwe^i the two armies 
had occurred ear l ier . Both sides agreed not to use force 
to change the military status quo in that area. But India 
complained that Pakistan was not even wil l ing to reiterate 
th i s understanding during subsequent ta lks . Intermittent 
clashes in the Siachen area have continued since. 
India has also noted that after remaining s i l ent 
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f o r years , Pakistan ra ised the Kashmir i s s u e at the UN 
General Ass^ttoly t h i s year leading to a rebuttal by the 
Indian de legat ion . Another bone of contention i s Sikh 
terrorism in the s t a t e of Punjab, Asserting that more 
than 90 Sikh t e r r o r i s t s tra ined in Pakistan are now being 
held in the s t a t e , the Indian dismiss Pakis tan's denial 
of involvement with Sikh extrepi i s t s . 
Pakistan' s armed f o r c e s are in a s t a t e of b a t t l e 
preparedness, desp i t e Islamabad's avowed preference for 
diplomatic measures to defuse tension on the border with 
India . O f f i c i a l s say Pakistan would continue to "press 
precautionary measureis i n t o action without any overt 
alarm", in response to I n d i a ' s massive mi l i tary motHlzation. 
Although Indo-Pakistan r e l a t i o n s have been tense s 
s i n c e l a s t Noveirber, the current e sca la t ion fol lowed I n d i a ' s 
demand f o r a withdrawl of Pakistani troops engaged in 
mi l i tary e x e r c i s e s along the border. Pakistan argued 
that the demand f o r cance l la t ion of Pakistani e x e r c i s e s 
was u n j u s t i f i e d India llias i t s e l f been having mult i -corps 
manoeuvres s ince Nov. involving as many as 200,000 s o l d i e r s 
and several armoured u n i t s . 
The Indian Ambassador in Islamabad S.K. Singh was 
t o l d by Minister of s t a t e f o r foreign a f f a i r s Zain Noorani 
that Pakistan would not accept u n i l a t e r a l withdrawal from 
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the border but was prepared to d i scuss measures t o defuse 
the s i t u a t i o n . Prior t o the Noorani Singh meeting there 
had apparently been a gap in routine coronunication between 
mi l i t ary personnel of the two s i d e s . O f f i c i a l s on both 
s i d e s acknowledge that there i s a lack of nutual confidence, 
which cont inual ly feeds periodic f ears of mi l i tary threat . 
Although the arrival of a negot ia t ing team from 
Islamabad has ended the f e a r of an Indo-Pakistan war 
breaking out« the two teams were s t i l l s truggl ing with 
r iva l proposals to prevent further e sca la t ion of the 
current mi l i tary confrontation on t h e i r common border. 
Both s ides had decided to keep t h e i r proposals 
s ecre t u n t i l l the conclusion of the nego t ia t ions , though 
i t i s widely be l i eved that India has been a t tr ibut ing the 
concentration of i t s forces in Rajasthan t o nozmal mi l i tary 
e x c e r c i s e s . 
Meamrhile, i t accused Pakistan of adopting meana-
c ing posture by moving one of i t s armoured d i v i s i o n s across 
the s u t l e j r iver c l o s e to the border and concentrating 
another armoured group further north in the Shankargarh 
area on the borderwith Indian Punjab and the Jairam region 
of the disputed Jaimru and Kashmir s t a t e . 
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President Zall Singh l i s t e d I n d i a ' s three main 
o b s t a c l e s to normalisation with Pakistan in h i s 23 
February s t a t e o£ the nation address t o the budget 
se s s ion of parliament. They were Pa)clStan's c landes t ine 
e f f o r t s to acquire nuclear weapons capabi l i ty* i t s arms 
acquis i t ion prograinne and i t s support to s e c e s s i o n i s t 
Sikhs in the Indian s t a t e o£ Punjab. 
Indian Foreign Minister ND Tiwarl had e a r l i e r t o l d 
Parliament on 27 February that New Delhi was keeping a 
c l o s e watch. Over Islamabad* s nuclear prograinne and would 
take action at the appropriate t ime. Vfhen some opposit ion 
members argued that Pakistan' s bomb was around the comer* 
Tiwarl sa id the government respected the peoples ' s e n t i -
ments and that i f Pakistan did make a bomb* India would 
t a k e action at that t ime. 
Zla has e f ten sa id h i s country w i l l sign the nuclear 
non-prol i ferat ion Treaty (NPI) and subject i ts nuclear 
establ ishments t o internat ional sageguards* provided India 
does the same. Alternatively* i t can Join India in a 
regional treaty to make the subcontinent f r e e of nuclear 
weapons. The th ird a l t e r n a t i v e could be a Indo-Fakistan 
agreement renouncing nuclear weapons production and open-
ing a l l nuclear research and production f a c i l i t i e s to 
inspnetion by the other s i d e . 
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A verbal agreement between Gandhi and Zia not to 
attack each others nuclear establishments was announced 
in December 1985 but a formal one is still awaited. 
The second hurdle, Pakistanis arms-aquisition relation-
ship with the US, is considered by India fraught with 
serious implications for its security. Zia has always 
argued that since he had never objected to and had no 
objection even now to Indian acquisition of a far 
bigger arj^ erjal from the Soviet Union and others sources, 
India should not objected to how Islamabad meets its own 
defence needs. 
Against a backdrop of continuing Sikh terrorism 
largely blaaed in India on Pakistan's support for 
separation the two statements had raised hopes for the 
removal of at least one main hurdle to normalisation. 
However, the optimists did not seem to have taken into 
account the complexities of domestic compulsions that 
steer both countries foreign policy. 
Pakistan had piDposed to India a Package deal 
committing the two countries to renunciation of overt 
or covett support for seccessionist movements in both 
the countries before Zia»s informal talks with Gandhi 
Zia repeated the offer to Gandhi during his visit. 
But it seems that some deep thinking will have to be 
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done before the proposal turns Into an agreenent* 
The current positive factor in the traditionally 
adversarial relationship is the Pakistani appreciation 
that Gandhi -> being free of most of the traditional 
antipathies - is their best bet for normalisation. 
The two countries seems to be in a hurry because of 
their understanding that any significant loss of time 
could further entrench the bilateral relationship in 
the same old groove. But it is not clear what significant 
steps they propose to take beyond agreeing to the 
remaining military withdrawal from the borders and 
re-starting the stalled dialogue at the foreign-
secretaries level. 
In late January India and Pakistan the sub-
continent*s perennial adversaries, came dangerously 
close to what could have been their fourth war since 
independence. As war games turned into an unintended 
battle of nervesy troops moved into battle positions 
on bothsides of the border before the forces could be 
pulled back from the brink. The latest confrontation 
originated last November» when the Indian Army began 
Operation Brass tacks, a large scale exercise to test 
it mechanised forces in the desert of Rajasthan, 
60 km from the Pakistan border. 
39 
With the Brasstacks in full swing in Rajasthan, 
biani bad chose to move its troops close to the border 
facing Indian Punjab in January, New Delhi responded 
in kind by lifting reserve divisions to its own foi^ 
ward locations in Punjab and Kashmir* Protests and 
rebuttals began flying fr<Mn the two capitals even as 
the armies were poised for a showdown. By the end of 
January, with neither side willing to risk a war talks 
were begun to defuse the crisis. That the crisis was 
unintended but could not be avoided reflects the depth 
of distrust between the two. Nearly four decades after 
independence India suspects Pakistan has not given up 
its designs of acquiring Kashmir by force. On the other 
hand, Pakistan, which was reduced by half after the 
Bangladesh war of 1971, fears that a Hindu India still 
has not reconcilisd itself to the exist nee of a Muslim 
Pakistan. 
The difficulties in evolving the current Indian 
defence posture, in addition to the overall scarcity 
of resources, have included Pakistan's ability to aegalre 
sophisticated hardware under US assistance programmes, 
generous financial help from Islamic Gulf countries, and 
Chinese aid since the 1960s. In turn, India has resorted 
to strengthening its own defence industries, selective 
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coianerclal purchases fr<»B Western Europe and the Licensed 
production of Soviet weapons paid for under the rupee 
trade agreenent with Moscow* 
Thus Indian and Pakistan defence purchases have 
tended to be mirror Images of each other. Under the 
now-defunct Seato and Cento in the 1950s, the US supplied 
Pakistan with M47 and 48 Patton tanks, F 104 and F 86 
fighters and B 57 Canberra bombers. India responded by 
going to France and Brltlan to buy Centurlan and AMX 13 
tanks, and Hunter, Mystere and B 1 Canberra aircraft. 
In the 1971 war, Indian-Produced MIG 21 interceptors 
and Soviet-supplied Sukhoi 7B fighter- bombers gave the 
Indian Air Force (lAF) a distinct edge. But Pakistan 
had bought Mirage III aircraft from France, a weapon 
India could not match. In the 1980s as the lAF moved 
to acc|uire the British Jaguar and Soviet MIG 23/25 air-
craft and the army got Soviet T 72 tanks, it was Pakistan's 
turns to "leap-frog" to US F 16 fighters and M 901 TOW 
anti-tank missiles. The Indian decided to go for the 
Franch Mirage 2000. Thus, by the time of operation 
Brasstacks at the beginning of this year, India held are 
unquestioned superiority over Pakistan in army divisions, 
tanks, artittery and aircraft. The force balance in amy 
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divisions is 35 : 19* Indian defence planners are 
concerned that with weapons technology advancing so 
rapidly in the West, the US particular bigger and 
better force multipliers would be available to Pakistan 
and China in the future. Washington's plans to supply 
the airbom warning and control system (AWACS) to 
Islamabad which would allow Pakistani air surveillance 
deep into India - has worried New Delhi. 
For the foreseeable furutre, the Indian Navy's 
role in the event of a war would be - apart from imme-
diate coastal defence, protecting offshore assets like the 
Bombay High Oilfield, an escort support for the national 
merchant fleet - see control against the Pakistan the 
navies of bigger powers interfering in the war, the 
Indian Navy can at best harass and delay it opponents. 
The most daogerous aspect of the Indo-Pakistani 
confirmation is the potential of thv two sides to obtain 
a nuclear weapons capability. The suscontinents arch 
rivals have not signed the 1968 nuclear Non-proliferation 
Treaty (NPT) and maintain that there nuclear programnes 
are for peaceful purposes only. 
In early 1987, Washington tried to persuade Pakistan 
to sign the NPT to smooth the way for congressional 
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approval of long term aid. This cource, the US has poin-
ted out, would still leave open tfte option of going 
nuclear if Islamabad felt its national security was 
greatly threatened* But Pakistani President, Zia-ul-
Haq refused to budge « 
India has consistently opposed th9 MPT. Which 
it says discriminates against non-nuclear powers. In 
the earlier stages of the UN debate on the NPT, Pakis-
tan seemed amenable to signing the treaty, but held back 
after assessing India's refusal. The defeat in 1971 war, 
stengthened Islamabad's resource to gain nuclear parity 
with India. In Pakistan's view. C^ly the nuclear option 
might guarantee its security against India. Indian 
strategists see their national security interests in a 
larger geopolitical framework. Pakistan is merely one 
part, though a significant one, of New [)elhi*s security 
concerns. 
In the i^ ast the a[uestion facing New Delhi was 
whA^her a developing country could afford the high 
costs of going nuclear. In contrast, Pakistan has 
played down the economic aspect, because it views the 
nuclear - weapons deterrent as a matter of national 
survival. However, as India spends under Aji of its 
grows national product on defence - as against 6»byi 
in Pakistan > and is among the bottom end of tne scale 
among nations on that scope* the country can bear extra 
security outlays* 
In the short run. New Delhi and Islaiaabad are 
likely to continue to react in kind to each others 
nuclear moves* In any case both sub-continental adver-
saries could continue improving their nuclear potential 
without going openly nuclear* Seizing the nuclear option 
unilaterally would have far-reaching international repur-
cussions for both countries* 
The Indian Defence Ministry's latest annual report 
to parliament highlights the deterioration of the security 
environment in South Asia and expectedly singles out 
Pakistan as the main cause, while mentioning China's 
improved military position in Tibet. 
The report argued that, alongwith a quantitative 
increase in its armed forces, Pakistan had sought to 
gain a technological edge over India* Affecting regional 
security was the enhancement of Pakistan Air Force's 
electronic counter-measure and precision - strike capa-
bility. The report claimed that such acquisitions and 
quest for Alrbom Warning and control systems, were for 
beyond Pakistan's genuine defence needs. Islamabad had 
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justified its aims purchases on defensive needs arising 
froB the Soviet-Afghan threat. 
The report also accused Pakistan of continuing to 
pursue a weapons-oriented nuclear programme* Further 
charges against Pakistan included hostile activities in 
the disputed Siachen glacier area in Kashnir t involve-
ment in Sikh separatist activities in Punjab, and other 
unspecified "negative actions** that prevented nomali-
sation in the wake of de-escalation of the year 1987 
border tension. 
Terrorist attacks in India's north-western state 
of Punjab, bordering Pakistan, have escalated into a 
guedlla war with Sikh separatists anbushing paramilitary 
forces and mounting rocket attacks on selected targets. 
Concerned by the rising death toll. Prime Minister 
Rajiv Gandhi cut short histour of the eastern state on 
2 April to rush back to New Delhi and preside over a 
high-level nightlong meeting on Punjab. The first part 
is to cut off the terrorists foreign links by sealing 
off border with Pakistan. The second element is to 
devise a tighter internal intelligence system. The third 
is to muster political support to solve the problem. 
Despite all the security measures taken in recent years. 
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Punjab's 533 km border with Pakistan has remained porous 
with separatists allegedly slipping in arms and men from 
Pakistan. Steps are to be taken to real off* Punjab 
as well as Rajasthan and Quj«rat states from Pakistan. 
The border between India's Jammu and Kashmir state and 
Pakistan, heavily guarded by the two armies, i s also to 
be closed* 
The government has announced plans to ere at a barbed 
wire fence, whenever possible* along the border. New 
Delhi watch towers are to be built at many places. In 
addition, patrolling i s to be intensified using low 
flying aircraft equipped with search l i ^ t s and two-way 
radio communication. The Punjab-Pakistan border i s 
guarded by the paramilitary BSF, parts of which are 
suspected of involvement in the cross border traffic of 
smugglers, Sikh militants, weapons, narcotics and a 
wide range of other i l legal ac t iv i t i e s . 
Pol i t ical analysts vis i t ing Punjab and talking to 
the relatively moderate Sikhs are pessimistic about the 
prospects of a pol i t ical settlement. While the extretnists 
want outright separation, the moderate Sikhs argue that 
New Delhi should allow Punjab a special autonomous position 
much better than that enjoyed by Jamnu and Kashmir under 
the Indian constitution. 
4B 
The instant raport between prime Minister 
Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto of India and Pakistan 
at the 29-31 December SAARC holds hope for the end 
of the hostility partition of the subcontinent and 
has taken in three wars since. 
Both leaders agree that there is posiibility for 
their countries to make a fresh start. At their joint 
press conference on 1 Januaary, Bhotto said " a momentum 
for peace** had begun. ** We will go step by step **, 
she added Gandhi said that the recent agreements signed 
between the two countries marked the first major step 
forward since the Simla agreement in 1972 after the 
Bangladesh war of liberation. 
Although both countries signed a treaty not to 
attack each others nuclear facilities, and have agreed 
to spare each others airlines from doubt taxation and 
cooperate on cultural and education matters, some out-
standing problems remain. While the occasion of the 
SAARC suBBdt proved positive for India-Pakistan relations. 
With the India-Pakistan thaw, however, hopes have 
risen for the first time that the Saarc could become 
an effective regional organisation, especially in 
economic affairs* UntiU now, Saarc could not discuss 
cooperation in trade and industry because Pakistan 
ISMi/f"lMTg!flPI 
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feared Indian industry would smother its flidling 
production capabilities* The Indians have now decided 
to leave it entirely to Pakistan to select the itens 
for bilateral trade and the fields of other econonic 
cooperation. 
India and Pakistan have accused each other for 
years of building military capabilities far in excess 
of any reasonable requirements. But neither has ever 
set out objective yardsticks by which their own build-
ups should be measured. It is a typical case of 
looking for the mote in the brothers eye but ignoring 
the beam in one's own. 
The growth rate nevertheless highlights the arms 
race between India and Pakistan* thanks to the links 
each has with its respective superpower friend. India 
was the second » largest recipient of Soviet arms deli-
veries to the Third World in 1982-86. Over the same 
period, Pakistan ranked fourth among beneficiaries of 
military credits from the US. 
Both India and Pakistan explain their accelerated 
arms build-up in the 1980s by claiming a sharp deter^ 
iorition in their security environment. Pakistan has 
made much of the danger to it from the Soviet presence 
in Afghanistan. 
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Indian claims are Just as dubious. The agreenent 
that India has to be on guard against China has sone 
merit. Chinese deployments in Tibet have increased, 
a fact kightighted in the latest report of the Indian 
Defence Ministry. 
The large sums India and Pakistan have spent on 
acquiring weapons have greatly increased their lethal 
capabilities but the relative poisition remains basi-
cally unchanged. Pakistan's purpose is deterrence, 
hence the search for a nuclear capability as a safeguard 
against blackmial by a neighbour India seeks a sufficient 
edge to that Pakistan will be dissuaded from chancing its 
luck. 
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bigger sinner is pointless* The figures conpiled by 
outside observers* For exafflple> show that Pakistan's 
nilitary spending, has twice as fast as India. 
Where do the two go from here ? This is a complex 
question but three points stand out* Economic constraints 
are becoming increasingly severe in both countries* 
Both have announce of freeze in spending* and both have 
been dropping hints - largely for the benifit of the 
aid givers in Pakistan's case * that future growth will 
be modest* 
Secondly* the superpower suppliers may not be as 
generous as they have been in recent years* Thridly* India 
and Pakistan are moving, though very scoroly* to allay 
some of the worst fears they have of each other* An agree-
ment to refrain from attacks on nuclear facilities is 
now ready for signature* There is* since the soring 1987 
scene over the real intent of large formations engaging 
in exercises close to both sides of the border, an interest 
in creating mechanisims to avoid misunderstandings* 
Best of all* non-official contacts between the two 
countries are now much greater than at any time in the 
past 25 years* This is reviving the love part of the Cove-
hate relationship between two countries that have so much 
so much in common* 
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CULTURAL AND SOCIAL FACTORS 
The long-standing ennity between India and 
Pakistan has its historical and cultural roots in 
the conmunal conflict which led to partition* Pakis-
tan's very identity as a nation has involved the need 
to differentiate the two countries* cultures and the 
fear of Indian '* reabsorption ** of Pakistan. The 
KashBiir issue has b#en particularly intractable because 
it pitted Pakistan*s Islaoiic identity against India's 
equally sensitive identity as a 'secular* state* 
The present regime has established '*Islamization*' 
as a prinary political goal and has enacted several 
reforms designed to help create an Islamic polity and 
economy* 
Islamization and labour migration to the Middle 
East appear to be contributing to an increases sense 
of self-confidence in Pakistan* This observation is 
difficult to measure systematically in the absence of 
regular public opinion polls in Pakistan, but the 
phenomenon has been noted by more than one outside 
observer* If Islamization contributes identity in 
Pakistan* it may indeed help to provide a cultural base 
for Pakistan's foreign policy initiatives* 
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SUMMING UP 
Indo^Pak relations cannot and must not be studies 
as an isolated phenomenon. It is a raulti-faceted 
problem and without examining all the linkages, one 
is apt to get a hopsided if not wholly distorted view 
of the painful reality. 
Since its inception in 1947 Pakistan's stance towards 
India has been of open confrontation in all spheres. 
Inbued with a false sense of history and achievement, 
it continued to regard itself as superior to India both 
as a race and as a nation. However, realising that the 
was weaker than India militarily. Her military strategy 
till the Simla Pact, and for a while thereafter, was 
visibly aggressive with liberation', or more candidly, 
the annexation of Kashmir by force of arms as an avowed 
aisw 
The need to live with India as a stronger and better 
endowed neighbour came as a slow, reluctant and even 
painful realisation to the elite of Pakistan. By mid-
1970, after a phase of revanchist display, understandable 
in the light of its military defeat vrtiich was more 
apparently more realistic and defensive, at time hording 
on a sense of insecurity. Despite there developments. 
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the BKitual distrust between India and Pakistan did not 
dininish to any appreciable extent* 
India and Pakistan are not only neighbours but 
have a long comnon historical past and socio-cultural 
affinity. Developoent of trade and other economic 
relations between them is natural and necessary to 
maintain historical continuity. Expansion of these 
relations can help in a big way to relax tensions in 
the subcontinent which is in the interest of both. 
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INDO - PAK RELATIONS 
1, CHOPRA (Surendra) Indo - Pak r e l a t i o n s : The need of a 
new paradigra. S t r a t e g i c Studies Journal 2 ,2 ; 1989,43-68, 
Indo - Pak r e l a t i o n s have s h i f t e d from c o n f l i c t to 
de -esca la t ion to c o n f l i c t and again t o de-esca la t ion but 
very seldom to cooperation. In the unending h i s tory of 
c o n f l i c t u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between the two countries there 
have been d i f f erent i r r i t a n t s on d i f f erent occas ions . 
Most of the i r r i t a n t s between the two countr ies are the 
product of perceptual divergence* I n s p i t e of the severe 
s t ra in on Indo - Pak r e l a t i o n s many r ight - th inking people 
in both countries have a l l along been emphasizing the 
advantages of mutually b e n e f i c i a l cooperative r e l a t i o n s h i p . 
The two countries have so mach in common that the unending 
s tory of conf l i c tua l r e la t ionsh ip seems to be a challonge 
to commonsense* 
2 . GHOSH (Partha S) Indo - Pak re la t ions* Portents and un-
certain I t i e s * Mainstream 21*24,? 1983. 2,12> 13-4 and 30. 
Recent trends for peace and cooperation between 
India and Pakistan are rooted in several Major changes in 
the p o l i t i c a l - s t r a t e g i c - e c o n o m l c ecology of the global 
system as wel l as the south Asian sub-system* On the 
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domestic p o l i t i c a l f ront , the rul ing e l i t e s of both India 
and Pakistan are becoming aware of the growing i rre levence 
of the PaMstan f a c t o r and the India f a c t o r in t h e i r 
r e spec t ive p o l i t i e s * Economic consideration must have also 
contributed to the peace e f f o r t s . The deep>rooted a t t i -
tudinal o b s t a c l e s that marred Indo - Pak r e l a t i o n s in the 
Past and which are dormant now may revive any time, pushing 
the r e l a t i o n s back to square one. The p o s s i b i l i t y of t h e i r 
taking a bold j o i n t i n i t i a t i v e to turn a new leaf in t h e i r 
s t r a t e g i c r e l a t i o n s h i p regardless of the wishes and 
preferences of the superpowers appears to be remote. 
5. HITCH IN Indo - Pakistan Relat ions , ed, Janata 37,5; 1982, 
3 , 7; 2 . 
There are two opinions in both countries about the 
d e s i r a b i l i t y of s igning a solemn no-war pact . But there 
a te no two opinions on one thing that the people at large 
in both countries are keen on e s tab l i sh ing f r i end ly 
r e l a t i o n s between them. Infact , some opposftit in the name 
of laying a sound b a s i s for promoting f r i e n d l i e r r e l a t i o n s , 
a l b e i t some time in the fu ture . Such widespread agreement 
and r e a l i s a t i o n should have normally l e d to ser ious d i s cu -
s s i o n s on a mutual a s s i s tance pact and not only on a mere 
no-war pact . What i s r e a l l y surpris ing i s that with ne i ther 
b') 
country prepared to lower i t s guard-for any eventual i ty— 
both are afraid of being l e d up the garden path and down 
i n t o the v a l l e y of death. 
4. KARNAD (Bharat) , Indo - PaX re la t ions* A ca lculus of f e a r . 
HT; 1980, 2, 20. 
The Indo - Pak r e l a t i o n s are b e d e v i l l e d by an i r r a -
t i o n a l f e a r . The 1971 war had changed the p o l i t i c a l and 
m i l i t a r y equation in the region, Pakistan might be f o r -
given for i t s e f f o r t s to protect i t s e l f from further l o s s 
in a war with India . The d i s t i n c t i o n between dt€ensive 
and o f f e n s i v e weapons are not clesur t o a l l . In the case 
of India and Pakistan each imagines that the other party 
i s being h o s t i l e and unreasonable. Rel ig ious fanat ic i sm 
and bigotry inform the r e l a t i o n s between the two countr ies . 
To improve the s i t u a t i o n . The a l t ernat ive i s to stock up 
the ongoing hys ter ia which may lead to yet another war and 
i n s e c u r i t y which everybody wants to avoid. 
5 . NAVSED AHMAD Recent developments in Indo - Pakistan r e l a t i o n s . 
Pakistan Horizon 35 ,2; 182;71-95. 
The S tra teg i c and p o l i t i c a l changes brought about 
in the region by the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and 
Pakis tan's subsequent acceptance of the American $3.2 b i l l i o n 
mi l i t ary s a l e s and economic aid package, added a new 
5i; 
dliaentlon to the already s trained r e l a t i o n s between India 
and Pakistan, To assure India of i t s goodwill Pakistan 
o f f ered India a no-war pact . Because Pakistan had gained 
d e f i n i t e diplomatic advantage through i t s peace i n i t i a t i v e , 
the Indian Govemniait was in no pos i t ion to r e j e c t the 
o f f e r in an off hand manner, Negot iat ions began between 
the two countries and the s i tua t ion seemed encouraging when 
the Indian Government suddenly took of fence over the 
Pakistan d e l e g a t e ' s statement r e i t e r a t i n g PaJcistan's stand 
on Kashmir. Hence another deadlock ensued. 
6. SAREBN (Rajendra) . Low BBB in Indo - Pak t i e s . Tribune? 
1986,10,15 . 
Indo - Pak r e l a t i o n s have entered an uncertain phase. 
The outlook i s b leak. There i s plenty to cause worry very 
l i t t l e to r a i s e hope. The two countries have l i v e d through 
long s p e l l s of uneasy peace but recent trends have not at 
a l l been conductive to the prospect of peace e i t h e r in the 
b i l a t e r a l or in the regional context . The pattern of 
Pakis tan's involvement in Punjab and Kashmir has changed 
Unfortunately, Pakistan does not seem to r e a l i s e that i f 
driven beyond a point , these are matters of war and peace. 
The i s s u e involved i s not lack of d e s i r e for f r i end ly 
r e l a t i o n s with Pakistan but safegaurding the v i a b i l i t y of 
the India has no claims on Pakistan, 
5/ 
7 . SONDHI (ML). Fact sheet on Pakistan. Tribune? 1985,12,30. 
The conceptual franework which views I n d i a ' s r e -
l a t i o n s with Pakistan only In terras of c r i s i s management 
does not take in to account the underlying causes of the 
d e s t a b i l i s i n g trends In south Asia. Part icular problems 
with Pakistan Bwst always be re la t ed to the o v e r a l l 
chal lange which Islamabad poses to Ind ia ' s g e o s t r a t e g l c and 
m i l i t a r y planning. While India has to continue to deter 
Pakistan from exerc i s ing adventurous op t ions . .There I s no 
short cut to ending the India - Pakistan c o n f l i c t . 
—, OONPLICT, ANALYSES. 
8 . FISHER (Ronald J), Third - party consultat ion workshop on 
the India - Pakistan c o n f l i c t . Journal of Socia l Psychology 
112 ,2 | 1980 Dec; 191-206, 
A problem-solving workshop on the India - Pakistan 
c o n f l i c t was designed and evaluated with the use of a 
model of third-Party consultat ion Intended f o r the study 
and reso lut ion of s o c i a l c o n f l i c t . Six Pakistan and 
Indian Nationals par t i c ipated In a s e r i e s of separate and 
Joint d i scuss ions focusing on the present r e l a t i o n s h i p , 
the national Images^ the pos s ib l e Ideal r e l a t i o n s h i p , and 
the major problems and potent ia l so lu t ions t o the c o n f l i c t . 
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A content descr ipt ion and a process ana lys i s o£ the work-
shop are provided. The r e s u l t s Indicate that the model 
was s u c c e s s f u l l y operat ional lzed and that the workshop 
has b e n l f l d a l e f f e c t s on the a t t i t u d e s of the p a r t i c i p a n t s . 
, . , BORDER 
9 . CHATTERJBE (RiO . Indians lamd bordetrst Problems and 
cha l l enges . New Delhi , S ter l ing Pubs India-Pakistan 
r e l a t i o n s . 1978, 
On the Pakistan borders, there has been continuous 
t e n s i o n s r ight ftom the beginning. Kashmir, however, 
continued to be Pakis tan's preoccupation and in 1965 
thousands of armed i n f i l t r a t o r s from Pakistan entered 
Kashmir and indulged in sabotage and destruct ion of in ternal 
defence of the s t a t e . This l e d to the 1965 war with Pak<r 
i s t a n . After three weeks war the two countries were 
renewed which culminated i n t o Tashkent agreement. The war 
ended in two weeks af ter which Bangladesh became a r e a l i t y . 
Since then, India has been try ing to normalise r e l a t i o n s 
with Pakistan as far as p o s s i b l e . 
10, REDDY (Narendra) , Lessons of In do - Pak border c r i s i s . 
IE; 1987 ,1 , 7; . 
The tens ion on the Indo - Pakistan border and the 
diplomatic e f f o r t s launched t h i s week t o d e - e s c a l a t e i t 
9 
has three Important l e s s o n s : the armed forces on both s ides 
of the border are so c l o s e to each other and any consequen-
t i a l move made by the other only further e s c a l a t e s the 
t e n s i o n . The p o l i t i c a l leadership in each country aware 
of the impact on the public of these tension and f i n a l l y 
diplomatic manoeuvres are under takon t o reso lve the tens ions , 
An important element in the s t r a t e g i c s i tua t ion along the 
Indo - Pakistan border i s that the peace time l o c a t i o n s 
are very near the border on the Pakistan s i d e . 
, - , - , KASHMIR, SIACHEN 
11. INDIA MID Pakistan to continue Dialogue on Siachen: Joint 
statement on New Delhi t a l k s . Foreign Affairs Record 32,6; 
1986 JUne; 171. 
The second round of the t a l k s between the Defence 
Secre tar i e s of India and Pakistan took place in New Delhi 
from June 10 to 12, 1986. They talfed in a cordial and 
f r i e n d l y atmosphere. They r e i t e r a t e d t h e i r reso lve to 
f i n d a negot iated sett lement of the Siachen i s s u e in acoor-
dan ce with the Simla Agreement. They discussed various 
ideas for an amicable reso lut ion of the problem and agreed 
t o report these to t h e i r respect ive Governments. 
12. INDO - PAK Relat ions! Borders come a l i v e . Current Topics 
12 ,1 ; 1985 D e c ; 10-11 . 
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For the f i r s t time s ince the Indo - Pak c o n f l i c t in 
1971 there have been border c lashes which cannot be dismi-
ssed as Riinor skirmishes. In the border areas of Ladakh, 
Pakistani troops have made repeated but vain attempts to 
dr ive away Indian troops s tat ioned at the 6000-metre high 
Siachen g l a c i e r . 
, - , - , - , SIACHEN GLACIER 
13. INDO - PAK Relat ions: Fighting on the snow. Current Topics 
14 ,4; 1988 April; 204. 
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi t a l k s to newsman that 
the siachen g l a c i e r was s i tua ted in Indian t e r r i t o r y and 
there was no question of Pakistan being allowed to have a 
footho ld in the area. According t o press reports Pakistan 
had f i n a l i s e d an agreeinent with the American Boeing firm 
f o r the purchase of heavy assaul t h e l i c o p t e r s with upgraded 
engines for operat ions at very high a l t i t u t e s in extreme 
weather condi t ions . With the siachen area becoming a major 
Indo • Pak skirimish area, Islamabad has decided to s tep 
up the a i r operat ions . 
14, INDO - PAK Relat ions: Shaking off legacy d i f f i c u l t . 
Current Topics 15,5; 1989 April; 268-9. 
Ms Benazir Bhutto sa id that to help e s t a b l i s h good 
Gi 
neighbourly r e l a t i o n s between India and Pakistan^ India 
should withdraw i t s forces from Siachen g l a c i e r to the 
pre - Simla agreement p o s i t i o n . She sa id that the Siachen 
g l a c i e r i s s u e had becoine unnecessary i r r i t a n t in b i l a t e r a l 
r e l a t i o n s . External Affairs Minister, Mr PV Narsiinha Rao 
had sa id in Harare that India looked forward to a "hope-
f u l future* f o r normalisation of r e l a t i o n s with Pakistan, 
The Prime Ministers of both countries had struck a very 
good c ^ p o i ^ and in the future we can expect normalisation 
of r e l a t i o n s to go ahead. 
15. JDSHI (VT^  . Rajiv, Junejo may d i scuss Siachen. Tl; 1987,11,3. 
The controvers ia l Siachen i s s u e may f igure in the 
b i l a t e r a l t a l k s between the Prime Minister of Pakistan and 
India , Mr Jlinejo and Mr Rajiv Gandhi at the time of th i rd 
SAARC summit. Among other t i c k l i s h i s s u e s of s i gn i f i cance 
at the conference i s the question of admission of Afghan. 
Pakistan had made c l ear i t s stand that af^zer the withdrawal 
of Soviet troops and i n s t a l l a t i o n of an independent regime 
in Afghanistan. 
16. PASRICHA (Prt) . Conf l ic t in the Snow-lx Siachen Glacier 
at b o i l i n g po int . Statesman? 1985, 11 ,6 . 
The exchange of f i r e and minor skirmishes between 
India effld Pakistan along the ers twhi le c e a s e - f i r e l i n e 
have been almost rout ine evers ince the 1949 t ruce . Recent 
G:^  
reports of some ser ious f i gh t ing in the Siachen Glacier 
region of Ladalch have, however, given a new and d iscon-
cer t ing dimension t o Indo - Pakistan h o s t i l i t y along the 
Jamna and Kashmir border. The Simla agreement, whi le 
converting the c e a s e - f i r e l i n e i n t o the l i n e of actual 
oontco l , in -exp l i cab ly f a i l e d to r e c t i f y t h i s lacuna. 
17. SARIN (Ritu). Siachen f i a sco t India r e j e c t s Pakistan's 
c la im that the g l a c i e r dispute has been reso lved , Sunday 
16 ,31; 1989, JUly 2-8; 14-5, 
For over three decades India and Pakistan have 
fought to gain control of the disputed Siachen g l a c i e r , 
Pakis tan ' s arbitrary claim would normally have e l i c i t e d a 
strong protes t from the Indian foreign o f f i c e in New Delhi , 
But in keeping with the s p i r i t of understanding that has 
marked Indo - Pak r e l a t i o n s ever s ince Ms Bhutto took over 
in Pakistan, The PMO ins tructed the MEA to playdown the 
f i a s c o , India and Pakistan are making honest e f f o r t s to 
s o l v e the Siachen problem because the stakes f o r both the 
countr ies in the i c y t e r r i t o r y are very high. But i t w i l l 
take several years before the i s s u e i s sorted out , India 
and Pakistan blame each other for v i o l a t i n g the terms of 
the 1972 t r e a t y . 
G:^  
18. SIACHSN GLACIER: Indo - Pak t a l k s . Current Topics 14, 
6; 1988 JUne; 332. 
The defence forces of India and Pakistan have been 
engaged In intermit tent c lashes in the siachen Glacier 
region s ince / ^ r i l 1984, The two s i d e s have also t r i e d 
t o come t o a sett lement through b i l a t e r a l t a l k s . Indo> 
Pak t a l k s on the i s s u e would take place s h o r t l y . India 
may u t i l i s e the occasion to r a i s e the i s s u e of Pakistan's 
in t er f erence in Punjab, 
19. WIG (AR). Talks with Pakistan on Siachen in May. OT 66, 
103; 1989, 4, 14; 1. 
In, y e t , another attempt to remove a major i r r i t a n t 
in t h e i r b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s , India i s sending Defence 
secretary , Naresh Chandra to Islamabad to help reso lve 
the Siachen g l a c i e r i s s u e . In a personal l e t t e r to Rajiv 
Gandhi, Ms Bhutto wrote to work together in the i n t e r n a t i o -
nal arena, had s ta ted in a recent interview that Indian 
troops must withdraw to the pre-Simla (1972) p o s i t i o n s in 
the Siachen g l a c i e r region to remove t h i s "Unnecessary 
i r r i t a n t * in t h e i r r e l a t i o n s . India considers Ms Bhutto 
was very p o s i t i v e on the need for normalisation of 
r e l a t i o n s . 
G l 
, CONFLICT, WAR 1971 
20. CHMJDHRY (GW) , Dismeinberroent of Pakistan, 1971: I t s 
in ternat iona l impl i ca t ions . Orbis 18,1? 1974, Spr; 179-200. 
External f o r c e s played a large ro le in the c i v i l 
war in Bangladesh and the Indo - Pak war of 1971. These 
c r i s i s enabled the Great Powers to extend t h e i r inf luence 
in t h i s reg ion . 
21 . MARWAH (Onkar). I n d i a ' s Mil i tary intervent ion in East 
Pakistan, 1971-1972. Modem Asian Studies 13,4j 1979,Oct; 
549-80. 
The balance between gains and l o s s e s in the Indian 
in tervent ion in East Pakistan i s in favour of the action 
taken by India . The l o s s e s remain emphemeral, long d i s tant , 
and speculati^re. The major s t r a t e g i c aftermath was that 
fo l lowing the creation of Bangladesh there i s no longer 
any mention of "balances" in the sub-continent, but of the 
"predominance" of India . As such, war was undoubtedly a 
watershed in South Asian h i s t o r y , redefining the ro l e of 
the l o c a l s t a t e s in respect to each other, in r e l a t i o n a l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p , and in i n t e r a c t i o n s with the great powers. 
22. MISRA (KP) . Tr i la tera l i sm in South Asia. Asian Survey 
14,7; 1974 July; 627-36. 
G.^ 
The Oecenber 1971 Indo - Pakistani war i s a 
surpris ing example of p o l i t i c a l metamorphosis with a 
view towards normalization of r e l a t i o n s between b e l l i -
g e r e n t s . 
, - , , POST - WAR 
23, BURKE (SH) , Postwar diplomacy of the Indo - Pakistani war 
of 1971, Asian Survey 13,11; 1973, Nov; 103 6-49, 
Normalisation of indo - Pakistani r e l a t i o n s was 
delayed because India refused to r e l e a s e Pakistani POWs 
without Bangladesh's consent, Bangladesh i n s i s t e d upon 
tirying 195 prisoners f o r war crimes, and Pakistan refused 
to recoghi:i# Bangladesh t i l l a l l prisoners were repatr ia -
t ed . A 3 way exchange of (1) Pakistani POWs in India 
except the 195, (2) Bengalis detained in Pakistan, and 
(3) Non-Bengalis in Bangladesh wishing to retain Pakistani 
c i t i z e n s h i p , was agreed upon on 28 August 1973. The f a t e 
of the 195 w i l l be decided by conference between India, 
Pakistan and Bangladesh, India and Pakistan continue to 
su f f er from interna l problems though Bhutto has done much 
b e t t e r than expected and Mrs Gandhi l e s s w e l l . Ind ia ' s 
and Pakistan's reduced importance shows that respect 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y i s won by actual performance, not by 
simply r e c i t i n g high p r i n c i p l e s of democracy, soc ia l i sm 
and the l i k e . 
GG 
, COOPERATION 
24, BARAL (Lok Raj) , Nation bui ld ing and region bui ld ing in 
south Asia. Asia P a c i f i c Conanunity 28; 1985 Spr; 54-73 . 
For both internal and regional purposes, the present 
s tra ined re la t i onsh ips between India and Paistan and between 
India Sri Lanka are counter productive. The manner in 
which India and Pakistan have been showing t h e i r enthu-
siasm in South Asia Regional cooperation, e x e r c i s e s now 
c l e a r that the i n t e m e c i v e c r i s e s b e d e v i l l i n g the South 
Asian s t a t e s can bes t be neutera l i zed by j o i n t endeavours 
of the regional s t a t e s themselves. 
25. JOHAL (Sarabji t ) . Regional cooperation and Indo - Pakistan 
r e l a t i o n s . JSAMES 8 ,2 ; 1984,win; 29-42. 
Ever s ince t h e i r independence in 1947, Indian and 
Pakistani Governments have been grappling with the b a s i c 
problem of how to normalize t h e i r r e l a t i o n s . The poverty 
in both countries has several impl icat ions for t h e i r 
regional c a p a b i l i t i e s . Indo - Pakistan economic r e l a t i o n s 
w i l l depend upon how each Govt perce ives the economic 
s trengths and weaknesses of the o t h e r . Indian and Pakistani 
nuclear energy c a p a b i l i t i e s are examined here for two 
major reasons: to compare t h e i r s c i e n t i f i c and technolo-
g i c a l c a p a b i l i t i e s with other countries and to show the 
b ^ 
e f f e c t of nuclear energy development on Indo - Pak r e l a t i o n s , 
compared to the developed countr ies , the Indian and Pakistani 
nuclear power progranomes are smal l . The p o l i t i c a l a s s e t s 
of the two countr ies have varied remarkably s ince 1947. 
Each country could use i t s domestic p o l i t i c a l c a p a b i l i t i e s 
f o r power and in f luence . India took an* ear ly lead over 
Pakistan in p o l i t i c a l development. 
, - , ECONOMIC 
26. BHAT (Taranath) . India and Pakistani See-Saw economic 
r e l a t i o n s . In, Seminar on Indo - Pak r e l a t i o n s (New Delhi) 
(1984) . Studies in Indo - Pak re la t ions* Papers. Bd by 
VD Chopra, 216-30, 
Indo - Pak p o l i t i c a l and economic r e l a t i o n s are 
character ised by a long s e r i e s of accords and d i scords . 
I n d i a ' s economic s tructure i s c er ta in ly superior to that 
of Pakistan. However, Pakistan i s b e t t e r placed in agr i -
cu l ture , raw mater ia ls and food. Economic r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between India and PaJcistan has been l a r g e l y confined to 
trade i n t e r a c t i o n . The Indo - Pak trade l i n k s which were 
snapped abruptly in 1965 we r e - e s t a b l i s h e d in 1974, f o l l o w -
ing the Simla agreement. An e f f o r t has been made by the 
Indian pr ivate sector as wel l as the government to norma-
l i s e d trade r e l a t i o n s with Pakistan. The Indo - Pak b i la tera l 
trade can grow with a l ense of o b j e c t i v i t y and commonality 
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of i n t e r e s t s with in the framework of nat ional p r i o r i t i e s . 
27, INDO - PAKISTANI economic cooperation. Commerce 150, 
3850; 1985, 3, 9; 437, 
The l e v e l of economic development in India and 
Pakistan i s comparable although because of the d i f f er ing 
s i z e s of the two countries and t h e i r population, there are 
in e v i t a b l e d i f f erences in the composition of the economic 
l i f e Pakistan major imports are: wheat, Petrolium, crude, 
d i e s e l o i l , palm o i l , t ea , dairy products, agr icul tural 
t r a c t o r s and o t h e r s . I t s e^qxjrts arej r i c e , row, cotton, 
cotton y a m , rug and mats, l e a t h e r and o thers . The trade 
between the two countr ies t e s t i f i e s to the pacify of t h e i r 
performance. Perhaps the trade between them would rece ive 
the mwch needed impetus i f , alongwith the apex organisat ions 
v i s i t e d each other provided there i s p o l i t i c a l w i l l on 
both s i d e s . 
28. PUN J (VP) . Indo - Pak economic cooperation. Indian and 
Foreign Review 20,16? 1983, P^ilne 144; 9 -10 . 
In the new era of in do - Pak r e l a t i o n s , trade and 
commerce w i l l not only provide the b a s i s of amity but 
strengthening of economic r e l a t i o n s between the two coun-
t r i e s . In order to t r a n s l a t e in to r e a l i t y the concept of 
t o t a l economic cooperation an environment permissive f o r 
G9 
acce lerated Indo • Pak r e l a t i o n s I s Imperative. Now that 
the cl imate £or b e t t e r understanding and dialogue has been 
created, there should be increas ing and regular exchange of 
trade de legat ions between the two countr ies and part ic ipat ion 
in trade f a i r s and e x h i b i t i o n s , 
, - , - , COMMERCE 
29, APTE (Vlnod), Trade with Pakistani Good beginning towards 
normalisation. Commerce 152, 3897; 1986, 1, 25; 153-6. 
The tt«o Finance Ministers of Indo - Pakistan have 
certainly paved the way towards normalisation of trade and 
economic relations between the two countries. The economies 
of both countries are complementary to each other and both 
the countries can help one another in their trade. Despite 
concerted efforts to improve the economic ties, the rela-
tions between the two sides during the past years were 
plagued by political tension. During the discussions 
Foreign Ministers of both side recognised the need to 
encourage greater contact between the industrial and trad-
ing communities of the two countries. 
30. FREE TRADE Winds, editorial. lE^ 1985, 1, 19. 
The agreement between India and Pakistan to increase 
significantly the levels of their trade and other forms of 
70 
mutual economic involvement i s good news. Pa r t i cu la r ly 
a t a time when there i s a heavy overhang of p o l i t i c a l 
d i s t r u s t between the two count r ies . To wait for an appix>-
p r i a t e p o l i t i c a l climate even to begin to discuss improve-
ment of economic r e l a t i o n s i s c l ea r ly an obtuse a t t i t u d e . 
The momentum given by the current agreement should be 
consciously accelera ted. Without In do - Pakistan economic 
cooperation, grandiose declara t ions of commitment to SAAE%C 
are empty r h e t o r i c , 
31 , GILL (Sucha Singh) and GHUMM3 (RS) . Indo - Fak t r ade : 
prospects and cons t r a in t s , In^ Seminar on Indo - Fak 
r e l a t i o n s (New Delhi) (1984) , Studies in Indo - Pak 
re la t ions* Papers ED by VD Chopra. 187-205. 
India and Pakistan are not only neighbours but have 
a long common h i s t o r i c a l past and socio-cMltural a f f i n i t y . 
Development of t rade and other economic r e l a t i o n s between 
them i s na tura l and necessairy to maintain h i s t o r i c a l con t i -
n u i t y . Expansion of these r e l a t i ons can help in a big way 
to r e l ax tensions in the sub-continent wiiich i s in the 
i n t e r e s t of both. Trade between India and Pakistan was 
the d i r ec t outcome of the p a r t i t i o n in 1947 and to a large 
extent r e f l e c t s what was at one time f ree i n t e rna l t rade 
between the region those now cons t i tu t e the two independent, 
coun t r i e s . Recently cer ta in e f fo r t s have been made to 
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a c t i v a t e the trade r e l a t i o n s between both the countr i e s . 
32. JAVED AKHTAR (SM). Pakistan's trade with India . Indian 
and Foreign Review 20,16; 1983, June 1-14; 7 -8 . 
Pakistan foreign trade has grown s u b s t a n t i a l l y in 
recent years . Pakistan i s try ing to expand i t s trade with 
Ind ia . Pa)dtstan• s trade with India has been subjected to 
wide f l u c t u a t i o n s , Currently i t accounts for 0 .8 percent 
of Pakis tan's overa l l trade and jus t under 0.3 percent of 
I n d i a ' s trade . Indo - Pak trade l i n k s were cut off during 
the 1965 war and trade between them remained completely 
suspended f o r almost ten years . The two countr ies , however, 
re-established t h e i r trade protocol signed in November 197 4. 
I t was fol lowed by a formal trade agreement in January 1975. 
There i s inmense scope of b i l a t e r a l trade . I t s potent ia l 
i s manifold. 
33 . TRADE WITH Pakistan, e d i t o r i a l . Amrit Bazar? 1985. 11, 20. 
I t has always been India' s view that c l o s e r trade 
and economic cooperation with Pakistan w i l l make a constru-
ctiv€> contribution to iraporve overa l l r e l a t i o n s between 
India and Pakistan which are now under a several s t r a i n . 
The Joint Indo - Pak commission, with a sub-commission on 
trade and economic co l laborat ion , was s e t up mainly to 
achieve t h i s end. Much would no depend on the j o i n t 
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commission and the sub-comnlsslon on trade which w i l l 
consider the goods to be exchanged both at pr ivate s e t t e r 
and s t a t e l e v e l s . Though the economies of the two count-
r i e s are complementary to each o ther . Taking i n t o cons i -
deration the mounting tension in the r e l a t i o n s between 
the two countr ies , i f the agreement c o n s t i t u t e s a break-
through in economic r e l a t i o n s w i l l be helpful in reducing 
that t ens ion . 
• e f f e c t of APGHANISTN5 
34. NAVESD AHMAD. Recent developments in Indian foreign p o l i c y . 
Pakistan Horizon 33. 3; 1980; 47-95. 
Mrs. Gandhi's return t o power in 1980 co inc ides 
with a ser ious exacerbation of in ternat ional tension and 
grave impairment of de tente . The t e s t s of Mrs Gandhi's 
present p o l i c i e s i s provided by the Afghan c r i s i s , for i t 
has changed the s t r a t e g i c balance and the diplomatic 
environment to the detriment of both India and Pakistan. 
From t h i s change there ar i se new compulsions for both India 
and Pakistan to seek greater mutual understanding. Although 
President Zia-ul-Haq has proposed that r e l a t i o n s be impro-
ved, the Indian Prime Minister has as ye t shown no i n t e r e s t 
in taking up the o f f e r . 
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35, RIEN COURT (Amawry de). India and Pakistan in the shadow 
of Afghanistan. Foreign Affairs 61, 2; 1983-83 Win; 416-37. 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan i s the most 
s e r i o u s and dangerous demonstration of Soviet Marxist 
imperial ism s ince the end of the Second World War. I t i s 
e s s e n t i a l that the west, and the US in par t i cu lar , r e a l i z e 
that India holds the key to successful r e s i s t a n c e of further 
Soviet encro«;hments and that a l l t h e i r e f f o r t s should tend 
towards the re-establ ishmental l e v e l . Fa i lure on the part 
of India and Pakistan to achieve the required set t lements 
of t h e i r outstanding d i f ferences might ruin both of them, 
36. WRIGGINS (Howard W) . Pakis tan's search for a Foreign 
Pol icy After the invasion of Afghanistan, P a c i f i c Agfairs 
5, 2; 1984 Sum; 284-302. 
By maintaining a certain dis tance from Washington, 
Pakistan has made c l ear that i t i s not seeking to involve 
the US in regioned a f f a i r s . By the autuim of 1983 the 
q u i t e dialogue e s tab l i shed by India and Pakistan continued, 
and both p a r t i e s were exploring ways of deal ing with s p e c i f i c 
areas of d i f ference and d i s t r u s t . Both s t a t e s now seem 
able to accept the o t h e r ' s r e l a t i o n s h i p with the US with 
some good grace. But, in the face of the Soviet presence 
at the door of the sub-continent , i t would appear that 
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l eaders in both Pakistan and India are themselves beginning 
t o change t h e i r sense of p r i o r i t i e s . Yet, f o r the f i r s t 
time in many years India and Pakistan are deal ing some 
what more e o n s t m c t i v e l y with t h e i r ancient f ears and 
s u s p i c i o n s . 
, e f f e c t o f BANGLADESH 
37. INDO - PAK - Bangla Relat ions , 1971-74| Background note . 
Foreicm jtffatrg Reports 23, 5; 1974, Mayj 8 0 - 2 . 
Soon a f ter the l i b e r a t i o n of Bangladesh in Decerrber 
1971, India alongwith Bangladesh made f r a n t i c e f f o r t s t o 
normalise r e l a t i o n s with Pakistan. India a l t ered in to a 
s e r i e s of nego t ia t i ons with Pakistan on t h i s i s s u e r e s u l -
t i n g from the c o n f l i c t of Decemner 1971, These negot ia t ions 
brought about Simla agreement between India and Palcistan 
on July 1972. The two s ides reviewed the developments 
s ince the s igning of the Simla agreematit. Relat ions between 
the two countries were bogged down on the repatr ia t ion of 
POWs and exchange of Bengalies in Pakistan. 
, e f f e c t o f FUNDAMENTALISM, ISLAM 
38. BRHAIXJR (KallnO . I s lamic fundamentalism and Indo - Pak 
r e l a t i o n s , Ijn^  Seminar on Indo - Pak r e l a t i o n s (New Delhi) 
(1984) . Studies in Indo - Pak re la t ions* Papers. Ed by 
VD Chopra. 251-8. 
Alnost a l l the shades of Indian Is lamic fundamenta-
l i s t s opposed the Pakistan movemeat. VThereas the majority 
of Indian Ulama belonging t o the Jarolat-ul-Ulamat-1-Hlnd. 
Paki s tan ' s rul ing c l a s s e s had wanted to use Is lamic s o l i -
dar i ty in i t s s truggle with India over the i s s u e of Kashmir, 
Paki s tan ' s Is lamic fundamentalists have been as mach obsessed 
with India as the ru lers of Pakistan. Moreover, Pakistan 
had some agreements with India which had not been abrogated 
and diplomatic r e l a t i o n s between the two countr ies were being 
maintained, in such a s i tua t ion the war in Kashmir was not 
a Jihad. Is lamic fundamentalists have seen India as a 
Hindu s t a t e . On the indo - Pak r e l a t i o n s Is lamic fundamenta-
l i s t would continue to spearhead the most aggress ive and 
communal elements in Pakistan. 
• e f f e c t o f PERSIAN GULF 
39. TAHIR-KHELI (Shirin) . India, Pakistan and the Persian Gulf. 
In t h i r t y f i f t h roefeting of Association Studies (San Pran-
s i sco) (1983) I Prospects for detente in South Asia: Internal 
and External fac tor in India - Pakistan r e l a t i o n s . Asian 
Affa irs 10,3; 1983 P a l l ; 24-31. 
The involvement of India and Pakistan with the 
countr ies of the Persian Gulf region accelerated af ter 
1971. The impetus for improved and c lo ser r e l a t i o n s with 
the Persian Gulf countr ies came from PaJcistan. Pakis tan's 
task has become more complicated in recent years . From 
1971 to 1979, Islamabad augmented i t s needs by de l ibera te ly 
s h i f t i n g i t s focus from South Asia to Southwest Asia. After 
1979, Southwest Asia no longer seemed so f r e e of trouble 
and cos t t o Palcistan. The recent es^hasis of Pakistani 
po l i cy 
fore ign/on the search for a permanwat normalisation with 
India i s as much a recognit ion of the problems of the Gulf 
as i t i s an acceptance of Ind ia ' s primacy in South Asia. 
• e f f e c t o f POLITICS, INTERNAL, PAKISTAN 
40. GANDHI (Indira) . Se lected Statements* Indo - Pak r e l a t i o n s . 
India Quart 41, 1; 1985, Jan- Mar; 129-35. 
We are not a fra id of Pakistan; But we do r e a l i s e 
that the danger i s not so much from Pakistan as i t i s 
from those forces who envisage confrontation on t h i s sub-
cont inent . I t i s in our i n t e r e s t that the e f f o r t to turn 
the face of Pakistan from i t s Past hatred and b i t t e r n e s s to 
a new future of peace and fr iendship i s supported by u s . 
With the Simla agreement India i s in a b e t t e r pos i t ion to 
f a c e the fu ture . Pakistan cannot be allowed to seek a 
so lu t ion of i t s p o l i t i c a l or other problems at the expense 
of India and on Indian s o i l . The suppression of democracy 
i s the o r i g i n a l cause of a l l the trouble in Pakistan. 
41 . INDIA AND Benazir, e d i t o r i a l . Tl; 1986, 6, 25; 8 . 
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Gen Zia-ul-Haq has charged that India i s s e c r e t l y 
f inancing to Miss Benazir Bhutto's current p o l i t i c a l com-
paln . The external Affairs Ministry has promptly refuted 
t h i s preposteroui a l legat ion . Internat ional Media has 
recorded the extent and warmth of her reception in various 
Pakistani c i t i e s and i t cannot be any body's connection 
that publ ic demonstrations on such a manmonth s c a l e could 
be the handiwork of a foreign power. I t cannot and need 
not be denied that press and p o l i t i c a l l eaders in India 
have shown considerable I n t e r e s t in popular response to 
Miss Bhutto in Pakistan. This i s e n t i r e l y because she i s 
deemed to be a r a l l y i n g point f o r democratic f o r c e s in 
Pakistan. 
42. MUSHAHID HUSAIN. Pak po l i cy on India has not changed. TIj 
1989, 8 , 2 . 
In the wave of recent e f f o r t s of the PPP government 
to promote normalisation of r e l a t i o n s with India, Ms Bhutto 
i s under attack from the oppos i t ion . I n t e r e s t i n g l y , in a 
couple of key areas where Pakistan and India have improved 
r e l a t i o n s under the new c i v l l i a m government, the b a s i s was 
l a i d during the previous regime. The problem for the PPP 
government regarding i t s guest for b e t t e r t i e s with India 
w i l l be two-fo ld . ' ^ " 
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43. PM: Pak interference has affected relations, ed i tor ia l . 
Patriot? 1986, 10, 13. 
The involvement of Pakistan in the internal affairs 
of India, particularly assistance and training to terror is ts 
from across the border, has affected Indo - Pak relat ions . 
There was "very d i f in i te ly involvement from across the 
border" Mr Gandhi said in an interview. India has very 
hard information that terrorist were being helped, assisted 
and trained by Pakistan, th i s has always affected our 
re lat ions . 
44. RICHIER (William L) . Domestic factors in Pakistan's India 
pol icy. In_ Thirty f i f t h meeting of Association Studies 
(San Fransisoo) (1983) t Prospects for detente in South 
Asia: Internal and External factor in India-Palcistan rela-
t i ons . Asian Affaits 10, 3; 1983, Pall; 24-31. 
Despite the po l i t i ca l frustration of martial law 
and of the unfulf i l led promises to restore c ivi l ian male, 
the present regime im Pakistan has taken greater steps 
towards normalisation of relations with India than any of 
i t s predecessors. Whether the present direction of policy 
can be sustained probably depends more upon external than 
internal factors, but increased domestic po l i t i ca l turmoil 
could create problems. The relat ive absence of domestic 
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c r i t i c i s m of Pakis tan's current India po l i cy bodes wel l 
f o r i t s continuation beyond the l i f e of the current regime, 
but the reso lut ion of d i f f i c u l t i s s u e s l i k e Kashmir remain 
uncer ta in . 
45, SABHERWAL (OP) • What clouds indo - Pak r e l a t i o n s . Main-
stream 18, 48; 1980, 7, 26; 3 - 4 . 
Minis ter ia l l e v e l t a l k s between India Pakistan that 
have taken p lace during the l a s t few years , have brought 
t o the surface a dual trend in the r e l a t i o n s between the 
t%*o countr ies . The des ire for normalization of r e l a t i o n s , 
f o r c los ing the chapter of animosity and c o n f l i c t and 
fosteirih^ c l o s e t i e s * beginning with economic and cul tural 
spheres i s one d i s c e r n i b l e trend, Islamabad Junta, there -
f o r e , moves between the dev i l and the deep sea, the f i r s t 
beginning domestic compulsion, and the second Islamabad 
external t i e s - u p . I t i s on there two denominators that the 
shape of Indo - Pakistan r e l a t i o n s depend. 
46. SARSEN (Rajendra) . P o l i t i c a l scene in Pakistan, IPSA 
Journal 13, 2; 1980, Oct - Dec? 217-34. 
Pakistan i s un l ike ly to a t ta in p o l i t i c a l harmony 
under Gen Zia ' s r u l e . For a l l i t s tough postures , the 
ru l ing Mil i tary junta e s s e n t i a l l y remain vulnerable . The 
f a i l u r e of P o l i t i c a l system in Pakistan ten be traced 
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to the domination in the early period of nat ional p o l i t i c s 
by leadersii*»o ndgrated from India to the new country in 
1947. Another source of i n s t a b i l i t y i s the manifestation 
of sectar ian ant gonisms rooted in the theo log ica l dogmas 
which div ide the musiims of Pakistan, The hoplessness of 
war against India appears to have f i n a l l y reg i s t ered on 
the nat ional psyche of Pakistan, Hence Ind ia ' s diplomatic 
thrus t should be to'reassure Pakistan, 
47. THAPAR (Karan) , Uaderstanding Pakistan. HT; 1980, 4, 12, 
Prom the standpoint pf b i l a t e r a l , sub-cont inental 
r e l a t i o n s , the important point about Pakistan i s that i t 
has not come to terms with i t s e l f Pa3cistan i s in search of 
an Is lamic Ident i ty and for t h i s i t has de l ibera te ly iden-
t i f i e d i t s e l f with the Is lamic countries on i t s west . But 
the p e r s i s t i n g c u l t u r a l , f a m i l i a l and geographical a f f i n i -
t i e s that l i n k Pakistan with India are also the r e a l i t i e s 
which Pakistan cannot erode. The people of Pakistan look 
towards India and f e e l that they could have a lso progressed 
i f they were given a f a i r chance by t h e i r government. At 
the popwlar l e v e l there i s no animosity for India , People 
on both s i d e s of borders only r e l a t e through the processes 
the govt provide for them. The Govt of India and the Govt 
of Pakistan need therefore , show an understanding towards 
each other . 
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48. V2NKAT NARA.YAN (S) , Hope of new era in Indo - Pak r e l a t i o n s . 
Patriot? 1988, 10, 2 . 
The party based parliamentary e l e c t i o n in t h i s 
country, may v e r i l y herald the beginning of a new era in 
India-Pakistan r e l a t i o n s . During Zia-ul-Haq's 11- years 
r u l e , r e l a t i o n s between the two countries had h i t an a l l 
time low. The g « i e r a l * s f i v e v i s i t to India and h i s e ight 
meetings with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in India and 
abroad did not help change the t ense b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n -
s h i p . The two most important reasons f o r the souring of 
b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s are Ind ia ' s b e l i e f that Pakistan aiding 
and abett ing s ikh t e r r o r i s t s to create trouble in Punjab 
and Pakistan nuclear programme. 
, _ - , _ , - , MILITARY 
49. KUKEREJA (Veena) , Mil i tary intervent ion in p o l i t i c s : 
Contrasting cases of Pakistan and India. India Quart 
38, 3 & 4; 1982, July-Dec; 302-14, 
Hie Pakistani and Indian p o l i t i c a l systems share many 
common fea tures re la t ing to h i s tory , mi l i tary organisat ion 
and over a l l areal cul ture , the two systems have displayed 
contrast ing patterns of c i v i l mi l i tary r e l a t i o n s . The 
armies of both the countries inher i t ed the B r i t i s h Indian 
m i l i t a r y t r a d i t i o n s of non-involvement in p o l i t i c s , but in 
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Pakistan the army eroded t h i s t rad i t ion by intervening 
d e c i s i v e l y and frequently whereas in India, the p r i n c i p l e 
c i v i l i a n supermacy remains i n t a c t . Their post independence 
development, composition, and r e l a t i o n s h i p with the c i v i l i a n 
authority has been markedly d i f f e r e n t . This has a d irec t 
bearing upon the divergent ro l e s of the armies of the two 
c o u n t r i e s . Given the var ie ty of hypotheses that have been 
suggested as explanations for the contrast ing behaviour of 
the two successor armies of B r i t i s h India . 
, FOREIGN POLICIES 
50. BANBRJBB (Jyotirmoy) • Hot and cold diplomacy in Indo-
Pakistan r e l a t i o n s . Asian Survey 23, 3j 1983 Mar; 280-301. 
The Afghan c r i s i s renewed US s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t in 
m i l i t a r y co-operation with Zia-ul-Haq*s Pakistan. With 
Mrs Indira Gan !^it*s return to power in New Delhi in early 
1980, a game of hot and cold diplomacy accelerated betwe«j 
the two South Asian l e a t e r s . Islamabad have been p r o j e c t -
ing are image of being a modest junior of India which i s 
preoccupied with the Soviet mi l i tary presense in Afghanis-
t a n . Indo - Pakistan r e l a t i o n s reached a new low in Feb 
1982 over Kashmir. Top-level t a l k s and publ ic r e l a t i o n s 
ge s tures notwithstanding, the h i s t o r i c mutual mistrust 
lurks beneath the surface as seen in the need f o r a new 
pact desp i te the 197 2 Simla Agreement. 
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5 1 , BARAL (JK), Indo - Pale diplomacy s ince 1981: Motivaticai, 
s t r a t e g i e s and prospects . Foreign .Affairs ReT»rt 35, 4&5; 
1986, i^r-May; 29-47. 
Pakistan has sent several 'peace' proposals to 
India: Kowar pact . Ratio Fornula, and South Asia as a 
nuclear Weapons Free Zone. I t may be pert inent to re fer 
t o Z i a ' s advice to New Delhi to maintain a low p r o f i t for 
sake of peace in the sub-continent . I t i s not prec i s e ly 
c l e a r whet Gen 2 i a means by'low key* what he expect, India 
t o do when he impliedly advised Mrs Gandhi to maintain 
•Low Key*. The dual between Pakistan's proposal of No War 
Pact and Indians proposal of Treaty of peace and fr iendship 
i s r e a l l y a game of one-up-manship between these two count-
r i e s . Pakistan wants a No war Pact with India without much 
improvement in s o c i a l , cul tural and economic r e l a t i o n s . I t 
argues that a pledgd by both countries that ne i ther would 
go to war would lead to improvement in over a l l r e l a t i o n s 
between the«i. 
52. BASHIRUDDIN AHMAD, Pakistan: An unending quest f o r v a l i -
dat ion . China ReTX>rt 18, 4; 1982, July-Aag; 35-57. 
This paper deals with changes in Pakistan foreign 
p o l i c y and publ ic opinion towards India and draws the 
impl ica t ions of these changes for Indo-Pak r e l a t i o n s . 
Pakis tan's foreign po l i cy has a larger se t of o b j e c t i v e s 
Ok 
than mere pre-occupation with India , and these are sought 
to be rea l ized in a time-frame of long durat ion. Having 
f a i l e d to resolve the i ssue of the character of i t s s t a t e 
and formulate durable const i tu t ion Pakistan has looked 
for success a l l these years in the f i e l d of foreign r e l a t i ons . 
With the rea l i za t ion tha t I n d i a ' s i n d u s t r i a l , mi l i t a ry and 
p o l i t i c a l development close the option for Pakistan to 
gain se l f - r e ipec t in i t s own eyes and tha t of the 
world community. I t s attempts to make up with India i s 
one of the f i r s t s teps in the r ea l i s a t ion of t h i s objective* 
There i s considerable public support in Pakistan for nor-
malising i t s r e l a t i ons with India and widespread admiration 
for the allround development reg i s te red by the l a t t e r , 
53. BHOGAL (Parminder S) . Pak is tan ' s India pol icy-Shif t from 
Zia to Benazir. India Quarterly 45 ,1 ; 1990, Jan-Kar; 35-45. 
Pakis tan ' s foreign policy mainly revolves round i t s 
Ind ia pol icy, the reason being the h i s t o r i c a l background 
of Indo - Fak r e l a t i o n s . However, with the change of 
leadership in Pakistan. Some changes were brought in the 
countr ies policy towards Ind ia . General Zia adopted a 
hawkish policy of convest war with India and also meddled 
in I n d i a ' s in te rna l e thnic problems. Even in SAARC, Zia 
maintained h o s t i l e pos tures . Besides another controversial 
i s sue of Siachen Glacier emerged during h i s e ra . After 
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Z i a ' s death Benazir came to power and es tabl ished a demo-
c r a t i c form of government, her arrival would help improve 
b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i ons between the two neighbours. Although 
ear ly months of Benazir ' s ru le were encouraging and there 
has been a &hift from Z ia ' s beaten t rack , yet remains to 
be seen whether the re would be an actual improvement in 
In do - Pak r e l a t i ons in the long run or not . 
54, BOSE (Pradip) , Future demands b e t t e r Indo - Fak r e l a t i ons . 
Janata 37, 19; 1982, 6, 20; 7-9. 
The demand of the future which wi l l have increasing 
influence in the thinking, fee l ing and behaviour of the 
two people, and tha t wi l l exest a more pos i t ive influence 
on the r e l a t ionsh ip between the two countr ies in the 
fu tu re . Diplomats of both countr ies often f ind themselves 
in an endaarassing posi t ion of having to explain controver-
c i a l statements on the Indo - Pakistan r e l a t i onsh ip . The 
a f f e r of no- war pact by Pakistani president was not 
genuine, and was meant primari ly to influence the US 
congressional opinion in favour of the US m i l i -
t a r y supplies to Pakistan. 
55. GOHEN (Stephen Philip) and WEINB/4JM (Marvin G) , Pakistan 
in 1981: Staying on Asian Survey 22, 2; 1982 Feb; 136-46. 
In 1981 Pakistan demonstrated a sophis t ica t ion in 
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I t s foreign r e l a t i o n s . The year saw the revival of a 
s t r a t e g i c r e l a t ionsh ip with US, the i n i t i a t i v e of a no-
war agreement with m d i a , several important Islamic s t a -
t e s , and even the USSR. This s k i l l f u l l y conceived and 
implemented foreign policy r e f l e c t s the two domestic con-
t r a i n t s of mi l i t a ry bureaucra t ic necess i ty and popular 
supports for non-alignment, 
56. FOREIGN POLICY issues of Pakistan: Indo-Pakistan r e l a t i o n s 
S t r a t eg i c Studies 10, 3; 1987, Spr; 106. 
The turbulence recent ly esqierienced in Pakistan 
India r e l a t i ons has one important lesson t o of fe r . The 
dialogue between the two countr ies must oontinue to avoid 
per iods of regression and despondency. Prudence demands 
t h a t the two countr ies remain firmly engaged in the task 
of improving r e l a t i o n s . While we shallpursue the para-
mount object ive of es tab l i sh ing a good neighbourly and 
cooperative r e l a t i o n s with India, which we bel ieve i s the 
l o g i c a l l y course d i l t a t e d by h is tory and geography, we are 
also constrained to note some unhelpful t rends in India . 
57. GHOSH (Partha S) , India - Pakistan r e l a t i o n s : Problem and 
prospects . Foreign Affairs Retx>rts 32, 5; 1983, May; 70-85. 
I n d i a ' s Foreign policy in the South Asian region being 
l a r g e l y dependent on I t s r e l a t i o n s with Pakistan, a c lear 
understanding of the problem involved imperative. The 
problem that b e s e t s Indo - Pak r e l a t i o n s i s thus two f o l d : 
f i r s t , i t perta ins to the nat ional ethos of both the coun-
t r i e s , par t i cu lar ly Pakistan; and second, to the interna-
t i o n a l system which seldom allows a small power to play 
a ro l e independent of the super power systems par t i cu lar ly 
in a s t r a t e g i c area. 
58. HAQQjttJI (HUSAIN) , Ready for peace, or War: Pakistan seeks 
t o ease tens ions with India but prepares for war. Far East 
Boon Review 135, 7; 1987, 2, 12? 16-7. 
Pakistan* s armed f o r c e s are in a s t a t e of b a t t l e 
preparedness, desp i te Islamabad's avowed preference f o r 
diplomatic measures t o defuse tension on the border with 
India . PaMstan would continue t o "press precautionary 
measures in to action without any overt alarm* in response 
t o I n d i a ' s massive mi l i tary mobi l i sa t ion . Although Indo-
Pakistan r e l a t i o n s have been tense s ince l a s t November, 
the current e sca la t ion fol lowed I n d i a ' s demand for a wi th-
drawal of Pakistani troops engaged in mi l i tary e x e r c i s e s 
along the border. 
59. INDO - PAK t a l k s : Z ia ' s diplomatic weapons. Link 25, 3; 
1982, 8, 29; 14-5. 
88 
Good nelghboutly r e l a t i o n s between India and Palcis-
tan are necessary for peace not only in the sub-continent 
but in the whole of South Asia. At the o f f i c i a l level 
t a l k s , not only was I n d i a ' s f r iendship t r e a t y proposal 
discussed but also i t s suggestions for the se t t ing up of a 
j o i n t indo - Pak economic oonunission. Relations between 
these two sides have passed through many ups and downs. 
Between India and Pakistan there are many porblems and 
i s s u e s : the occupied areas of Kashmir, r i v e r water dispute, 
e t c . much more se r ious . The supply of P-16 a i r c r a f t capable 
of h i t t i n g t a r g e t s deep ins ide India including our nuclear 
power generation and research f a c i l i t i e s have added a new 
dimension to Indo - Pak discord. In short , r e l ig ious 
fanat ic ism, lack of democracy, aggressive mi l i t a ry posturs 
backed by massive US arms there are some of the major causes 
of lack of accord and fr iendship between India and Pakistan. 
This i s the crux of Indo - Pak r e l a t i o n s . 
60. JDSHI (VT). Bet ter indo - Pak t i e s foreseen, Tl; 1988,9,23. 
What wi l l be the shape of indo - Pak r e l a t i ons in the 
2 I s t century? The occasion was pregnant with p o s s i b i l i t y 
of an i n c i s i v e , object ive and educated review of Indo- Pak 
r e l a t i o n s . I t was a l l the more surpris ing tha t Gen Kamal 
Matinuddin seemed to i n v i t e an exposition of the Pakistani 
89 
mind* ra the r than question to e l i c l t e information or 
r ec t i f y wrong perceptions for the betterment of r e l a t i ons 
between the two count r ies . The only s i l v e r l in ing came 
from a formet pakis tani diplomat who largely endorsed 
the robust and op t imis t i c proposi t ions of the Indian envoy, 
and suggested tha t Indo-Pakistan t i e s were bound to improve 
in the next century because of the changing global s i t u a -
t ion and the breath - taking technological advances. 
61. JDSHI (VT) . Indo - Pak t i e s under a cloud. TI; 1985,10,10. 
With v i r t ua l standing matches on one score or another 
in the Past few weeks, Indo-Fak r e l a t i ons appears to be 
coming under a cloud again, if not exactly heading for a 
c r i s i s . Close on the heels of a sharp rebuke from the 
Pakistan foreign off ice for I n d i a ' s "insinuations'* regard-
ing the attempt on Mr Rajiv Gandhi's l i f e at Rajghat l a s t 
week comes the accusation of India s double standards on 
the acquis i t ion of arms by the two count r ies . 
62. JOSHI (VT). Posi t ive t rends in Indo-Pak r e l a t i o n s . TI; 
1989, 5, 29. 
The long-awaited meeting between the Home Secre tar ies 
of Pakistan and India , reinforcing the promising trend in 
b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i ons since the two prime Ministers met 
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l a s t Deceniber, The tone and tenor of the discussions on 
c ruc ia l border i s sues was said to be happily devoid of 
polemics or acrimony. Both s ides s ta ted t h e i r concems 
and apprehensions c lear ly and ca tegor ica l ly . The hope of 
inrprovement in the ground s i tua t ion ra ised by the Islamabad 
meeting are va l id dep«ads on what happens in the next few 
months. 
63. KATYAL (KK), Relations with India— Z ia ' s con t rad ic t ions . 
Hindu? 1980, 6, 2. 
The Indian publ ic i s not to blame if i t f e e l s 
bewildered by the conf l ic t ing poin ters from Pakistan about 
i t s ideas on b i l a t e r a l r e l a t ionsh ip . But Pakis tan ' s a t t i -
tude would continue to be ambiguous and India should recog-
n i s e i t as an e s sen t i a l par t of the diplomatic r e a l i t y and 
deal with i t accordingly. I t has not been poss ib le to 
efface the old memories from the minds of Pakistani r u l e r s . 
But there are pos i t ive developments also in the In do - Pak 
r e l a t i o n s , l i k e promotion of tourism and t rade between 
the two count r ies , 
54. MOHAMMAD SARWAR. Indian Foreign Relations in South Asia 
Jan-JUne 1987: Indo - Pakistan. South Asian Studies 4,2; 
1989, JUly-Dec; 7 6-88, 
The Indian diplomacy remained bogged down in i t s nore 
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inanediate neighbourhood with no signs of any improvement 
in her r e l a t i o n s with Pakistan, indo - Pakistan r e l a t i ons 
during the period under review remained clouded under 
border tension, accusation by India on Pakis tan ' s nuclear 
programme and Pak i s tan ' s involvement in East Punjab, The 
forces of the two countr ies cewie to the close to f igh t 
a f t e r the Indian operation of Brasstacks. The armed forces 
on both sides moved in forward pos i t ions along the Punjab 
border and were pwt on "red a l e r t " . In annual report of 
the External Affairs Ministry r e i t e r a t e d India 's des i re to l i v e 
in peace and good neighbourly r e l a t i ons with Pakistan 
demonstrated. The Pakis tan ' s Foreign Minister informed 
t h a t establishment of tension f ree good neighbourly r e l a t -
tLons with India on the bas i s of equal i ty of Pakistan 
foreign pol icy. 
65. PANDIT (CS) . Hopes of Indo - Pak understanding on firmer 
garound. Ipdian Nation? 1986, 1, 9 . 
This week wi l l witness a f resh and determined beginn-
ing on the Part of India and Pakistan to normalise t h e i r 
r e l a t i o n s . For onething; the e f fo r t s tha t wi l l be set in 
nation are the d i r ec t r e su l t of the agreement reached 
between President Zia-ul-Haq and the Prime Minister Mr 
Rajiv Gandhi, during the former 's stopover in New Delhi 
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l a s t month on h i s way back from h i s o f f i c i a l v i s i t to 
rocaldives, apart from reaching a solemn understanding not 
to a t tack each o thers nuclear i n s t a l l a t i o n s fiaesd a firm 
time frame to reac t iva te the dialogue at various p o l i t i c a l 
and o f f i c i a l l eve l s to sor t out differences tha t p e r s i s t 
between the two countr ies , 
66. SALAMKP itt.1. Back t o the old r e f r a in : Indo- Pakistani 
r e l a t i o n s worsen yet again. Par East Boon Review 134,47; 
1986, 11, 20; 52. 
Last years high lK>pes of a thaw in Indo-Pakistan 
r e l a t i o n s have faded away a t la&t. The two countr ies are 
now back to t h e i r usual no-war-no-peace r e l a t ionsh ip New 
DelVJi seems reconciled to the view tha t i t has managed to 
get alon^ without normalisation with Islamabad so f a r and 
can continue to do so for the forsceaible fu tu re . The hopes 
of breakthrough in b i l a t e r a l t i e s had reached t h e i r beght 
a t the end of l a s t year following a s e r i e s of events . 
However, even as the mutual recriminations continue un-
abated - Pakistan also has i t s long l i t any of complaints 
foreign analyst do not expect an outbreak of major armed 
h o s t i l i t i e s . 
67, SALAMAT ALL Obstacle remain: Indo-Pak normalisation 
hurdles ou t l ined . Far East Boon. Review 135, 11; 1987, 
3 , 12; 35-6. 
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A verbal agreement between Gandhi and Zia not to 
a t t ack each o t h e r ' s nuclear establishments was announced 
in Deceirber 1985 But a formal one i s s t i l l awaited. Against 
a backdrop of continuing Sikh ter ror ism la rge ly blamed in 
Ind ia on Pakis tan ' s support for separatism the two s t a t e -
ments had ra ised hopes for the removal of a t l e a s t one main 
hurdle to normalisat ion. However, the opt imis ts did not 
seem to have taken in to account the complexities of domes-
t i c compulsion t h a t s teer both countr ies ' foreign pol icy. 
68. ZIRING (Lawrance) . Pakistan and Indiax P o l i t i c s , Persona-
l i t i e s and Foreign Policy. Asian Survey 17, 7> 1978, 
July; 706 - 30. 
I n d i a ' s Foreign Policy was also shaped by i t s 
s t r a ined r e l a t i ons with Pakistan. In sp i t e of p ro te s t a -
t i o n s to the contrary, I n d i a ' s primary object ive lay in 
peu t r a l i z ing Pakis tan ' s mi l i ta ry capab i l i ty . All matters 
considered, i t s foreign policy continues to be influenced 
by fea r and bittex^ness toward Ind ia . I t therefore continues 
t o judge the US by i t s remoteness or intimacy with i t s 
l a r g e r neighbour and sworn enemy.. 
,-- . , DIPLOfMCY 
69. INDO - PAK Talks. Current Topics 10,8; 1984, July ; 472. 
The t a l k between the Indian and Pakistan Foreign 
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S e c r e t a r i e s of May 20 cjovered the whole range of Indo-Pak 
re la t ions— the Treaty of Friendship and cooperation 
o f f ered by India and the Non-aggression Pact o f fered by 
Pakistan. They a l so signed an agreement on group tourism 
and exchange l e t t e r s on amending v i s a r u l e s . 
70 . MADHU LIMAY8. India and Pakistan* Some comron problems. 
Mainstream; 1982, Republic Day; 15-8. 
Some Indian I n t e l l e c t u a l s , tend t o adopt a superior 
moral a t t i tude towards Pakistan. The f a c t of the matter 
I s that the Indian p o l i t y and s o c i e t y are plaugoedby the 
same problem as our Immediate neighbour. When Pakistan 
f e l l under mi l i tary d ic ta torsh ip Jawaher Lai Nehru was at 
the helm of our a f f a i r s . Neverthless alarming tendencies 
azBvis ib le everywhere which connot but ra i se doubts about 
the future of democratic I n s t i t u t i o n l i k e judic iary , the 
press and the l e g i s l a t u r e s . Just as fundament a l l sm and 
obscurantism are playing havoc with Pali£stai and the 
musllm community here, s o c i a l exe lus lveness of the Hindu 
s o c i e t y and the u t t e r s e l f i s h n e s s and aggr^.dlsement of 
I t s rul ing e l i t e are threatening Indian democracy with 
a n n i h i l a t i o n . 
7 1 . PAKISTAN: Indo - Pak Joint Press Statement, Foreign 
Affa irs Record 31, 8; 1985, Aug; 251. 
95 
The Fore ign S e c r e t a r i e s no ted wi th s a t i s f a c t i o n 
t h a t meetings a t d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s between I n d i a and 
Pak i s t an were becoming r e g u l a r and f r e q u e n t . They met 
f o u r tiroes t h i s y e a r . There was a candid review of 
v a r i o u s a s p e c t s of Indo - Pak r e l a t i o n s in a c o r d i a l and 
c o n s t r u c t i v e atmosphere. Both s i d e s sought f u r t h e r c l a s s i -
f i c a t i o n s and agreed t o cont inue e f f o r t s aimed a t t h e 
conc lus ion of a comprehensive t r e a t y between two c o u n t r i e s , 
, FOREIGN POLICY, PAKISTAN 
7 2 . CHOPRA (Surendra) Evolut ion of P a k i s t a n ' s fo re ign p o l i c y 
and i t s r e l a t i o n s wi th I n d i a . In. Seminar on Indo - Pak 
r e l a t i o n s (New Delhi) (1984) . S tud i e s i n Indo - Pak 
r e l a t i o n s * p a p e r s . Ed by VD Chopra. 231 - 46. 
P a l d s t a n ' s fo re ign p o l i c y i s an impor tant and 
c h a l l e n g i n g sub jec t which has engaged t h e i n t e r e s t of 
many a n a l y s t s and r e s e a r c h e r s . Her p o l i c y can be d iv ided 
i n t o f o u r p e r i o d s ~ 1947 t o 1954, 1954 t o 1958, 1958 t o 
1971 and t h e p e r i o d s ince 1971, The one t h r e a d running 
throughout t h e s e fou r phases has been t h a t P a k i s t a n ' s 
f o r e i g n p o l i c y had been I n d i a — c e n t e r e d . The h i s t o r y 
of Indo - Pak r e l a t i o n s has been mainly a s t o r ^ of con-
f l i c t and d i s c o r d , mutual d i s t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n . I t 
has r e s u l t e d from a nuntoer of i n t r i c a t e f a c t o r s l i k e 
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legacy, the difference in religion, conflicting national 
interests and objectives of ideology divergent perception 
of the world situation, perception of each other and of 
themselves and various bilateral disputes including Kash-
mir, This is in brief is the legacy whlich determined the 
psche of the elites of the two countries and conditioned 
their bilateral relations, A part from this major deter-
minant there are other determinants which have influenced 
Indo - Pak relations, 
, — , _ , e f f e c t o f COMMONWEALTH 
73 , ISLAM (Z) , Pak is tan ' s foreign policy i ssue since her with-
drawal from the Commonwealth. Pakistan Horizon 27,2; 1974j 
3 - 1 7 . 
Pakistan withdrawal from the comnonwealth in the 
wake of the t o t a l l y unprincipled stand of senior common-
wealth members towards the dismemberment of the country 
through naked aggression. Ever s ince, Pak is tan ' s policy 
v i s - a - v i s Br i ta in and other commonwealth countr ies i s 
based upon b i l a t e r a l i s m . Pakistan has pursued r e l e n t l e s s l y 
her policy of normalising r e l a t i ons with Bangladesh and 
India but i t firmly opposed to hegemonism in the region. 
She has closely i den t i f i ed herself with the causes and 
asp i ra t ions of Third World, strengthened bonds with Maslim 
h ( 
countr i e s and stood f irmly by a l l people f i g h t i n g opera-
t i o n , aggression, intervent ion subversion and e x p l o i t a t i o n . 
, — , - , e f f e c t o f POLITICS, INTERNAL 
74 , GUPTA (S) • Pakis tan's domestic c r i s i s and fore ign policy— 
problem of i d e n t i t y and r e l a t i o n s with India , South Asian 
Studies 7, 1; 1972, Jan; 114 - 26. 
There has been a c lear i n t e r - r e la t ion between 
the in terna l developments in Pakistan and evaluat ion of 
i t s foreign p o l i c y . The mi l i tary a l l i a n c e with the USA 
strengthened the pos i t i on of the armed forces as a fac tor 
in Pakistani p o l i t i c s and endx>ldened them to impose an 
authoritarian structure on a highly complex s o c i e t y . The 
c o n f l i c t with India severe ly s trained the concept of a 
s i n g l e Pakistani nat ion, s ince much of Pakistani uni ty 
depended on the acceptance of the f a c t of a common sub-
cont inental c i v i l i z a t i o n , 
, —, - , e f f e c t of SUPER POWERS 
7 5 . MUSHAHID HUSAIN. Pakis tan's foreign po l i cy : An Exercise 
in t i g h t rope walking, Pakistan Jotrmal of American 
s t u d i e s 2 , 2 ; 1984, Sep; 14 - 2 1 . 
There are b a s i c a l l y two major in f luences on Pakistan 
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foreign policy, domestic and regional . I t s locat ion which 
s t radd les the v o l a t i l e middle East and an unstable South 
Asia makes Pakistan a key element in the foreign policy 
of both super power as well as countries in the region. 
Regional i n s t a b i l i t y has not proved adverse in short term. 
The other main influence on Pakis tan is foreign policy i s 
the region i t s e l f , where both super powers are engaged in 
a l t e rna t ing po l i c i e s of collusion and contension for spheres 
of inf luence . The India fac tor has been dec is ive . B i l a t e ra l 
r e l a t i o n s have now reached a new phasej the i n s t i t u t i o n of 
a j o i n t commission and Pak i s tan ' s offer of a no-war pact 
followed by India ' s proposal for a t r ea ty of f r iendship, 
although Palcistan's nuclear programme i s also seen by 
India as a major f l ash point in b i l a t e r a l t i e s . 
— , —, - , effect of U S A 
76. SITANSHU DAS. Benazi r ' s India policy and the US. Link 31, 
18; 1988, 12, 11; 4-5 . 
America cas t i t s weight behind Benazir Bhutto and 
persuaded the Pakistan mi l i ta ry high command to except her 
as Prime Minister . Benazir has accepted the real p o l i t i k 
of the Pakistan s i tua t ion by pl ight ing her word tha t she , 
would not touch the militarY budget. The new Primer 's 
Foreign Policy mirrors the care which has gone in to the 
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making of her p o l i c y . Benazi r B h u t t o ' s I n d i a p o l i c y o f f e r s 
h igh hope and some fo r ebod ings . Her I n d i a p o l i c y , i t I s 
fe i rvent ly hoped i s he r own and i s not t h e o t h e r s i d e of 
what she o b l i g e d , by fo r ce of c i rcumstances t o pursue in 
r e l a t i o n t o Afghanistan and t h e USSR, 
—.-, GEOPOLITICS 
7 7 . CHAUDHRI (MohOTimad Ahsen) . G e o p o l i t i c a l f a c t o r i n Pakistan-
I n d i a R e l a t i o n s . Pak is tan Horizon 40, 1; 1987; 30 - 50. 
Even a f t e r 39 y e a r s of Independence, r e l a t i o n 
between Pakis tan and I n d i a remain in a s t a t e of f l u x . 
P a k i s t a n ' s o f f e r of no-war pac t has no t r ece ived a very 
p o s i t i v e Indian r e sponse . I t seems t h a t I n d i a has y e t 
t o r e o o n c i l i t s e l f t o the e x i s t e n c e of Pakis tan as a 
sovere ign s t a t e . At any r a t e t h e p rocess of no rma l i s a t i on 
of r e l a t i o n s between I n d i a and Pak i s t an r e c e i v e d an impe-
t u s a f t e r t h e change of l e a d e r s h i p i n I n d i a and Pakis tan 
i n 1977, Pak is tan would l i k e t o l i v e i n peace w i th I n d i a 
b u t no t a t t h e expense of i t s sovereign r i g h t s . Moreover, 
r i v a l r y between I n d i a and Pak i s t an i s enhancing t h e i n f l u -
ence of super powers i n t h e r e g i o n . 
7 8 , COHEN (Stephen Ph i l i p ) . G e o s t r a t e g i c f a c t o r s in I n d i a -
Pak i s t an r e l a t i o n s . In_ T h i r t y f i f t h meeting of Associa-
t i o n of Asian S t u d i e s (San Prans i sco) (1983): P rospec t s 
f o r detente In South Aslat Internal and External f a c t o r s 
in India - Palcistan r e l a t i o n s . Asian Affairs 10, 3; 
1983, P a l l ; 24 - 3 1 . 
Ul»n independence, India in part icu lar re jec ted 
the kind of geos t ra teg i c l o g i c so care fu l ly developed by 
the B r i t i s h , Instead, Nehru sought t o d e f l e c t I n d i a ' s 
important neighbours with good w i l l , whi le Pakistani l e a -
ders proclaimed t h e i r support of the "great game," t h e i r 
concerns were primarily d irected against the much larger 
and b e t t e r ei|Qi^ p^>ed India . A number of f a c t o r s r e s t upon 
boundary between region and the border in ternat iona l s y s -
tem. These are by f a r of grea te s t importance t o outs iders 
worried about India and Pakistan's r e l a t i o n s h i p to the 
"arc of c r i s i s , " although not n e c e s s a r i l y with in India or 
Pakistan; the uncertain qua l i ty of Chinese and American 
i n t e r a c t i o n with both Pakistan and India . India and 
Pakistan, the major mi l i tary s t a t e s of South Asia, are 
each locked in a tr ip le s t r u g l e . 
, HISTORY 
79 . BOMBWALL (KR). Indo - Pakistan r e l a t i o n s : Continuing 
Logjam. Current Tbpics 11, 9; 1985, Aug; 539 - 41 . 
In January 1966 India and Pakistan signed the 
Tashkent pact to res tore normal r e l a t i o n s between two 
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coun t r i e s . Likewise in July 1972 Simla agreement envisaged 
noimialisation of r e l a t i o n s . The paradore of Indo - Pakistan 
r e l a t i o n s i s d i f f icwl t to understand. Gen Z i a ' s offer to 
sign a no-war pact with India - Pakistan to make some 
ges ture of ooncilat ion towards India , k new fac tor tha t 
has entered in to the o rb i t of Indo - Pakistan r e l a t i o n s . 
Normalisation wi l l have t o wait t i l l Pakistan i s able to 
make up i t s mind on what kind of an equation i t wants with 
i t s neighbour. Whose hand of f r iendship has always been 
s t re tched towards i t . We re fe r to Pakistan involvement 
with Sikh s e p a r a t i s t s . 
80. CHELLANY (Brahma) . Roots of Indo - Pak conf l i c t . Tl/ 
1988, 3 , 16. 
The o r ig ins of th ree wars between India and Pakistan, 
Dr Sumit Ganguly looks at th ree p r inc ip le i ssues i the 
disengagement s t ra tegy of Br i t i sh colonial Govt the 
p a r t i t i o n ideological differences between the Indian National 
Congress and the Muslim League and dispute over Kashmir. 
The t h r ee wars in 1947-48, 1965 and 1971 were rooted in 
common i s s u e . Two major developments since 1971 have changed 
the s t r a t e g i c and mi l i ta ry equation in the sub-continent 
and diminished the p o s s i b i l i t y of a fourth war between 
Ind ia and Pakistan. In opposition to the Weberian conten-
t ion tha t modernization weakens e thnic t i e s and l o y a l t i e s . 
'} \ d 
c o n f l i c t s In South Asia have shown that t r a d i t i o n a l a t t r i -
b u t e s can e a s i l y adapt t o a modern VIbrld and provide the 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n for group i n t e r e s t s . 
8 1 , CHOPRA (VD) . Indo - Pak re la t ions* A h i s t o r i c a l perspec-
t i v e . In, Seminar on Indo - Pak r e l a t i o n s (New Delhi) 
(1984) , Studies in Indo - Pak re la t ions* Papers. Ed by 
VD Chopra. 259 - 7 0 . 
No o b j e c t i v e study of Indo - Pak irelations i s 
complete without an assessment of the ro l e of imperialism 
in t h i s sub-continent , both before and a f ter the two 
countr ies became independent and sovereign s t a t e s . The 
range of the confrontation did not get beyond the frame-
work of Indo - Pak c o n f l i c t s . Indo - Pak tens ions have 
in ternat iona l ramif icat ions , an e n t i r e l y new development 
dominating Indo - Pak r e l a t i o n s at present . Just as Indo-
Pak r e l a t i o n s , the socio-economic structure of Pakistan 
too has a d irec t and determining inf luence on these r e l a -
t i o n s . Tb say a l l t h i s should not mean that one should 
throw up one* s hands and compeletely rule out the p o s s i b i -
l i t y of bringing Indo - Pak r e l a t i o n s on an even k e e l . 
Fortunately , the main thrust of Indians po l i cy has been 
and continues t o be to nortnalise r e l a t i o n s between the two 
countr i e s . 
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82. JAMIL RASHID, Pakistan and India a t f o r t y . Pa t r i o t ; 
1987, 10, 20. 
On 14 - 15 August 1987, Pakistan and India , the 
twin s t a t e s of the post- imperial sub-continent, ce lebera-
t ed for ty years as independent s t a t e s . I t has be 
repeatedly argued tha t India developed as a bourgeois-
c a p i t a l i s t s t a t e , i t has br ight future in the long run. 
Pakistan has remained in the clutches of imperialism. 
India and Pakistan have been developing in to d i f ferent 
socio-economic and p o l i t i c a l formation. In Pakistan, colo-
n i a l capi ta l ism had created uneven development. The Indian 
was a t rue successor of the colonial s t a t e with a l l i t s 
t r app ings . With these development India and Pakistan 
at fo r ty are moving in d i f ferent d i r ec t i ons . I t i s qu i te 
l eg i t imate to argue tha t in the f i r s t decade, the re were 
s igns t h a t Pakistan was shaping in to a "Secularised" 
soc ie ty . I t was only during the fourth decade tha t re l ig ion 
and r e l i g ious ideology became the focus for confrontation 
and discuss ion. 
83. MANSERGH (Nicholas) . India and Pakistan: Whither have 
they turned? Int Journal 39, 2; 1984,Spr; 466-80. 
Refers to e a r l i e r a r t i c l e in 1958 revi w ing Br i t i sh 
commonwealth Affairs , Problem of wartime cooperation and 
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post war change 1939 - 1952, in which the world in 1947 
waited to see what po l i c i e s India and Pakistan would 
pursue on a t t a in ing independence. Pa r t i cu la r a t ten t ion 
i s given to the ro l e of both countr ies in the ending of 
colonialism, which was heralded by the t r ans fe r of power 
in India to t h e i r reconc i l ia t ion of ant i -colonia l ism with 
commonwealth menibership and to I n d i a ' s conceptual forrtula-
t ion of non-alignment in the Panch Shi la and her leadership 
s t a tu s in the non-aligned World today. In Delhi, in 1947, 
the ending of colonialism in South Asia was thought l i ke ly 
to prove a landmark in World h i s to ry , as momentous in i t s 
way as the French or Russian revolu t ions . How i s i t to be 
reckoned, near ly fo r ty years l a t e r ? 
84. MISRA (KP) , Regional peace and security* Coalesence and 
Clash in Indo - Pakistan r e l a t i o n s . India Quart 40, 3-4; 
1984, July-Dec; 262 - 73 . 
Ever since independence, India and Pakistan have been 
involved in ser ious differences leading sometimes to open 
warfare . The divergences are of a fundamental and multiple 
na ture and they have outs t r ipped convergences. The s i t u a -
t ion i s complicated by the conf l ic t of the super powers. 
India and Pakistan must learn tha t no external power can 
b a i l out t h i r d world countr ies from t h e i r economic and 
secur i ty problems. 
1 5 
85. RAJ ( J ) . Indo - Pakistan r e l a t i ons since the 1971 war— 
An Indian view poin t . Aastral J Po l i t Piist 20, 1; 1974, 
Apr; 22 - 31 . 
The indo - Paid.stan sub - continent has been 
plagued by four conf l i c t s in i t s f i r s t 25 years of freedom. 
There have been two wars in Kashmir, a l imited action in 
Kutch, and the l a t e s t one over the p o l i t i c a l c r i s i s in 
East Pakistan. The f u t i l i t y of continuous confrontation 
was rea l ized both in India and Pa!kistan soon a f te r the 
1971 war. But even af ter the Sinda agreement signed in 
the ear ly hours of 3 July 1972 and the Delhi agreement on 
POWs on 28 August 1973, the bas ic i ssue s t i l l predominates 
the d i s t r u s t of India by Pakistan. The question a r i ses 
as to whether Pakistan i s r ea l ly i n t e r e s t ed in peace and 
ever las t ing f r iendship with India . 
86. RASHID AHMAD. Indo - Pak Ties in a f lux . HT 66, 358; 
1989, 12, 26; 11. 
After the for ty years , Pakistan faces a new c h a l l -
ange in dealing with the nefw Indian leadership . The 
e lec t ion of VP Singh leaves a big question mark hanging 
over the future course of impproving r e l a t i ons between 
the two count r ies . rhe inmediate i s sues having f i r e 
between the two are the Siachen Glacier dispute and Ind i -
an plan to b i i i ld a barrage over the Jhelum r i v e r . 
1 t * 
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8 7 . SATISH KUMAR. I n d i a - Pak i s tan t e n s i o n s , OT? 1985, 1 0 , 1 . 
The cause of I n d i a - Pak i s tan t e n s i o n s are wel l 
known. Vfliat we must do i s t o cons ide r c o n c r e t e s t e p s 
which must be taken t o improve t h e hard core of Indo -
Pak r e l a t i o n s . The pe r iod s i n c e 1971 may be d iv ided i n t o 
two p a r t s i e up t o 1977, when a c i v i l i a n govemrnent r u l e d 
Pa lds t an and a f t e r 1977, when a n i i l i t a r y regime se ized 
power. A nuntoer of bo ld and s i g n i f i c a n t s t e p s towards 
n o r m a l i z a t i o n of r e l a t i o n s between t h e two c o u n t r i e s were 
taken in t h e f i r s t per iod, bo th c o u n t r i e s have been dragging 
t h e i r f e e t on a l l v i ^ a l m a t t e r s i n t h e second p e r i o d , 
Indo - Pak is tan t r a d e i s v i t a l not on ly t o t h e i r two coun-
t r i e s b u t a l so t o t h e success of South Asian Regional co-
o p e r a t i o n . And Regional coopera t ion in South Asia i s 
l i n k e d so much t o Indo - Pak r e l a t i o n s t h a t they nus t 
improve. 
, IMPROVEMENT 
88. ABRAHAM (A). Indo - Pakistani Dialogue: Some crucia l 
ques t ions . TI^  149, 38; 1986, 2, 7; 8. 
Over the l a s t few weeks, there has been a great 
f l u r r y of Indo - Pakistani p o l i t i c a l and diplomatic a c t i -
v i t y . Indo - Pakistani exchange has not se t Indian mis-
givings on some crucia l questions at r e s t . Does i t bel ieve 
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t h a t Pakistan has at l a s t conne to r e a l i s e tha t good r e l a -
t i o n s with India are necessary fo r t h e i r own sake and for 
Pakistani s t a b i l i t y . 
89, BAHADUR (Kallm) . Recent developments In Pakis tan ' s i n t e r -
nal and exteraal a f f a i r s . In t Stud 13, 1; 197 4,Jan^Mar; 
105 - 27. 
Pakistan provides an In t e re s t ing subject of study 
for India and foreign researches because of I t s s t r a t e g i c 
Importance and I t s ro le among the developing count r ies . 
Numerous books and a r t i c l e s have been devoted to i t s 
p o l i t i c a l and economic h i s to ry , to problems of In teg ra -
t ion of Muslims and Hindus, to Bangladesh and to In te rna-
t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s , 
90. BERINDRANATH (Dewan) . Indo - Pak dialogue: A s tep forward. 
Democratic World 11, 6; 1982, 2, 7; 5 - 6 . 
While sumDoing up h i s discussions with Indian leaders 
the Pakistan Foreign Minister said tha t the New Delhi t a l k s 
were in no way discouraging. The two countr ies had so 
widely differed not only In t h e i r views but also in the 
matter of global and regional percept ions . The decision 
to i n s t i t u t e a j o in t Indo - Pakistan commission appears 
the nost tangible r e s u l t of the p layers . In case the two 
decide to normalise r e l a t i ons i t would be a great s tep 
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forward. India and Pakistan have a major stake in nor-
mal is ing trade at l e a s t in border areas. 
9 1 . DEY (Sudhin) • Breakthrough in indo - Pak d i s c u s s i o n s . 
Statesman; 1986, 11, 18. 
There has been a modest breakthrough towards 
normalization of Indo - Pakistani r e l a t i o n s which have 
been overshadowing the SAARC meeting. Mr Gandhi wanted 
t o e s t a b l i s h good and f r i end ly r e l a t i o n s with Pakistan 
and was i n t e r e s t e d in reviving the process of normaliza-
t i o n . Mr Gandhi has charged Pakistan' that Pakistan i s 
t ra in ing slkh t e r r o r i s t on i t s o i l . Mr Junejo charged 
that India was a lso running some tra in ing camps on i t s 
s ide and i n t e r f e r i n g in Pakis tan's a f f a i r s e s p e c i a l l y in 
Sindh. These charges and counter-charges would be tackled 
during the secretary l e v e l meeting next month in Lahore. 
92 . INDO - PAK ta lkss Str ides in b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s . Link 
24, 26; 1982, 2, 7; 9 - 10. 
The Indo - Pak t a l k s between the two Foreign 
Ministers of the two countr ies were frank and construct ive 
but they have no treaty of non-aggression. There was no 
i l l u s i o n on Ind ia ' s part that desp i t e t h e i r I s sues fo l l ow-
ing from the two countr ies divergent understandings of the 
regional s i t u a t i o n , a non-aggression pact could not be 
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e a s i l y f i n a l i s e d . The s t r i d e s taken in the d irec t ion of 
linproving b i l a t e r a l t i e s . The indisputable f a c t of these 
t a l k s i s that f a r from being confined to the no-war pact 
proposal^ these d iscuss ion have bom f r u i t s in the sphere 
i s 
of b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s . If PaJcistan/interested in peace, 
i t should not go f o r the soph i s t i ca ted weaponary from US. 
9 3 . KAMATH (MV), Time i s r ipe f o r India and Pakistan to come 
toge ther . Telegraph; 1986, 1, 9 . 
India and Pakistan may be two separate s t a t e s in 
theory, but they are one in s p i r i t . Part i t ion was a s o c i o -
p o l i t i c a l aberration, a h i s t o r i c a l n e c e s s i t y and an econo-
mic mostrt>sity. Whether Indians and Pakistanis l i k e i t 
or not and whatever some people may say, the prospect of 
India and Pakistan coming together i s g e t t i n g br ighter . 
I t i s not that president 2 i a and Prime Minister Rajiv 
Gandhi are now expected to go on t o make further construc-
t i v e moves towards e s tab l i sh ing peace in the sub-continent, 
But, once Pakistan r e a l i s e s that i t s future i s with India 
and thereaf ter decides to throw away the fore ign yoke, 
prosper i ty i s i t s f o r the asking. The time has come. 
94 . KATYAL (KK) . Intangib les in new se t -up . Hindu; 1985,12,23, 
For the f i r s t time a f ter a long period there i s 
hope of an upswing in indo - Pakistan t i e s . This i s so 
even though none of the b a s i c problems plaguing t h e i r 
I I U 
b i l a t e r a l r e l a t ionsh ip was tackled, during the recent 
discussion between Prime Minister, Mr Rajiv Gandhi and 
Gen Zia-ul-Haq. How wi l l the change-over to c i v i l i an 
rt i le in Pakistan affect the cours-e of indo - Pakistan 
r e l a t i o n s . The f i r s t t e s t of Pakis tan ' s in ten t ions would 
come in the f i r s t week of January next year wh«:i the 
Finance Ministers of the two countr ies meet to tap the 
t r ade po t en t i a l , only a f ract ion of which i s now made 
use of. 
95. KOTRU (ML). Indo - Pak Ties : Benazir for s tep-by-s tep 
approach. Statesman; 1989, 5^  5> 1. 
The Pakistan Prime Minister, Ms Benazir Bhutto, 
be l i eves t ha t India and Pakistan must resolve a l l t h e i r 
out standing disputes in a spir i t of f r iendship and good 
neighbourl iness . The approach, she under l ines , wi l l have 
to be s t ep - by - s tep one. The pos i t ions of the two coun-
t r i e s have been fu l ly recognized in the accord which 
provides for a f i na l settlement of Jammu and Kashmir. Ms 
Bhutto bel ieves t ha t ever since her meeting with Mr Rajiv 
Gandhi during the SAARC summit a forward movement in 
b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s was d i sce rn ib l e . 
96 . MALHOTRA (inder) , SATISH KUMAR, KHOKHAR (Riaz Husain) and 
AURORA ( J a g j i t Singh) , Peace and Indo - Pak r e l a t i o n s . 
I l l 
Foreign AEfarls Retorts 31 , 4; 1982, J^r; 6 7 - 8 0 . 
Indo - Pak fr iendship i s a subject in which every 
s ing le Indian and every Pakistani has a s take . We are 
both sworn to the Simla agreement. The Main th rea t i s 
under development and poverty. This has been given abso-
l u t e l y no a t ten t ion by the two governments as f a r as 
r e l a t i o n s between them are concern. Pak is tan ' s posi t ion 
in the dispute of Jamnu and Kashmir i s well known to India . 
The Simla agreement requires t ha t between two s ides be 
governed by the purposes and p r inc ip le of United Nations 
Char ter . The essense of the Simla agreement was tha t we 
would t r y an resolve our porblems on a b i l a t e r a l b a s i s , 
i s 
Kashmir i s a problem which/dif f icul t to swallow on e i t h e r 
s i d e . Despite Simla agreement Pakistani representa t ive 
have made dif ferent formulation in in te rna t iona l forums. 
97. NAYAR (Raldip) . Need for India - Pakistan de ten te . IE; 
1980, 1, 16. 
For the f i r s t time in many years Pakistan appears 
to be in a mood to keep Kashmir aside and t a l k about steps 
to secure peace in the region. Islamabad may well be 
inc l ined to seek a firmer r e l a t ionsh ip with New Delhi 
without i n s i s t i n g on the settlement of the Kashmir question 
f i r s t . India should t r y to organise a jo in t move to 
: '^ \1 
persuade the Soviet Union to qui t Afghanistan without 
fu r the r loss of t ime. In t h i s context, the India - Pak-
i s t an detente becomes necessary. 
98, NORMALISING INDO - PAK Relat ions. Current Topics 14, 7; 
1988, July? 394. 
Normalisation of Indo - Pak r e l a t i ons has been the 
subject of continuing discussions between the representa-
t i v e of India and Pakistan for more than four years now. 
The main i ssue a t the t a l k s has beai the j j j s s ib i l i ty of 
concluding a non-aggression Pact and an agreement under-
taking not to a t tack each o t h e r ' s nuclear i n s t a l l a t i o n s . 
India i s understood to have i n s i s t e d tha t Pakistan hand-
over to India Sikh t e r r o r i s t operat ing from Pakistan, 
Another subject tha t has come in the t a lk s i s increasing 
indo - Pak t r ade , 
99. PASRICHA (PM) , Relation with Pakistan, Year Book on 
I n d i a ' s Foreign Policy? 1984-85; 105 - 115, 
Mentions t ha t a prominent aspect of Indo - Pakistan 
r e l a t i o n s i s the dominance of the normalization process by 
a highly surcharged emotional approach ra ther than cold 
log ic on both s ides , h ighl ight ing the acute sense of d i s -
t r u s t of each other at both the o f f i c i a l and non-off ic ia l 
l e v e l s . This r e l a t ionsh ip can be regarded as a oontlnuation 
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of the pre-lndependence c i v i l conf l ic t waged on communal 
l i n e s , aggravated by the syndrome of typ ica l neighbourly 
j ea lous ies and one-upmanship. The key to the improvement 
l i e s in t r u s t i n g each other even with an element of 
ca lcula ted r i s k , 
100. PM in Islamabad, e d i t o r i a l ! Patr iotg 1989, 7, 18. 
Hopes of a q u a l i t a t i v e change in indo - Pak r e l a t i ons 
have exis ted since Ms Bhutto assumed the off ice of PK l a s t 
December, The resolut ion of the Siachen tangle would 
reduce tensions between the two count r ies . That PaJcistan's 
nuclear programme i s s t i l l a big i ssue in Indo - Fak r e l a -
t i ons was c lear from Rajiv Gandhi's remark tha t , unl ike 
India the nuclear programme in Pakistan i s very much 
cont ro l led by the army. The t a l k s between the two leaders 
and emphasis on s t ep - to - se tp approach to normalisation 
mark a s igni f icant setp forward which can gradually replace 
suspicion and h o s t i l i t y with t r u s t and good w i l l . 
101, RASGOTRA (Maharaja Krishna) , Dialogue with Pakis tan, IE; 
1987, 1, 16. 
Pakistan i s I n d i a ' s most d i f f i c u l t and also i t 
most important neighbour. The fun and beauty, of India-
Pakistan diplomacy l i e in the fac t of t h e i r ta lk ing 
together , not in what the t a l k s achieve. Dialogue I t s e l f 
1 ^ 
i s the roost v i t a l t i l ing in the r e l a t i o n s between India and 
Pakistan: t h e i r d r i f t towards war begins when they cease to 
t a l k . In r e l a t ion to India , the apprehensions f e l t in 
Pakistan about i t s secur i ty are la rge ly of Pak is tan ' s 
making for our b i l a t e r a l differences, the venkateswaran-
sa t t re masting did not resolve the argument over the clause 
to be inse r t ed in the t r e a t y under negot iat ion about the 
inadmissibly of foreign bases in the t e r r i t o r i e s of India 
and Pakistan, The i n i t i a t i v e in our dialogue with the 
neighbours should always be with u s . 
102. REDDY (GK). India Inv i t e s Pak for t a l k s . Hindu, 1987,1,25. 
The Government of Inclia asked Pakistan to s«3d a 
secre ta ry level delegation at i t s e a r l i e s t con^venience to 
Delhi for t a l k on de-escalat ion of the border tension. In 
discussing such withdrawals by both the armies to t h e i r 
normal peace s t a t i o n s , the Govt of India wi l l have to 
draw a d i s t inc t ion between the nu l t i - c rops force of many 
d iv is ions t ha t has been assembled in southern Rajasthan 
fo r the triennial exercise away from the Pakistan borders 
and the ask forces now deployed by both s ides at forward 
pos i t ions in d i f fe ren t s ec to r s . I t remains to be seen 
whether Pakistan i s i n t e r e s t ed in an ear ly de-escalat ion 
by concentrating on the more immediate need for disengage-
ment to avoid the r i sk of c o n f l i c t s . 
1 i 5 
103, SAREEN (Rajendra) • Easing of Indo - Pak t e n s i o n s . Tribune; 
1989, 5, 29. 
The Home Secre tary- l eve l t a l k s between India and 
Pakistan f i r s t began in 1986 fo l lowing I n d i a ' s a l l e g a t i o n s 
that Pakistan was involved in promoting terrorism in Punjab. 
The two countries have agreed to take concrete measures to 
contain terrorism and i l l i c i t border cros s ings . In the 
event i t has become necessary to ensure that p o l i t i c a l 
r e l a t i o n s between India and Pakistan are not exp lo i t ed by 
turbulent e lements . Their ^al^s were part of an ongoing 
process of dismantl ing the super s tructure of h o s t i l i t y 
tha t came to dominate the Indo-Pak r e l a t i o n s under 3 i a , 
The Indo-Pak summit at Islamabad on Oecenber 31 l a s t year 
s e t in motion the process of normalisation of r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between the two countr i e s . 
104. SAMHNEY (RG) . Indo-Pak re la t ions t Road to rapproachment. 
S t r a t e g i c Analysis 9 , 1 ; 1985, Apr; 1-10. 
Bridges cannot be b u i l t without strong foundations 
and supporting s tructures , so a lso r e l a t i o n s between 
n a t i o n s . The r e l a t i o n s between India and Pakistan suffer 
from many structural and a t t i t u d i n a l impediments. The 
deep rooted d i s t r u s t between the two people continues to 
plague t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p . The primary f a c t o r which 
b e d e v i l s Ind6-Pak r e l a t i o n s i s the national ethos in 
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Pakistan aPd also t o some extent In India. The h i s t o r i c 
Simla agreement of 1972 paved the way for several measures 
which could help In the development of peaceful and mutua-
l l y b e n e f i c i a l r e l a t i o n s . Over the l a s t few years . Gen 21 a-
ul-Haq, in h i s t yp i ca l approach to r e l a t i o n s with India, 
has been making proposals off amd on for normalisation of 
r e l a t i o n s between the two countr i e s . In the u l t imate 
a n a l y s i s , the Simla agreement already provides a durable 
b a s i s f o r b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s . 
105. SENGUPTA (Bhabani) . Shine in indo-Pak relations.NH; 1989,1,9, 
If a new leaf was turned in India Pakistan r e l a t i o n s 
as 1988 was breathing away in to h i s t o r y . A number of 
f a c t o r s made i t p o s s i b l e f o r the two young Prime Ministers 
of India and Pakistan, at t h e i r very f i r s t meeting, to make 
a new beginning in r e l a t i o n s of the two s t i l l - q u i t e -
d i s t a n t neighbours. The two Prime Ministers of India and 
Pakistan e e a l l s e d that both of them were under a global 
pressure to recast India-Pakistan r e l a t i o n s in the mould 
of worldwide peres tro ika . They a lso know that they would 
have to face formidable re s i s tance in t h e i r e f f o r t s to 
transform India-Pakistan r e l a t i o n s from a cold peace to 
wainn good-neighboumess. 
106. SHARMA (SK) , Framework f o r Indo - Pakistan r e l a t i o n s j 
1.. 
An Indian perspect ive . Asian Affairs 7,4; 1985, Oct-Dec; 
4 1 - 5 7 . 
The cxjnfllctual pat tern of Indo - Pak r e l a t i o n s 
can be analysed at the macro and micro l e v e l s . At the 
macro l e v e l , the difference between a la rge developing 
p o l i t y and a small developing po l i t y , and the difference 
in s t ra tegy and external environment account for oonf l ic-
t u a l pa t t e rns of In do - Pak r e l a t i o n s . At the micro l eve l , 
the d i f fer ing r e l i g ious , pa t te rns of economic development 
and pa t t e rns of p o l i t i c a l system account for the confl ic tual 
r e l a t i o n s . All these fac tors have operated in Indo-Pak-
i s t an r e l a t i ons not separately but simultaneously and 
in unison. 
107, SMALL STEP, forward, e d i t o r i a l . Tribune; 1986, 7, 9 . 
Reports of pos i t ive developments in India- Pakistan 
r e l a t i o n s are so few and ra re t h a t one has to re jo ice at 
such a peripheral event as the recent i den t i f i ca t ion by 
s c i e n t i s t of the two countr ies of areas of mutual coopera-
t i on in agr icu l tu ra l research. I t was 14 years ago tha t 
t he two countr ies signed the Simla agreement and resolved 
on a "s tep-by-step" approach to progressively r e s to re and 
normalise t h e i r r e l a t i o n s . The recent agreement between 
the agr icu l tu ra l s c i e n t i s t s of the two count t ies i s welcome, 
i f only for the reason tha t i t may cons t i tu te one small 
118 
s t ep towards the cherished object ive of p o l i t i c a l under-
standing and cooperation between the two neighbours. 
108, SRIRAM (K) . Craving for f r iendship in two coun t r i e s . 
IE.; 1987, 1, 6. 
The common people on both s ides want to be f r iends 
and good neighbours. I t i s the two governments tha t do not 
allow them to be so despi te t h e i r loud professions to the 
country. Process of normalisation to which both the Govts 
are coranjtted i s making such sluggish progress . Yet, some 
o thers were c r i t i c a l of the Indian s i d e ' s repeated reference 
to the Simla agreement. 
109, SRIRAM (K) . Talks with Pak beginsi India offers second 
r a i l l i nk , IB; 1986, 12, 28, 
India and Pakistan took yet another small, but 
s ign i f i can t , s tep towards resuming the s t a t ed process of 
normalization of r e l a t i ons when the foreign s e c r e t a r i e s 
of t h e two countr ies held wide-ranging discussions cover-
ing the e n t i r e spectrum of b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s . There was 
also discussion at length of how to give p r ac t i c a l shape 
to t he year-old j o i n t residue of the Prime Minister Gandhi 
and the President Mr Zia-ul-Haq of not at tacking each others 
nuclear i n s t a l l a t i o n s because the proposal of peace and 
f r iendship t r e a ty and no-war pact were gone in to in-depth 
J-.9 
With a view to f inding out a nutual ly acceptable fomwla-
t ion on the two s i d e s . 
110. WARIAVWALLA (B), Indo - Pakistani Agreement and s t a b i l i t y 
in the sub-continent . Survival 16,1; 1974, Jan-Peb; 17-20. 
The present in te rna t iona l s e t t ing i s more conducive 
t 6 keeping Indo - Pakistani tensions ver^ much within the 
l i m i t s o£ the sub-continent . For the United S ta te s , t h i s 
region i s of per ipheral importance to her secur i ty and 
economic i n t e r e s t s and largely for t h i s reason she i s w i l l -
ing to endorse I n d i a ' s primacy t h e r e . The sub-continant 
c a r r i e s weight in the context of sino - Soviet r i v a l r y , 
but l e s s than Indian self-esteem would l i k e to be l i eve , 
, - , NO - WAR PACT 
111. BURKE (St<l. I n d i a ' s offer of a no-war declarat ion to 
Pakistani I t s h i s tory and import. Pak Horizon 25, 
3; 1972; 2 3 - 3 7 . 
Pakistan has uniformarly welcomed the offer provided 
the slogan of no - war i s givan rea l meaning by adding to 
i t an agreed formula which would ensure the f a i r sett lement 
of the main disputes between the two countr ies which could 
erupt in to war i f allowed to fo s t e r too long. 
112. GANGAL {SC), Indo- Pak r e l a t i ons No-war dialogue: What 
next . Link 24, 24; 1982, 1, 26; 27 - 8. 
123 
Pakistan's Foreign Minister, ^ h a Shahl v i s i t India 
f o r t a l k s on the proposed no-war pact . Leaving as ide the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of some over emphasis, here and thete^ the 
reasons advanced f o r I n d i a ' s early reluctance to respond 
t o the Pakistani no-war move seemed sens ib l e and substa in-
t i a l . In December 24 communication India has suggested that 
the two countries should respect each others t e r r i t o r i a l 
i n t e g r i t y s e t t l e a l l d isputes peaceful ly and b i l a t e r a l l y * 
In the Indo - Pa3d.stani context , the emphasis should not be 
on the game of nuntoers or on hal f -hearted , unreal guarantees 
in a row, Sof ar, even at the best of t imes , the Indo -
Pakistani r e la t ionsh ip has been t a n g e n t i a l . The need i s 
t o make i t widely in t erac t ing and i n t e r l o c k i n g . 
113. KARNAD (Bharat) , Pakistan's n o - l o s e opt ion . HT; 1982 ,1 ,9 . 
The Indian government has designed to d i scuss a 
no-war pact with Pakistan, I t has done so not because 
i t th inks such an agreement necessary but because i t wants 
to prevent the peace o f f e r made by Islamabad from turning 
i n t o a public r e l a t i o n s d i s a s t e r f o r India . A no-war pact 
should be an u l t imate and not jus t an expedient p o l i t i c a l 
document. The no-war pact , by l e s sen ing the prospect of 
super power involvement in the Indo - Pak dispute , w i l l 
defuse tension in South Asia. 
114. PRWPB (ishtllcant) . India and Pakistan: Beyond the No-rwar 
Pact , S tra teg i c Studies 8^ 4; 1985; 58-63. 
India and Pa)d.stan Interact ion on the no-war pact 
has sparked a good deal of debate on the p o l i c i e s and 
i n t e n t i o n s of the t%*o countr i e s . The no-war pact i s a 
p la in non-aggression agreement which would e n t a i l both 
countr ies to d e s i s t from committing an aggression against 
another. The two roost important watersheds were the 
Tashkent Agreem^at of 19 66 and the Simla Agreement of 1972. 
The Simla Agreement of 1972 that accepts the p r i n c i p l e s of 
durable peace and b i l a t e r a l diplomacy s t a t e s on the i s s u e 
of Kashmir. 
115. RAMARiO (R). Behind Zia ' s No-War Pact . Link 24, 41; 1982* 
5, 23; 37. 
Palcistan had of fered India a no-war pact . Pakistan 
a l so having made i t c l e a r that i t was f o r India t o accept 
or r e j e c t h i s no-pact war o f f e r . I t has t o be remeiribered 
that Prtihe Minister Indira Gandhi had gone s tep further and 
had u n i l a t e r a l l y declared that pact or no pact India would 
and attack Pa3d.stan and that India would be happy to conclude 
a t rea ty of peace and fr iendship with PaJcistan. I t i s d i f f i -
c u l t t o understand General Z ia ' s stand that he w i l l consider 
the peace and fr iendship t rea ty idea only i f India n o t i f i e d 
1; 2 
t ha t i t has re jec ted h is no-war pact of fer . Gen has 
r e i t e r a t e d tha t I n d i a ' s proposal tha t a j o in t conmission 
be se t up to suggest ways and means of improving b i l a t e r a l 
t r ade and cu l tu ra l exchanges* wi l l be taken up only af ter 
the signing of no-war pact , 
116, SENGUFTA (Bhabani) , Indo - Pakistan r e l a t i o n s : Spring in 
Winter, I £ ; 1985, 12, 24. 
Six hours on a cloudy and cheerless day in mid-
December have brought India and Pakistan t a n t a l i s i n g l y 
close to a breakthrough in t h e i r fau l ted r e l a t ionsh ip of 
near - for ty years . The agreemait tha t binds the two 
countr ies not to at tack each others nuclear i n s t a l l a t i o n s 
i s , for a l l p rac t i ca l purposes, a mini-no-war pact verba-
l l y concluded between the two heads of government. The 
Simla agreement ru les out war in order to resolve the 
Kashmir i s s u e . There i s reasonable ground for hope tha t 
a t r e a t y r e l a t ionsh ip wi l l bind the two neighbours before 
t ime. 
117. SUBRAHMANYAM (K). Reflections on Indo - Pak t a l k s . Main-
stream 20, 25; 1982, 2, 20; 17 - 22. 
The Prime Min i s t e r ' s of India give suggestion to 
have a jo in t commission set up to review and promote 
Indo - Pakistan r e l a t i ons i s i nd i ca t ive of I n d i a ' s anxiety 
.i 
and concern t o advance confidence b u i l d i n g t o underpin 
any pac t of non -agg re s s ion . I t i s now no s e c r e t t h a t 
t h e r e a re very s e r i o u s d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of 
t h e two c o u n t r i e s i n r e s p e c t of s t r a t e g i c environment, 
non-a l ignment^ b i l a t e r a l i s m and d i s p o s i t i o n of armed 
f o r c e s * I t i s not going t o be easy t o narrow down t h e 
very deep d i f f e r e n c e s between our r e s p e c t i v e world v iews . 
Pak i s t an was i n f a c t inposed on t h e u n w i l l i n g Punjab is , 
S i n d h i s , Pathans and Baluchis by t h e w i l l of t h e e n t i r e 
Muslim coiwnunity of t h e Indian s u b - c o n t i n e n t . 
, _, SALAL DAM 
118, MEHTA ( Jaga t S) « S a l a l Dam: A microcosm of Indo-Fak t i e s . 
I E ; 1988, 4, 8 . 
The Sa la l s t o r y i s worth recoun t ing as i t i s a 
microcosm of Indo-Pak r e l a t i o n s . Economic g a i n s became 
hos t age t o f e a r about n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y , bu t bo th coun-
t r i e s have demonstrated t h e i r capac i ty t o b reak ou t of 
t h e v i c i o u s g r i p of mutual pa r ano i a t o reach b i l a t e r a l 
agreements . All t h e r i v e r s of t h e Indus system flow throu-
gh Ind ian t e r r i t o r y b ^ o r e they e n t e r Pak i s t an , under t h e 
t r e a t y . This t r e a t y was s igned by t h e La te Jawaher la l 
Nehru and t h e La te Presidffl^t Ayub Khan in Karachi in Sep-
tember 1960 a f t e r 12 y e a r s of w e l l - n i g h cont inuous and 
U.S.S.R. y " - ! . , r -
JAMMU AND KASHMIR 
i^Wheoti'ARice ^ M a i z e . ^ ? s ilk worms INDUSTRIES-^Telephone 
J<;4 
of ten tortuous n e g o t i a t i o n s . The Salal story shows that 
success fu l negot ia t ions depend on a proper understanding 
of the p o l i t i c a l cons tra in t s of the adversary, 
# -# ro le of SUPER POWERS 
119, CHAtJDHRI (Mohaininad Ahsen) . Pakistan and the changing 
pattern of power r e l a t i o n s in South Asia, Pak Horizon 
31 , 1; 1978; 71 - 101. 
The s t a b i l i t y of South Asia depends on good r e l a -
t i o n s between India and Pakistan. The f a l l of Mrs Gandhi 
in India and of Z A Bhutto in Paidstan in 1977 further 
change the s i t u a t i o n . The new leaders in India and Pak-
i s t a n improved r e l a t i o n s between t h e i r two countr ies on 
the b a s i s of equal i ty respect f o r sovereignty and t e r r i -
t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y . The super powers, motivated by t h e i r 
g lobal i n t e r e s t s , may continue to support one s t a t e against 
the other , but i t i s not i n t e r e s t of peace that s t a t e s with 
in south Asia act as powers in the game, 
, KASHMIR 
120, BANERJIE (Indranil) , Ins ide , looking out , Sunday 17, 8; 
1990, 2, 25; 38 - 42, 
Tb the Indians, Kashmiri m i l i t a n t s are pla in tern>-
r i s t s , who have gunned down government o f f i c i a l s , secur i ty 
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personnel and prondnent supporters of the Indian Govt, 
In the eyes of the Pakistanis* however* the m i l i t a n t s 
are loijaheddln (feedom f ighters) s truggl ing against 
barbaric Indian oppressors . The average Pakistani gen-
u i n e l y b e l i e v e s that Kashnilr has been f o r c i b l y taken over 
by India and that I t I s h i s r e l i g i o u s and p a t r i o t i c duty 
t o help l i b e r a t e I t , 
121. BANBRJIE (IndranllX I s war the answer?: As v io l ence mounts 
In Kashmir, India holds Pakistan respons ib le . Sunday 17, 
6; 1990, Feb, 11 - 17; 24 - 30. 
VThlle war h y s t e r i a I s mounting on both s i d e s , the 
a u t h o r i t i e s of the two countr ies , oddly enough, are vehe-
ment In discounting any p o s s i b i l i t y of actual war. The 
no-war scenario hinges on the presumption that the v ,p 
Singh governments tough posturing against Pakistan w i l l 
douse the upris ing in Kashmir. If i t does not , then the 
government could be faced with two equally unpleasant 
o p t i o n s : e i ther t a c i t l y acknowledge that i t cannot do any 
thing to prevent Pakistan from in ter f er ing in Kashmir or 
go to war. Peace between India and Pakistan consequently 
depends on whether the VP Singh government can f ind a 
quick so lut ion to the Kashmir c r i s i s and prevent the 
break-out of g u e r i l l a warfare. 
o 
122, BLAMING PAKISTAN: Government i s overlooking the real 
problems in Kashmir, Sunday 17, 4; 1990, Jan, 28; 12 - 3 , 
The Indian Govt has been complaining about Pak-
i s t a n ' s help to Sikh extremists f o r years without any 
e f f e c t . The Pakistan Govt of Benazir Bhutto wanted to 
a t l e a s t g ive the iir^jression that she was ser ious about 
improving r e l a t i o n s with India . I t could be argued that 
a healthy r e l a t i o n s h i p i s a surest guarantee of non- in ter -
ference then a mere show of pique. By blaiming Pakistan 
the Indian Govt i s f a i l i n g to focus on the real i s s u e in 
Kashmir, The Govt has not been qui te s tra ight forward in 
i t s dea l ings with Pakistan on the Kashmir i s s u e . Relat ions 
between the two countr ies have predictably taken a turn 
f o r the worse, 
123. DAYAL (Gyaneshwar) .& SABEEHA MANZOOR. Even babes cry 
freedom. One- Nation Chronicle? 1990, June, 1 - 15^10 -15, 
Once described as the Switzerland of Asia, the 
Kashmir v a l l e y today wears the look of war reai^aged b a t t l e -
f i e l d with s i l e n t s t r e e t s , half-burnt bui ld ing and gun 
t o t i n g s o l d i e r s standing behind sandbag bunkers. The 
frenzy for freedom has reached a crescendo. Even school 
going children are running from t h e i r homes to cross over 
to Pakistan held Kashmir f o r arms t r a i n i n g . 
124, DHAR (0 N) , India must counter Pak be l l ige rence . S t a t e s -
man? 1990, 7 , 17; 5. 
The violence in Kashmir i s bound to esca la te fu r ther 
in coming weeks. The v isual ized scenario in Islamabad can 
only be one of i n t ens i f i ed "struggle* on the val ley and 
increased " a t r o c i t i e s " by the secur i ty fo rces . The only 
way India can turn t ab les on Pakistan i s to come out with 
de t a i l ed f a c t s and f igures of how hundreds of innocent 
Kashmiri Hindus, as also Hi slims, have been murdered under 
a systematic pogrom of extermination of minor i t ies and 
secular-minded Muslims; how t h e i r proper t ies are being 
destroyed through arson and bomb b l a s t s , 
125. PYZEE (AAA), Accession of Kashmir i s not f i n a l . One 
Nation Chronicle; 1990, June, 1-15; 20-21. 
At the time of p a r t i t i o n , the ru l e r of Kashmir 
did not accede to e i t h e r of the s t a t e s when however, a 
par t of h i s own t e r r i t o r y was disturbed by ra ide r s from 
across the border, I n d i a ' s ass is tance was sought and India 
made i t a condition tha t such ass is tance could be granted 
only i f he acceded to Indian union. In the two resolut ions 
passed in the uni ted Nation Security council i t was made 
c l e a r tha t India did not consider t h e accession as f ina l 
and i r revocable r a the r India pledged i t s e l f to see tha t 
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the question of the accession of the s t a t e of Jairatu and 
Kashmir to India o r Pakistan shal l be decided through the 
denx>cratic method of a f ree and impar t i a l . 
126. MAJUMDAR (Ananda). In- f i l t ra t ion—major challenge for 
B S P , Statesman; 1990, 7 , 17; 7 . 
The B s P ' s area of r e spons ib i l i ty along the l i n e of 
control covers 254 km and as f a r i n t e l l i gences agencies 
have iden t i f i ed 108 In f i l t r a t i on routes along i t . The 
major challenge, however, l i e s in another area. There are 
between 4,000 and 6,000 t ra ined Kashmiri mi l i t an t s on the 
o ther s ide of the l i n e of control waiting for an opportu-
n i ty to get in to Ind ia . And i t i s keeping them at bay 
t h a t has been one of the prime tasks of the B SP, I t i s 
not t ha t i n f i l t r a t i o n has been grea t ly curbed. Nonetheless 
f a c t s ind ica te t ha t Border Security Porce personnel have 
succeeded in making i n f i l t r a t i o n increasingly d i f f i c u l t . 
127. MALHOTRA (Inder) Can India counter Pak is tan ' s chalte^nge 
on the Kashmir i s sue? : Host i le winds. Sunday 17, 6; 
1990, Peb, 1 1 - 7 ; 9 . 
There a r e th ree stands in Pakistan* s Kashmir policy 
which are unacceptable to India and have therefore to be 
r e s i s t e d . P i r s t , Pakistan i s determined to go on giving 
Kashmiri t e r r o r i s t and secess ionis t gangs a l l manner of 
J.:9 
he lp seoond, Pakistan i s t ry ing to p"* mi l i ta ry pressure 
on the l i n e of con t ro l . Third, Pakistan i s out to i n t e r -
n a t i o n a l i s e the Kashmir i s sue , take i t back to the u N 
and flog the dead horse of p l e b i s c i t e . However, Indian 
capaci ty to r e s i s t o r mit igate h o s t i l e in te rna t iona l 
opinion %«ould depend almost en t i r e ly on how soon we bring 
i n t e r n a l disorder and subversion under cont ro l , 
128, MALrHOTRA (Inder). Gen Zia and Kashmir i ssue - highly 
negat ive s tance, TI.; 1980, 5, 29, 
Since an inprovement in r e l a t i ons with Pakistan i s 
one of I n d i a ' s major foreign policy planks i t would be 
both u n r e a l i s t i c and unhelpful to overlook the misgivings 
t h a t have arisen of l a t e on t h i s score. These am l a rge -
ly from what Gen Zia-ul-Haq has chosen to say about 
Kashmir and tend to cloud the optimisn generated by Mr 
Swaran Singh's Mission, Gen Zia i s r a i s ing the Kashmir 
i s sue at a wrong time when the developments in Afghanistan 
warrant b e t t e r r e l a t i ons between India and Paidstan. Gen 
Zia recent acts make one wonder whether he has s t a r t ed 
los ing i n t e r e s t in b e t t e r r e l a t ions with India which he 
had shown i n i t i a l l y . 
129, MALHOTRA (Inder), Kashmir i ssue threa tens to sour Indo-Fak 
relations:Unf r iendly v ibes . Sunday 17,5; 1990, Feb, 4-10; 7, 
1 'V^ 
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What a quirk of irony i t i s . The more s incerely 
I n d i a ' s new government t r i e s to make South Asia an "area 
of fr iendship* the more i t i s thwarted by melgin forces 
t h a t cannot be wished away from the subcontinent =?1 scene. 
A par t from giving t e r r o r i s t and seccess ionis t s of Kashmir 
ample covert help, in the form of Kalashnikovs, cash, 
t r a i n i n g , indoctr inat ion and sanctuary, Pakistan i s now 
planning to i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s e the i s sue by taking i t back 
to the UN, They r e a l i s e t ha t if India- Pakistan r e l a t i ons 
over Kashimr continue to de te r io ra t e at the current r a t e , 
the US policy of befriending both India and Pakistan, of 
gliding mi l i t a ry aid and p o l i t i c a l support to Pakistan and 
economic and technological ass is tance to India , would 
become untenable, 
130, MUSTAFA (ZX Kashmir dispute and the Simla Agreement, 
Pakistan Horizon 25, 3,y 1972; 38 - 52, 
I t i s now c lea r that the f ina l settlement of Kash-
mir i ssue wi l l be determined not only by the po l i c i e s 
adopted by India and Pakistan, but also the a t t i t u d e 
taken by the people of Kashmir on e i t h e r side of the 
ceasef i re l i n e and also the shape the power s t ruggle be t -
ween china and the USSR assumes in the region. 
131, PALIWAL (Shyamdatta) . Avenging a be t r aya l . One Nation 
131 
Chronicle; 1990, June, 1-15? 16-18 
After independence India had refused to sign the 
argeement which Maharaja Hari Singh had concluded with 
Pakistan. Pakistan knew that with the re lease of Sheikh 
Abdullah, Kashmiri's would have a popular movement f o r 
t h e i r accession to India and therefore took recourse to 
aggress ion. The Indian Govt forgot i t s f i r s t promise of 
not i n t e r f e r i n g in the internal a f f a i r s of Kashmir, Kash-
mir was humiliated and repressed f o r a long time but t i l l 
Sheikh Abdullah was there the s t a t e presented the b e s t 
example of comninal harmony. The r i s e of fundamentalism 
and terrorism began a f t er h i s death and the central Govt 
did nothing to counter i t . On the other hand i t gave i t 
r e s p e c t a b i l i t y , 
132. RAHMAN (IA) . Whose Kashmir ? Sunday 17, 6; 1990, Feb, 
11-17; 3 1 . 
Even the moderates in Pakistan f a i l to accept the 
Indian view that Kashmir i s an in tegra l part of India and 
that t h i s cannot be the subject of nego t ia t i on . What 
l eaders in both countr ies must r e a l i s e i s that both Indians 
and Pakistanis have had to pay a proh ib i t ive p r i c e f o r 
t h e i r a t t i t u d e s on Kashmir and that the search f o r a new 
b a s i s of understanding must begin with a c l e a r r e a l i s a t i o n 
that they have to f a l l in l i n e with the epoch-making changes 
occurring a l l over the World, 
lo2 
133. SIDHVA (Shiraz). Kashmir: Rule of the gun. Sunday 17, 8; 
1990, Feb, 25- Mar 3; 20-29. 
That the people are with the mi l i t an t s i s qu i te 
c l e a r in the one month since the new administration has 
taken over, not a s ingle mi l i t an t s has been captured. The 
m i l i t a n t s who now enjoy the widespread support of the 
people are slowly abadoning t h e i r e a r l i e r caution and 
r e s t r a i n t . The violence and t e r r o r continue. Mean while, 
arms and poeple continue to be snuggled in from Pakistan 
occupied Kashmir to help t h e i r "trapped bre th ren ," 
134. SIDHVA (Shiraz) . Who runs the valley? Sunday 17, 20; 1990, 
5, 20-28, 32-5, 
According to i n t e l l i gence sources the two reigning 
mi l i t an t groups at t h i s juncture are these who ca l l the 
shots in the val ley while the JKLP has over the years 
earned the support of a la rge section of the va l ley , i t i s 
the HM tha t has gained popular i ty . I t enjoys considerable 
c lout in terms of money and arms, because of the tremendous 
backing i t receives from the JEI in Pakistan and other 
"sympathetic" Islamic coun t t l e s . While the two main groups 
launch t h e i r a t tacks separately, they are careful to help 
each o ther underground, and are said to even have met 
recent ly across the border to discuss a coordinated counter 
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o f f e n s i v e aga ins t t h e Indian g o v t ' s r ecen t crackdown. 
They a l so h e l p each o t h e r wi th funds and money. Together , 
they enjoy t h e mass support of t h e people - t h e JKLP 
through popula r appeal and t h e HM through t h r e a t s and f e a r . 
, MILITARY 
135. SHARMA (P) . I n d i a - Pak arms r a c e c o n t i n u e s . HT 66, 278; 
1989, 10, 6; 14. 
Despi te improved p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s between I n d i a 
and P a k i s t a n , bo th c o u n t r i e s con t inue t o i n v e s t h e a v i l y 
i n t h e i r armed f o r c e s , according to ISIS ( I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
I n s t i t u t e f o r S t r a t e g i c Studies) . The r e p o r t of ISIS has 
p o i n t e d out th^it I n d i a and Pakis tan had c lashed on s eve ra l 
o c c a s i o n s dur ing t h e yea r i n t h e d i s p u t e d Siachen g l a c i e r 
reg ion bu t a c e a s e f i r e has now been agreed. Both c o u n t r i e s 
a r e expanding t h e i r defence i n d u s t r i e s t o improve t h e i r 
a rmeJforces . Tbe r e p o r t s a i d t h a t bo th Indian and P a k i s -
t a n i a i r f o r c e s had i n c r e a s e d t h e i r combat s t r e n g t h , 
-.^-, - , ARMS, BALLISTIC, PAKISTAN 
136. JASJIT SINGH, B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e s in P a k i s t a n . T l ; 152, 
59; 1989, 2, 28; 6. 
All of a sudden a rash of b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s appea-
r e s t o have e rup ted in P a k i s t a n . The achievement of a 
J () -t 
s ign i f i can t b a l l i s t i c capabi l i ty had been percieved as a 
remote future poss ib i l i ty . Pakistan adopted a raultipron-
ged approach which extended to del ivery systems as wel l . 
The r e a l i t y of a b a l l i s t i c miss i le programme reaching a 
l eve l of maturity in PaXistan must be recognised. Pakistan 
can improve accuracies to l eve l s where conventionally 
armed b a l l i s t i c miss i les wi l l be of s igni f icant mi l i t a ry 
va lue . 
, _, -, AIRPLAN3S, P-16, PAKISTAN 
137. CHAKRAVARTI (Subhash) , India concerned at Pak more to 
buy 60 P-16s. TI_; 152, 19; 1989, 1, 19; 1. 
If the US administration were to comply with Pak-
istan* s request to s e l l i t 60 addit ional P-16 f i gh t e r 
a l t c r a f t then i t would be a matter of great concern to 
the Indian Govt. Pakistan move made i t c l ea r today tha t 
i t s adverse impact on the developing r e l a t i ons between 
India and Pakistan was known in Washington. She cannot 
afford to withdraw the request by may pr iva te ly slgfial 
than Ms Bhutto i s not pressing i t . The F-16 request 
would r a i s e Pakistan overa l l s t rength in combat a i r c r a f t . 
138. JASJIT SINGH. More arms for Pakistan: Request for P-15. 
HT; 66, 26; 1989, 1, 26; 11. 
J ty '-) 
Pakis tan i s seeking an a d d i t i o n a l 60 P-16 combat 
a i r c r a f t from t h e US, I n d i a was s i n c e r e l y , looking f o r -
ward t o b e t t e r r e l a t i o n s wi th Pak i s tan in t h e days ahead. 
The re inforcement of m i l i t a r i s t approach in i n t e r - s t a t e 
r e l a t i o n s r e f l e c t s t h e mi l i t a ry -domina ted f roe ign p o l i c y 
in P a k i s t a n . At t h e same t ime, g l i b J u s t i f i c a t i o n s are 
on ly l i k e l y t o fue l m i s t r u s t between I n d i a and Pakis tan 
and f o r c e t h e window of oppo r tun i t y f o r improvement of 
b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s to c l o s e . The o p p o r t u n i t y of t h e 
cen tu ry in improving Indo-Pak r e l a t i o n s , 
, _, - , NUCLEAR 
139. AKMAL HUSAIN. Indo-Pak i s tan t h r e a t p e r c e p t i o n . Asian Stu-
d i e s : 1987, 5, 9; 2 3 - 3 7 . 
Discusses t h a t t h e h i s t o r i c a l r i v a l r y between t h e 
Ind ian Nat iona l Congress and the Muslim league in B r i t i s h 
I n d i a has cont inued in t h e b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s of I n d i a 
and P a k i s t a n . The c o n f l i c t i n g t h r e a t pe rcep t ion emana-
t i n g from each o t h e r has brought them c l o s e r t o t h e i r 
r e s p e c t i v e super power a l l i e s , I n d i a ' s s t a t u s as a r e g i o -
na l power s i n c e 1972 has been cha l l enged by Pa3cistan 
th rough he r sea rch . o r n u c l e a r p a r i t y . The Sovie t i n t e r -
ven t ion in Afghanistan in 1979 has added new complex i t i e s 
i n Indo - Pak i s tan r e l a t i o n s . P a k i s t a n , according t o h e r 
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policy makers, would under take "Limited" remodelling of 
i t s armed forces with the newly acquired US arms. This 
conf l ic t ing th rea t perception cannot create the required 
environment of peace for SAARC, 
140. ANITA (SN) Islamic Bomb and India: An appra i sa l . Main-
stream 17, 45; 1979, 7, 7> 11-2. 
Pakistan i s on the verge of exploding the f i r s t 
ever nuclear de ter rent by an Islamic country. I t must be 
fu l l y appreciated tha t without massive f inanc ia l aid from 
some o i l r ich Arab countr ies , Pakistan could not have 
achieved the nuclear capab i l i ty . The ' I s l amic ' nuclear 
d e t e r r o i t wi l l not be the sole property of Pakistan but a 
j o i n t Arab venture, which wi l l obviously be control led by 
the Arab Nations and wi l l require t h e i r unanimous sanction 
fo r use against Ind ia . I n d i a ' s nat ional policy of using 
nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes has been made 
amplyclear to the world. Those who are enamoured of the 
manufacture and possession of nuclear weapons should 
remember tha t there w i l l be no v i c to r s in a nuclear war. 
141. BIDWAI (Praful) . Nuclear Weapons Free Zones, Seminar 
19 66, Aug; 27-33. 
The pace at which India and Pakistan have moved to 
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make the h o r i f i c p o s s i b i l i t y r e a l i s a b l e . In both the 
countr ies vigorous e f f o r t s are underway to acquire a 
nuclear weapon c a p a b i l i t y and more weapon grade f i s s i l e 
material and auxi l iary equipment. The evidence to t h i s 
e f f e c t i s f a i r l y strong and lobbies in both the countr ies 
have grown stronger and more vocal in the recent pas t . The 
creat ion of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in South Asia, as 
nuclear weapon are not and can never be l e g i t i m a t e i n s t r u -
ments of s t a t e p o l i c y . There i s a s i l v e r l i n i n g to South 
Asia dark nuclear clouds in the sense that pressure groups 
arguing and compaigning against a nuclear bomb and nuclear 
weapons Free Zone in South Asia are everging are both India 
and Pakistan. 
142. CHARI (PR). Pakistan's nuclear posture and Ind ia ' s 
o p t i o n s . Bconomic and P o l i t i c a l weeklvl5,3? 1989, Jan; 117-22, 
Given the h i s tory of the Conf l i c t between India 
and Pakistan, and given Ind ia ' s own nuclear explosion in 
May 197 4, the act ivat ion of Pakistan's foreign and nuclear 
p o l i c y to counter the perceived threat from India has hardly 
been unesqpected. This a r t i c l e descr ibes PaJcistan's e x i s t -
ing nuclear f a c i l i t i e s , i t s future plans in the d irect ion 
of achieving mi l i tary nuclear c a p a b i l i t i e s , and the opt ions 
ava i lable to India to meet them. 
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143. KHAS (iAnsar Ali) . Pak is tan ' s pentad—India* s obstinancy 
Nuclear debate in the region. South Asian Studies 4, 2; 
1987, JUlyj 65 - 74, 
Pakistan has offered India one concrete and p r a c t i -
cal proposal a f t e r the o ther which have now transformed 
in to a pented, India has not only re jected every proposal 
but has also eiitoarked upon a malicious propaganda against 
Pakis tan, Instead of evaluating her own ambitions she i s 
obstreperous about Pakis tan ' s peaceful nuclear programme. 
What are the rea l motives behind I n d i a ' s obstina<:y and 
Rejection ? To erase even the l a s t t r aces of suspicion and 
doubt Paikistan has offered India a pentad consis t ing of 
j o i n t l y signing the NPT 1968-70 or a b i l a t e r a l NPT i n t e r -
nat ional o r b i l a t e r a l inspection of each o thers nuclear 
f a c i l i t i e s and j o i n t renunciation of the use of nuclear 
weapon. If India r ea l ly des i res peace in the region, she 
mast give a supporting hand to Pakis tan ' s proposals . 
144. KULKAPNI (VG) . Indo-Pakistani r iva l ry boosts nuclear 
op t ions . Far East Econ Rev 136, 15; 1987, 4, 9; 40-41, 
The most dangerous aspect of the Indo - Pakistani 
confrontation i s the po ten t ia l of the two sides to obtain 
a nuclear-weapons capab i l i t y . In the short run. New Delhi 
and Islamabad are l i ke ly to continue to react in kind to 
each other* s nuclear moves. In any case both sub-continental 
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adversar ies cx>uld continue Improving t h e i r nuclear 
po ten t i a l without going openly nuclear . Seizing the 
nuclear option u n i l a t e r a l l y would have far reaching I n t e r -
na t iona l repercussions fo r both count r ies . 
145. MARWAH (Onkar) . India and Pakistani Nuclear r i v a l s In 
South Asia. In t Org 35, 1; 1981, Win; 165 - 79, 
The new In te rna t iona l nuclear regime requires 
accession to f u l l scope safeguards and an acceptance of 
the formal r e s t r a i n t s Imposed by the London, Nuclear 
Suppliers Group on the Worldwide a v a i l a b i l i t y of sens i t ive 
nuclear technology, mater ia ls and equipment. Pakistan has 
cap i t a l i z ed on the existence of such a market to acquire 
the means to make nuclear weapons. Though South Asia i s 
l i k e l y to be the f i r s t region outs ide the centra l 
s t r a t e g i c system to harbour nuclear-armed nat ional r i v a l s , 
the s i tua t ion i s manageable through the imposition of 
innovat ive i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d cons t ra in t s on the region. 
In the long run, the imbalance of c a p a b i l i t i e s between 
India and Pakistan wi l l manifest i t s e l f in the nuclear 
f i e l d as i t has in o the r s . 
146. MEHROTRA (0 N) . Imminence of Indo-Pak Arms Race. S t ra teg ic 
Analysis 3, 11; 1980, Feb; 401-5. 
The Soviet mi l i t a ry intervent ion in Afghanistan in 
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December l a s t year posses many serious problems for the 
world in general and for the s t a t e s In t h i s region in 
p a r t i c u l a r . Since the nd l i t a ry intervent ion was by one 
of the super powers, o ther super power the uni ted s t a t e s 
got na tu ra l ly concerned by the act ion. The present s i t u a -
t ion i s in a sense grimmer because P a k i s t a n ' i s also seeking 
to acquire nuclear weapons and the US has v i r t u a l l y given 
up i t s e f for t s to r e s t ra in Pakistan. Pakistan has been 
t ry ing to strengthen i t s defence bui ld up by secur i ty 
ass i s tances from the United Sta tes and i t s a l l i e s . The 
indo- Pak arms race i s a d i r ec t corol lary of ac t ion - re l a -
t ion phenomenon of t h e i r e f fo t t s to acquire arms. Time 
i s already running out and therefore some ser ious e f for t s 
have to be made to control the arms race between the two 
neighbouts - India and Pakistan, 
147. INDO - PAK r e l a t i o n s ! More on the Islamic bomb. Current 
Topics 13,6; 1987, May; 329 -30 . 
The magazine "Time" of USA has reported on March 22 
t h a t Gen 2ia-ul-Haq had admitted h i s country to bu i ld up 
a nuclear bomb. He to ld New Delhi. according to the 
correspondent of Time:"Pakistan can bui ld a bomb whenever 
i t wishes. Once you have acquired the technology which 
Pakistan has, you can do whatever you l i k e " . Mr Gandhi 
has said tha t any nuclear weapon produced by Islamabad 
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would in fac t be an "Islamic bomb,,, which i s funded by 
Arabs and wi l l be made avai lable to the Arab's", 
148. SUBRAHMANYAM (lO , Our Nuclear predicament. S t ra t eg ic 
Analysis 9,7; 1985, Oct, 647 - 68. 
The t a l k of Indian nuclear predicament in terms of 
Pakistan only ±n terms of Pakistan and china only i s to 
ignore the most c ruc ia l and dominant f ac to r in in t e rna -
t i ona l r e l a t ions and s t r a t egy . In such circumstances to 
ignore the nuclear f ac to r in a l l i t s dimensions and to look 
at i t as an Indo - Pak or Indo- China f ac to r wi l l be to 
continue to display the c redul i ty and negligence. I t s 
extremely doubtful whether the already de l i ca t e p o l i t i c a l 
r e l a t i o n s between India and Pakistan can stand the s t ra in 
of i n t r u s i v e mutual insoection. If India i s to remain non-
nuclear surrounded by the three major nuclear weapon powers 
and with Pakistan having reached the capabi l i ty to produce 
nuclear weapons our sense of insecur i ty wi l l be such tha t 
pressures to expand our conventional forces wi l l be never 
ending. 
149. SUBRAHMANYAM (K) . Pak is tan ' s nuclear capabi l i ty and I n d i a ' s 
response, In_ Seminar on Indo-Pak r e l a t i ons (New Delhi) 
(1984), Studies in Indo-Pak r e l a t i o n s : papers, Ed by VD 
Chopra. 120-34. 
The Pakistani ambition to go nuclear i s also 
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a matter of nat ional consensus in tha t country, A par t 
from these fac to rs there i s the well-known explanation 
fo r cer ta in countr ies going nuclear put forward by the 
American s t r a t e g i c cummunity. Early in 1978 the Indian 
Foreign Minister f i r s t disclosed in Parliament tha t Pak-
i s t a n i nuclear e f fo r t s had non peaceful dimensions. Since 
PaldLstan has reached the uranium enrichment capab i l i ty , 
i t i s to be assumed tha t they wi l l be in a posi t ion to 
bu i ld up an arsenal of uranium bombs constrained only 
by the out put of t h e i r centrifuge p l an t . The announce-
ment of reaching enrichment capab i l i ty i t s e l f i s a f i r s t 
major s tep in t h i s s t ra tegy . This s t ra tegy has several 
ser ious mplications fo r conventional war in the Indo-
Pakis tan. 
150, SUBRAMANIAN (RR) . India Vs Pakistan: the nuclear opt ion. 
Foreign Affairs ReTX>rt3 34, 5; 1985, May; 5 9 - 6 8 . 
In the mid 1980s, the s t r a t e g i c environment of 
South Asia displays a markedly d i f ferent charac ter from 
t h a t prevai l ing in the sevent ies . At tha t time, l a rge ly 
as a r e su l t of the Bangladesh war, I n d i a ' s c reden t i a l s as 
the dominant power in the region had been c lear ly estab-. 
l i s h e d . The proximity of the South Asian region to South-
west Asia may cause the tensions there to have t h e i r 
sp i l l ove r in to the former. Added to t h i s the nuclear 
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f a c t o r , on tha t has assumed some degree of importance, 
in view of the recent success t ha t Pakistan has achieved 
in developing a nuclear weapons capab i l i t y . 
, - , - , - , INDIA 
151« MUKERJEB (D) . I n d i a ' s nuclear t e s t and Pakistan. India 
Quart 30, 4; 1974, Oct - Dec; 262 - 70. 
If i t i s to maintain the c r e d i b i l i t y of i t s peace-
ful professions, India wi l l have to give a very convincing 
arguement for any objection to the Pakistani UN proposal 
t h a t Indian nuclear f a c i l i t i e s should be put under i n t e r -
na t iona l safeguard. Beyond t h i s , the Pakistani have 
argued t h a t South Asia should be a zone of peace from which 
nuclear weapons are barred. Neverthelsss; even of the 
1974 Pakistani proposal were to be adopted, mutual suspi-
cions between India and Pakistan would s t i l l not be 
d i s s ipa ted on the nuclear i s sue if the ongoing underlying 
f r i c t i o n between them did not cease with respect to 
border long term questions* 
152. POULOUSE (TT) . India and the nuclear safeguards contro-
versy . India Quart 35, 2; 1979, Apr-June; 153 - 62. 
I n d i a ' s nuclear policy from i t s inception has been 
t o renounce the acquis i t ion of nuclear weapons as an 
instrument of na t ional policy and to ^emphasize to 
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importance of nuclear weapons in in t e rna t iona l p o l i t i c s . 
Ind ia has a l l along favoured un iversa l , non-discriminatory 
safeguards applicable to a l l nat ions and to a l l nuclear 
f a c i l i t i e s . The Pakistani move to acquire nuclear weapons 
thirough the uranium route can only reinforce the ra t iona le 
of re ta in ing India* s nuclear opt ion, 
153. SUBRAMWIMJ (RR) . India and the bonibi to overview. India 
Quart 30, 4; 1974, Oct - Dec; 2 9 5 - 9 . 
India ' s peaceful nuclear explosion can be viewed 
in terms of a "domestic" p o l i t i c a l decision taken in the 
l i g h t of various in te rna t iona l developments during the 
pas t two decades. Although the "bonto" decision was made 
over two years ago following the exhibit ion of an i r r a t i o n a l 
pol icy of "Gunboat Diplomacy" on the par t of US in pursuance 
of the Kissinger t i l l theory, the actual denodation came at 
the time when India was determined to destroy the "equal 
India to Pakistan" theory. Indian Foreign pol icy, in the 
context of South Asia, has witnessed the effect of the 
above theory v ia the mi l i t a ry arming of Pakistan by the 
peoples Republic of China and the US. Also the so ca l led 
"Nixon-Mao Shock" ar i s ing from Kiss inger ' s secret journey 
to peking from Islamabad had necessitated an e x p l i c i t 
demonstration of "Nuclear weapons capab i l i t y . " The mis-
conception tha t India and Pakistan f igure in a balance of 
power calculus i s g rea t ly removed by I n d i a ' s bomb. 
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154. CHEEMA (Pervez Iqbal) . Pak is tan ' s quest fo r nuclear 
technology. Past Outlook 34, 2; 1980, Aig; 188 - 9 6. 
Pakistan wi l l continue experimentations in the 
nuclear f i e l d and wi l l not subject i t s researches to 
in te rna t iona l safeguards and inspection u n t i l l i t s n e i -
ghbours, India , agrees to do the same. Although the 
Indian nuclear explosion accelerated Pak i s tan ' s e f fo r t s 
to acquire nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, 
western pressure to influence Pakistan to refrain from 
undertaking the course of action has strengthened the wi l l 
of the Pakis tanis to go nuclear . 
155. KAUSHIK (Bri j Mohan), Pak is tan ' s nucLear pol icy. Punjab 
Journal of P o l i t i c s 7, 1; 1983, Jan-Oune; 15-33. 
Pak is tan ' s nuclear policy i s by and la rge a func-
t ion of I n d i a ' s nuclear pol icy. Pakistan intends to go 
in fo r nuclear weapons because she perceives India as a 
nuclear weapon power. India has made no e f for t s to assuage 
Pak i s t an ' s apprehensions in t h i s regard. If Pakistan has, 
there fore , f a i l ed to have a nuclear explosion so f a r , i t 
i s not because of any lack of p o l i t i c a l wi l l on i t s par t 
but because of the d i f f i c u l t i e s in enriching uranium for 
weapons purposes. There should be a diplomatic offensive 
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by India so as to check Pakistan from going nuclear , fo r 
nuclear cooperation between India and Pakistan as the 
poss ib le way t o s top the prospect ive nuclear arms race 
in the sub-continent . 
156. INDO - PAK RELATIONS: Pakis tan ' s nuclear ambitions. 
Current Topics 13, 7? 1987, OUne; 394. 
Sahibzada Yaqub Khan i n i t i a t i n g in a debate on 
April 20 pleaded for a construct ive dialogue between 
India and Pakistan on the thorny i s sue of nuclear weapons 
to avoide p ro l i f e ra t ion in the region. Mr KC Pant had 
t o l d the Lok Sabha tha t the weapon or iented nuclear 
pol icy of Pakistan and the emerging th rea t from tha t 
country were forcing India to review i t s opt ions in the 
mat ter . Be noted tha t I n d i a ' s e f for t s to mormalise r e l a -
t i o n s with Pakistan had not proceeded beyond a cer ta in 
po in t . 
157, INDO - PAK RELATIONS: Progress in Pak N-Programme. 
Current Topics 13, 4; 1987, Mar; 202. 
The US ambassador, Mr Dean Hinton ha« said tha t 
Pakistan was going ahead with i t s nuclear weapons progra-
mme, fu r the r he added some Pakistani people shared the 
Late Zulfiqar All Bhut to 's view tha t "we should eat grass 
to have nuclear weapons." 
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158, KAFUR (Ashok) . Nuclearizing Pakistan: Some hypotheses. 
Asian Survey 20, 5; 1980, May; 495-516. 
There I s evidence in Pakis tan ' s declaratory policy 
and i t s development of capabi l i ty since I n d i a ' s 1974 t e s t , 
to move towards a boixib decis ion. The theses of In do-
Pakistan "act ion-react ion" should be cr l t ica l ly-exandned 
because Pakis tan ' s nuclear policy making process i s respon-
s ive to domestic, regional and in te rna t iona l f a c t o r s . The 
indo - Paid Stan "act ion-react ion" focus should not be over-
s t a ted because Pak is tan ' s nuclear h is tory can be divided 
in to four p a r t s . Before Pakistan decides to engage India 
in a nuclear race there wi l l be an in house debate.Pak-
i s t a n ' s nuclear policy i s a reaction to Mr Garter ' s a n t i -
p ro l i f e ra t ion policy and i t i s cautious and arribiguous. 
159. MOHAMMED ASLAM. Pakis tan ' s ha l t ing s t eps . HS; 197 5 ,1 ,21 . 
The process of India-Pakistan reconci l ia t ion i s 
moving slow. There are many reasons for t h i s Pakistan 
s t i l l doubts I n d i a ' s in tent ion towards i t , in s p i t e of 
Indian assurance of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 
Mr Bhutto knows he cannot be completely indi f fe rent to 
normalizations n e i t h e r does he want instantaneous f r iend-
ship because of the in te rna t iona l s i tua t ion and domestic 
publ ic opinion respect ive ly . If peace and progress i s 
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to be achieved in Simla accord i s necessary. But t h i s i s 
poss ib le only if Mr Bhutto gives up h i s policy of delaying 
th ings in one way or the o the r , 
160. NAMBOODIRI (PKS). Pakis tan ' s nuclear s t ra tegy . S t ra teg ic 
Analysis 4, 9; 1980, Dec; 403 - 7 , 
Pakistan has made a decision to acquire nuclear 
weapon in 1972. This c lear ly t e l l s tha t Pak i s tan ' s 
nuc lear ambition was not an offshoot of I n d i a ' s nuclear 
explosion in May 1974. The water resource of India pro-
vides her a great opportunity to l i f t the bulk of her 
population from the morass of poverty and d isease . The 
challenge of the e igh t i e s i s to provide the technical 
ingenuity and needed wil l to use t h i s resource wisely. 
There i s a g rea te r need today to evolve low-cost techniques 
to a r r e s t if not e rad ica te , water po l lu t ion . 
, - , _, - , ro le of IRW^ 
161. BETTS (Richard K) . Incentives fo r nuclear weapons: India, 
I r a n , Asian Survey 19, 11; 1979, Nov; 1053-7 2. 
India and Pakistan have sample secur i ty incent ives 
f o r acquiring nuclear weapons. Both face major t h r e a t s 
and tack r e l i a b l e a l l i e s India may need nuclear weapons to 
to counter China 's nuclear araenal , and Pakistan has no 
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hope of matching I n d i a ' s power at the conventional l e v e l . 
Iran has po ten t ia l incent ives for nuclear weapons. Domestic 
p o l i t i c a l deterndnants of nuclear decisions in the three 
countr ies are also discussed. 
, - , - , ro le of SUPER POWERS 
162. HAMMOND (J Casey) . Aplonib o r the borrib: Outlook for Indo-
Pakis tani r e l a t ions in a global perspec t ive . India Quart 
37, 4; 1981, Oct-Dec; 590 - 98 . 
The US, the USSR and China would do well to r ea l i ze 
t ha t t h e i r own secut l ty would be enhanced if they helped 
t o develop a non-aligned sub-continent . In p a r t i c u l a r , the 
US should reassess i t s re la t ionsh ip with Pakistan. The US 
must do a l l i t can to bui ld a s tab le and popular Govt,in 
Pakistan; only then would India reach an accord with Pak-
i s t a n . In addit ion, the US irust recognize India for what 
i t i s the s trongest and most i n f l u e n t i a l country in South 
Asia. 
, - , - , ro le of U S A 
163. IN DO - PAK RELATIONS: Concern over Pak arms bui ld-up . 
Current Topics 14, 6; 1988, June; 333, 
Mr Prank Carlucci said in Islamabad tha t even a f te r 
the Soviet troops leave Afghanistan, the USA wil l continue 
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t o supply arms to Pakistan. India looksup the matter with 
The USA and coveyed to Washington i t s concern over the 
massive supply of soph i s t i ca ted American arms to Pakistan, 
A s t a t e o f f i c i a l was reported to have sa id , "We have strong 
r e l a t i o n s with Pakistan and they w i l l cont inue." Mr Gandhi 
s a i d , "we are very worried about US arms to Pakistan, What 
i t means i s that we have to spend a l o t of our money on 
defence which i s t o t a l l y contrary to our economic develop-
ment," 
164, JOHAL (Sarabjit) . America's arming of Pakistan: India 
views in the 1950s and 1980s. S trateg ic Studies 9, 2? 
1986, Win; 68-79, 
The Indian Govts response to the recent re-arming 
i s thus heavi ly inf luenced by i t s perceptions of the 
e a r l i e r United States - Pakistan a l l i a n c e s . India and 
Pakistan have been negot ia t ing to permanently normalise 
r e l a t i o n s between the two countr ies . Some progress has 
been made in s e t t i n g up a j o i n t commission f o r economic 
and cu l tura l cooperat ions , Indo-Pakistan r e l a t i o n s have 
deter iorated over such matters as Kashmir and a l l eged 
Pakistan support to Sikh s e c e s s i o n i s t s in the Punjab, 
For Indian p o l i c y makers the 1981 rearming of Pakistan 
c l o s e l y p a r a l l e l s the 1954 arming of Pakistan, 
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165. NARAYANA (KR) . American arms, India and Pakistan. Free 
Press Journal ; 1984, 11, 12. 
The two aspects of American policy-strengthening 
Pakistan mi l i t a ry in the »ab-continent and project ing i t 
g lobal ly as a l ink in the Chain of anti-communist s t ra tegy-
went s ide by side reinforcing each o the r . The fac t tha t 
in the past American arms were used by Pakistan against , 
and only agadnst India makes us examine closely the ques-
t ion of the bas i s of the current supply of sophis t ica ted 
and deadly arms to Pakistan. As the supply of arros to 
Pakistan i s i n t e r t nded with America? S global po l i c i e s 
and has the effect of accentuating Pak is tan ' s differences 
and competition with India, a relaxat ion of in te rna t iona l 
tens ions generally and of the conf l i c t s in South West Asia 
and the Persian Gulf p a r t i c u l a r l y , i s e s sen t i a l in a very 
p r a c t i c a l sensefor improving I n d i a ' s r e l a t ions with the 
USA and Pakistan. 
166. PARIMDO (JN) . PM t e l l s Reagan of Pak N-plan t h r e a t . TI^; 
1985, 10, 25. 
Indo - Pakistan r e l a t i ons were the focus of Mr 
Rajiv Gandhi's meeting with US pres ident , Mr Ronald Reagan 
Mr. Gandhi voiced the growing concern of the people of 
Ind ia over Pak i s tan ' s nuclear weapons making progranme. 
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Mrleagan t o l d Mr Gandhi t h a t P r e s i d e n t Zia had no p l ans 
t o make t h e boinb. The US P r e s i d e n t suggested t h a t t h e 
two c o u n t r i e s should r e s o l v e t h i s i s s u e through mutual 
c o o p e r a t i o n s . I n d i a ' s growing concern ove r t h e cont inued 
u s supply of arms t o Pakis tan Mr Reagan suggest t h a t t h e 
b e s t s o l u t i o n t o t h e problem l ay in I n d i a improving i t 
r e l a t i o n s wi th P a k i s t a n . 
, MILITARY POLICY 
167. BAID (Samuel) and SREBDHAR. P a k i s t a n ' s de fence p o t e n t i a l . 
Fore ign Af fa i r s Repor ts 25, 4; 197 6, ^ r ; 53 - 66. 
The cont inued t ens ion system in Pak i s tan and I n d i a 
de i v e s P r imar i l y from t h e f o r m e r ' s p e r s i s t e n t b e l i e f 
t h a t I n d i a c o n s t i t u t e s a t h r e a t t o h e r s e c u r i t y . Against 
t h i s backdrop t h e au thors examine P a k i s t a n ' s defence 
p o t e n t i a l i n t h e nex t decade. The a r t i c l e i s d iv ided 
i n t o f i v e s e c t i o n s : exper iences dur ing t h e t h r e e wars , t h e 
p r e s e n t economic b a s e , t h e t h r e a t pe rcep t ion of P a k i s t a n , 
i t s arms b u i l d - u p in t h e r ecen t y e a r s , and p o s s i b l e 
f u t u r e t r e n d s . 
168. ELKIN ( J e r r o l d P) and RITEZEL (w Andrew) . Indo - P a k i s t a n i 
m i l i t a r y ba l ance Asian Survey 26 ,5 ; 1986, May; 518-38. 
Islamabad's acqusition of s o p h i s t i c a t e d American 
.15 a 
weaponry has done l i t t l e to a l t e r pejeaci.sting power asy-
mmetries in the sub-continent, India countinues to 
enjoy an overwhelming numirecal and q u a l i t a t i v e advan-
tage in most weapon ca tegor ies , and a l i k e super io r i ty 
in command, cont ro l , and conwwnication l o g i s t i c s ; and 
the indegenous manufacture of armaments. New Delhi 
regula r ly adduces the th rea t presented by Pakistan in 
Just i fying i t s arms purchases. However, an expanded 
arsenal also f a c i l i t a t e s achievement of more sweeping 
pol icy objec t ives , such as gaining an ascendent power 
pos i t ion in the Indian ocean and u l t imate ly , a t ta in ing 
major power s t a t u s . 
169. GUPTA (Amit). Pak is tan ' s acquisi t ion of armss Rationale, 
quest and implicat ions for India . IPSA Journal 14, 3> 
1982, Jan-Mar; 422 - 4 3 . 
The existence of a well-armed American proxy, 
Pakis tan, on I n d i a ' s border l i m i t s I n d i a ' s a b i l i t y to 
act as a regional power and r e s t r i c t s i t from playing 
i t s due role in global p o l i t i c s . An armed Pakistan 
encouraged by the t a c i t support of the US may be tempted 
to wage a war to r e -e s t ab l i sh i t s mi l i ta ry pre-eminence 
o r to use the conf l i c t to resolve domestic problems. At 
l e a s t , t h i s development wi l l menace the ex is t ing 
regional power balance and push India in to a 
arms race . 
r 1 J5. 
170, JAIPAL (Rikhi) Non-nuclear rat ion able , NH; 1989, 4 ,4 . 
The nuclear danger to mankind's survival has been 
uppemost in the minds of I n d i a ' s l eade r s . In the view 
of the l a t e Smt Ind i ra Gandhi, nuclear weapons represent 
the u l t imate in force , and any attempt to el iminate force 
as the determining fac to r in in te rna t iona l r e l a t i ons nust 
begin with p rac t i ca l s teps towards nuclear disarmament. 
I t i s in t h i s context tha t we should consider the nuclear 
t h r e a t emerging from Pakistan, Such a t h r ea t can be met 
by signing the non-prol i fera t ion Treaty or by es tab l i sh ing 
a nuclear weapon-free zone in South Asia. 
171. MOONIS AHMAR. Security perceptions in the Indo-Pakistan 
r e l a t i onsh ip , Pak Horizon 37, 1; 1984; 100 - 119, 
India and Pakistan form the core of the South Asian 
secur i ty system and any adverse development in t h e i r r e l a -
t i o n s inevi tably affects the geo-po l i t i ca l and secur i ty 
environment of the e n t i r e region, India-Pakistan re la t ion 
s ince the time of the pa r t i t i on are marred with h i s t o r i c a l 
animosi t ies , mutual, suspicion, arms bui ld up and p o l i t i c a l 
tens ion . Security r e l a t ions between India and Pakistan 
are to be studied from h i s t o r i c a l , r e l ig ious , mi l i ta ry and 
and p o l i t i c a l aspects , A conducive secur i ty perception 
between India and Pakistan demands t h e i r convergence on 
external secur i ty t h r e a t s and in te rna l p o l i t i c a l d isputes . 
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17 2. MUKERJBE (Dillp) . Hi-tech players in a dangerous game 
of catch. Far East Soon Review 140,23j 1989, 6,9; 32-4. 
India and Pakistan have accused each o ther for 
years of building mi l i ta ry c a p a b i l i t i e s f a r in ejcass of 
any reasonable requirements. But ne i the r has ever set 
out objec t ive yards t icks by which t h e i r own build-ups 
should be measured. Both India and Pakistan explain t h e i r 
accelerated arms build-up in the 19803 by claiming a 
sharp de ter iora t ion in t h e i r secur i ty environment. Best 
of a l l , non-off ic ia l contacts between the two countr ies 
are now mach g rea t e r than any time in the past 25 years . 
This i s reviving the love par t of the love-hate r e l a t i o n -
ship between two countr ies tha t have so nuch in common. 
173. PASRICHA (PH) . Mili tary balance between India and Pakis-
t a n . In, Seminar on Indo-Pak re l a t ions (New Delhi) (1984) . 
Studies in Indo-Pak r e l a t i o n s : papers . Ed by VD Chopra, 
135 - 151. 
The Indo-Pak war of 1971 can be regarded as a 
watershed in indo-Pak r e l a t i o n s . The supply of arms by 
the US to Pakistan f i t s pa r t ly with the basic need of 
moder. n isa t ion and most of the remainder doveta i l s with 
the Pakis tani ro le in West Asia as assigned by the US. 
India , on the o ther hand, has i t s own l a rge r and long 
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term secur i ty needs to cater to through noder n i sa t ion 
of i t s armed f o r c e s . I t i s a delusion to think that 
f r i endsh ip between India and Pakistan would iiwnediately 
end the inoderanisation process or reduce weapon pro-
gramme. India cannot afford to ignore the portent of 
l i k e l y ac t ive US support to Pakistan in the event of a 
war with India. 
174. RAMA RX) (ft)t India and Pakistan : Dif fer ing secur i ty 
percept ions . India Quart 41, 1 ; 1985, Jan - Mar ; 28-35. 
Every country has certa in b a s i c secur i ty concerns ar i s ing 
from i t s geos t ra teg i c l o c a t i o n , s trength and a t t i t u d e s at 
any g i v o i time of neighbouring countr ies . In the case of 
Pakistan, threats from external sources have been minimal 
i f not a l together absent. There i s increas ing concern 
in India on t h i s account. Several f a c t o r s tend to re in -
force t h i s concern. F i r s t , Pakistan has secured extremely 
powerful a i r , naval and land attack weapons in the form 
of a i r c r a f t . Second, Pakistarfeelectronic surve i l l ance 
system, would enable Pakistan forces to destroy Indian 
f o r c e s . Third, Pakistan i s already a nuclear power and 
i t s c a p a b i l i t y may be approaching that of I s rae l in t h i s 
regard. 
lb/ 
, — , PAKISTAN 
175. CHMJDHRI (Mohammed Ahsen) . Pakistan and regional securltyi 
A Paldstanl view. India Quart 36, 2; 1980, i^r-June; 179-91. 
Pakistan I s worried over New De lh i ' s f a i l u r e to 
uhderstand the Implicat ions f o r the sub-continent of the 
USSR's invasion of Afghanistan. Yet, India I s opposed to 
any Pakistani move to strengthen i t s defences . I t g i v e s 
the impression that India does not want to irrprove r e l a -
t i o n s with Pakistan on the b a s i s of equal i ty Pakistan i s 
b e d e v i l l e d by the v i s ion of Scenario in which slmrultaneous 
pressure from India and the USSR i s accompanied by the 
danger of an in terna l subversion edmed at under mining 
the Ideo log ica l b a s i s of PaJdstan. At the same time 
Pakistan i s try ing to improve r e l a t i o n s with India because 
any s tra in in t h e i r r e l a t i o n s i s l i k e l y to aggravate the 
s i t u a t i o n in the region. 
176. RI25VI (Hasan-Askarl) . Pakistan's defence p o l i c y . Pak 
Horizon 36, 1; 1983; 32-56. 
A comprehensive review of PaJdstan's defence p o l i c y 
s i n c e 1947, taking i n t o account the g e o - s t r a t e g i c context . 
Security problems goa l s and s t r a t e g i e s . The author examines 
the InrpllcatL ons of establishment of Bangladesh on Pakistan's 
defence p o l i c y , I n d i a ' s nuclear explosion in 1974 Pakistan's 
Indian Ocean s trategy the Soviet mi l i tary intervent ion 
in Afghanistan and Pakistan's opt ions in 1980s. 
177. SUBRAHMANYAM (K) . Pakis tan's Armed Forces : A s t u t e 
modernisation s t ra tegy , TI_ 152, 58; 1989, 2, 27; 6. 
An o b j e c t i v e assessm&it of Pakis tan's mi l i tary 
preparedness not only by i t s e l f but a lso in comparison 
with India i s a necessary f i r s t s tep in f i x i n g our 
p r i o r i t i e s f o r arms a c q u i s i t i o n . Any o b j e c t i v e a s s e s s -
ment of Pakistani f o r c e s f o r a person in India o u t s i d e 
Government i s f a r more d i f f i c u l t than f o r a Pakistan in 
respect of India . Pakistan would incur no penalty f o r 
proceedings with i t s nuclear and m i s s i l e prograiranes. 
The bes t course f o r our modernisation prograinne i s to 
secure a nuclear m i s s i l e s h i e l d and thereaf ter adjust the 
pace of our conventional f o r c e modernisation to our means. 
178. SYBD ( A H ) . Pakis tan's secur i ty problem s A b i l l of 
c o n s t r a i n t s . Orbis 16, 4i 1973, Win; 952-74. 
Palcistan's secur i ty problan a r i s e s mainly from the 
t e n s e s t a t e of her r e l a t i o n s with India , I t i s aggravated 
by an Indian - Soviet combination against China and Pakis-
tan . Pakistan may be w i l l i n g to end the o l d confrontation 
with India but i s no twi l l ing to accept subordinate s ta tus 
in re la t ion to India . If India i n s i s t on being the domi-
nant power in South Asia, PakistatJfesecurity problem w i l l 
remain severe . In deal ing vd.th t h i s probl«n domestic 
cohesion and nat ional in tegerat ion are Just as important 
as mi l i tary c a p a b i l i t y . 
, PROSPECTS 
179. BSRINDRWATH (Dewan) . Indo-Pak t a l k s t Z ia ' s t a c t i c s . 
Democratic World 11, 10; 1982, 2, 7 . 
The Indian Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi herse l f has 
been touring round the globe strenghtening b i l a t e r a l 
r e l a t i o n s and g iv ing India a p ivota l r o l e in several 
m u l t i l a t e r a l and internat ional gathering. Pakistan had 
continued to harp upon a b i l a t e r a l i s s u e l i k e Kashmir in 
intezmational forums of the Simla agre«na)t would tend 
t o preclude t h i s . India could have come out with a bold 
and imaginative proposal f o r lowering of trade and trave l 
b a r r i e r s , cooperation in f i e l d l i k e Science, Technology 
and Culture and a mutually acceptable frame work of b i -
l a t e r a l assurance on the peaceful use of nuclear energy 
by the two countr i e s . The lacuna in Gen Z ia ' s o f t -repeated 
no-war pact including some doubts over i t s motivat ions . 
New Delhi has i t s r ight to point out , 
180. DAYAL (R) . India and Pakistan j Opportunities and compul-
s i o n s . India Quart 28, 2y 197 2, Apr-JUne; 106-8, 
The s i tua t ion of In do-Pakistani r e l a t i o n s i s usefu l 
of opportuni t ies and there are inherent compulsions which 
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must propel the two countr ies towards seeking a pattern 
of peaceful c o - e x i s t e n c e in which the ever-recurring 
spectre of war i s f o r ever banished. 
181. DHAR (MK) . Thaw in r e l a t i o n s with Pak l i k e l y . HT; 1989,7 ,19. 
Mr Gandhi has made i t c l e a r that India can ta lk with 
a democratical ly e l e c t e d government^ though i t w i l l take 
time f o r r e l a t i o n s , frozen f o r four decades, to thaw, I n d i a ' s 
main concern i s Pakistan's huge arms build-up and hence 
the need to normalise r e l a t i o n s to end a h o s t i l e r e l a t i o n -
ship with Pakistan and usher in peace so that the two 
countr ies could reduce t h e i r esqpenditure on armaments. 
India i s a lso concerned over i n f i l t r a t i o n of t e r r o r i s t s 
i n t o Punjab and Kashmir. I t i s f e l t that to g ive more 
meaningful thrust to b i l a t e r a l trades , i t should be per-
mitted in a l l those items which have been allowed to be 
f r e e l y traded with other countr ie s . 
182. INDO-PAK SUSPICIONS p e r s i s t . Link 24, 27; 1982, 2, 14; 8 -9 . 
Indo-Pak r e l a t i o n s have again become a major top ic 
of d iscuss ion in India and elsewhere, par t i cu lar ly non-
al igned block. India i s be l i eved to have t o l d Pakistan 
that a no-war pact by I t s e l f would not achieve the o b j e c t i v e 
of normalising r e l a t i o n s between the two countr i e s . Neverthe 
l e s s , India not ye t been able to see through President 
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Zia-ul-Haq*s motive for pushing the no-war pact projxisal 
to India , Indian policymakers *d.ll have to resolve many 
a pr ick ly point in t h e i r future negot ia t ions with Pakistan, 
183. KATYAL (KK). Big gulf. Uphill t a sk . Hindu? 1986, 6, 2. 
Since Mr Rajiv Gandhi and Gen 2ia-ul-Haq met in 
New Delhi l a s t December, the progress towards normalisa-
t ion of r e l a t ions between India and PaMstan has been 
n e g l i g i b l e . There i s a wide gap between the perception 
of the two neighbours and bridging i t wi l l not be an easy 
t a s k . I t has not been possible to in t eg ra t e t h e i r r e s -
pect ive formulat ions , - Pakis tan ' s paper on a no-war pact 
and I n d i a ' s draf t t r ea ty of peace fr iendship and coopera-
t i o n . There i s a genuine gap in perceptions between 
New Delhi and Islamabad, 
184. KATYAL (KiO . New phase in Indo-Pak r e l a t i o n s , Hindu, 
1989, 1, 17. 
There are several points of contras t in the Prime 
Minister , Mr Rajiv Gandhi's v i s i t to the Soviet Union 
and Pakistan, in Islamabad, the idea was to give a push 
to the process of changing the long time adversar ial r e l a -
t ionsh ip in to deal ings, based on t r u s t and understanding. 
The Indo-Pakistan r e l a t i ons , are poised for a switch from 
the unsavoury, bitter pas t , to a new phase, which made 
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a cautious s t a r t in December l a s t year . The fac t remains 
t h a t perhaps fo r the f i r s t time New Delhi f inds a genuine 
des i re to improve r e l a t ions with India and i s keen to 
reciprocate i t . The two side have s t a r t ed with a clean 
s l a t e on which could be writ ten the norms for f ree t r a v e l , 
frequent exchanges now and a t rade pact and the Siachen 
agreement l a t e r , 
185. KUNDU (Samarendra) . What a i l s Indo-Pak r e l a t i o n s . Janata 
37, 8; 1982, 3, 28; 6-7. 
I t i s indeed a tragedy tha t India suffered two 
important diplomatic reverses recently while handling 
i t s assignment on Pakistan. In the Simla agreement tha t 
a l l disputes between India and Padistan should be solved 
b i l a t e r a l l y and in a "peaceful manner." Unfortunately, 
Pakistan r a i ses the Kashmir i s sue again and again in 
various in te rna t iona l forums. The bungling goes on un-
abated between the rule of the fa the r and the daughter. 
All bridges b u i l t between the two countr ies to leave in 
peace and fr iendship were shat tered by the approach of 
the fa ther and by eccent r ic behaviour of the "she" fac tor 
of the daughter. 
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186, mSRA (GS) . Indo-Pak re la t ions* A permanent s talemate. 
Pa t r io t ? 1986, 9, 30, 
Pour decades a f t e r p a r t i t i o n , India and Pakistan 
remain locked in an adversary r e l a t i onsh ip . The occa-
sional oosmetlc words of good neighbourly r e l a t i ons 
notwithstanding. Fourteen years a f t e r the Simla pact, 
Pakistani leadership have repeatedly come to the conclu-
sion tha t normal t rade with India i s not in t h e i r i n t e r e s t , 
t h a t cu l tu ra l r e l a t ions with India are harmful, and tha t 
Pak i s t an ' s s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s preclude normalisation of 
r e l a t i o n s with India and require a s t a t e of near tension, 
obviously, a s t a t e of de l ibera te and prolonged adversary 
approach r e f l ec t s something deeper, Infact , the p o l i t i c a l 
stalemate i s a ref lec t ion of a mi l i ta ry s t r a t e g i c stalemate, 
187, MUGHA (Nazir ;0 . Inching together o r a mile apartx India 
and Pakistan towards detente , Pak.,Horizon 29, 3; 197 6; 20-32, 
Although i t would be unwise to be overly op t imis t i c , 
the prospects of the rapproachment between India and Pak-
i s t a n seem to be good. In view of the present balance of 
power in the Indian sub-continent, the domestic problems 
facing both count r ies , and the l imi ted c a p a b i l i t i e s of 
external powers to intervene in a decisive fashion, the 
prospects of Indo-Palcistan detente are encouraging. There 
are many recent premonitions of such a development. 
188, NORMALISING INDO - PAK Relat ions. Current Topics 15,4; 
1989, Mar; 202, 
Describes tha t the people of both sides of the Indo-
Pak border have been on the look out for signs of injyrove-
roent in Indo-Pak r e l a t ions and there has been l o t of 
wishful thinking on tha t score. Leaders in both countr ies 
have expressed t h e i r keen des i re to normalise b i l a t e r a l 
r e l a t i o n s . Prime Minister Bhutto said t ha t a solution 
to the Kashmir i ssue was necessary for t o t a l normalisation 
of r e l a t i ons with India , 
189. PANDIT (GS), Pakistan today: Relations with India , World 
Focus 2, 3; 1981, Mar; 3 5 - 7 , 
There are cer ta in elements in Pakistan who keep 
up the an t i - Ind ia bogey to perpetuate themselves in power. 
They have been using Kashmir for the purpose, India 
regards the Simla agreement to be a sound bas i s for 
improving Indo-Pakistan r e l a t i o n s . The bas ic question 
i s how re l a t ions between India and Pakistan would become 
normal and fr iendly ? Pakis tan ' s current e f for t s to 
secure nuclear capabi l i ty may be motivated by the t r a d i -
t i ona l des i re of having pa r i ty with India, but India 
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should welcome t h i s effor t so long as i t i s £or peaceful 
purposes. 
190. PARTHASARTHY (Milini) , SymbOlis of thaK in Inc3o-Pak t i e s . 
Hindu; 1989, 1,1. 
The nost s ign i f icant agreement tha t has been signed 
between India Pakistan i s the prohibi t ion of at tack 
against nuclear i n s t a l l a t i o n s and f a c i l i t i e s of India and 
Pakistan by each o ther . The agreement which was f i r s t 
verbal ly ass«i ted to by the Prime Minister, Mr Rajiv 
Gandhi and the l a t e Pak President 21a-ul-Haq, had been 
se t aside as the Indo-Pakistani r e l a t i ons became c h i l l e r 
in the subsequent months. The signing of the agreemait 
un l ike a t r ea ty of mutual ve r i f i ca t ion o r a nuclear weapons 
f ree zone proposal would not pre-empt i t s opt ions , but 
would represent only a measure to bui ld mutual confidence 
and strengthen the peace process. 
191. PATRA (Sarla) . India-Pakistan r e l a t ions touch a new low. 
P a t r i o t ; 1986, 10, 16. 
Unless a major shift takes place in Pakis tan ' s 
a t t i t u d e towards India , there i s hardly any chance of 
carrying forward the process of normalisation of r e l a t ions 
between the two neighbours. These are not f rozai , but 
have touclTed a new Ipw. i t may not be t o t a l l y unrela ted 
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t h a t Islamabads an t i - Ind ia propaganda during the recent 
past has r isen in volume and in t ens i ty along with i t s 
widely reported dexter i ty in handling nuclear f i ss ion 
ma te r i a l . Whether Pakistan has a nuclear bont? or not, 
t he re i s no l i t t l e doubt tha t i t has acquired the capa-
b i l i t y of producing nuclear weapons with the f a c i l i t i e s 
already es tabl ished in tha t country. While Gen 2ia-ul-Haq 
wi l l continue to complain in world forums about h i s 
perceptions of I n d i a ' s alleged misdemeanour against 
Pakis tan. 
192. POLITICAL CHANGE In Pakis tan- I I j A breakthrough in Indo-
Pak r e l a t i o n s . Current Topics 15, 4> 1989, Mar; 216 - 8, 
Describes tha t Pakistan i s a matter of special 
i n t e r e s t in normalization of r e l a t ions between the two 
d i s t a n t neighbours for four decades. During these four 
decades the two countr ies have fought four wars and have 
been indulging in eye-ba l l - to -eye-ba l l confrontat ion, 
India and Pakistan have signed three agreements providing 
for a commitment not to at tack on others nuclear i n s t a l l a -
t i o n s , avoiding double taxation and expanding cu l tu ra l 
exchanges. In the area of foreign policy and more espe-
c i a l l y in the area of Indo - Pak r e l a t ions in subject to 
s t rong and apparent cons t r a in t s . On a scale and at a 
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pace of h e r own choosing f o r t h e s teady development of 
good ne ighbour ly r e l a t i o n s with I n d i a she can he lp in 
t h e removal of b i l a t e r a l as well as r eg iona l misunder-
s t a n d i n g s . 
193. RICHTER (William L) . Pakis tan — A new "Front l i n e " 
s t a t e . Current His tory? 1982, May; 202 - 6, 225, 
In s p i t e of i t s a f f i rmat ion t h a t i t i s only a 
c a r e t a k e r government t h e p re sen t Pak i s t an i regime has 
embarked on a s e r i e s of s t e p s d i r e c t e d towards t h e t r a n s -
formation of P a k i s t a n ' s socie ty , economy and p o l i t y i n t o 
a new I s l amic o r d e r . Pakis tan has secured t h e means to 
upgrade and modernize i t s m i l i t a r y wi thout g iv ing up i t s 
non -a l i gned s t a t u s o r be ing fo rced t o make any s e r i o u s 
corranitments on t h e u s e of i t s new weapons. At t h e same 
t i m e , Pakis tan has a t tempted d i p l o m a t i c a l l y t o minimise 
t h e adverse impact of i t s arms b u i l d - up on i t s r e l a t i o n s 
wi th bo th I n d i a and Sovie t Union, While i t has o f f e r e d 
I n d i a a mutual no-war pac t and the fo re ign Min i s t e r s of 
t h e two c o u n t r i e s have exchanged v i s i t s . 
194. TACTICAL AMBIVALANCE. ed. I E ; 1985, 11, 20. 
Indo- Pak i s t an r e l a t i o n s have been b e d e v i l l e d f o r 
too long by a c c i d e n t s (?) , an to igui t ies and c o n t r a d i c t i o n s 
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of t h i s kind for anyone to be overly disconcerted by i t . 
I t would be as naively op t imis t i c to see in the Hi scat 
meeting a breakthrough in Indo-Pakistan r e l a t i ons as i t 
would be naively negative to be upset by Z i a ' s speaking 
fo r the record to a Br i t i sh Newspaper, The s tudies 
antoivalance of the Pakistani President was evident in the 
curious r ide r he made to h i s asser t ion of I n d i a ' s nuclear 
weapon capab i l i t y . Given the imperatives of sub-continen-
t a l harmony , i t would be wrong to l e t purely propagandist 
a l l ega t ions mar the e f for t s towards improvement of Indo-
pakis tani r e l a t i o n s . 
195. TOBA (Reijiro) . In search of s t a b i l i t y on the Indian sub-
cont inent , Asia Pacif ic community 28; 1985, Spr; 1-14, 
One of the bas ic condit ions for s t a b i l i t y on the 
Indian sub-continent i s t ha t India and Pakistan t r y to 
reduce t h e i r almost hy ter ica l antagonism and e s t ab l i sh 
f r iendly and cooperative r e l a t i o n s . This would cont t lbu te 
to h i s goals of s t a b i l i z i n g I n d i a ' s domestic p o l i t i c s and 
a t t a in ing economic growth, Gandhi nust take i n i t i a t i v e 
of efEorts to resume and expand t a l k s between the two 
coun t r i e s . 
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19 6. MEPiTA (Vinod) . I n d i a should make t h e f i r s t nove because 
Pak i s t an won ' t : Go on Be Daring. Sunday 17, l ; 1990, 
Jan, 7 - 13; 10 - 1 1 . 
Iirproving t i e s wi th Pakis tan i s no t a s u b j e c t 
vfrdch can be d i scussed open ly . The Pakis tan are always 
c r e a t i n g t r o u b l e , whi le we t h e innocent v i c t i m s a re 
caught unawares . I n d i a and Pak is tan have ave r t ed war 
by a h a i r ' s b r e a t h . We nus t ask wi th some anxie ty 
whether t h i s i s t h e benchmark on which Indo-Pak r e l a -
t i o n s a re t o be measured. A c l i m a t e w i l l be c r e a t e d in 
which r e l a t i o n s can be normal i sed . The Indo - Pak dead-
lock cannot be broksTn by time, t he g r e a t h e a l e r . Some-
t h i n g dramat ic i s r e q u i r e d . Yes, even t h e grand g e s t u r e . 
, PUNJAB 
197. PAHMIDA ASHRAP. S t ra tegemes : Pak is tan I n d i a R e l a t i o n s . 
S t r a t e g i c S t u d i e s 12, 1; 1988, J>ug; 12 -3 . 
The c o n f l i c t u a l na tu re of P a k i s t a n - I n d i a r e l a t i o n s 
i s an impor tan t f a c t o r in t h e South Asian p o l i t i e s . The 
Ind ian charge r ega rd ing P a k i s t a n ' s suppor t f o r t e r r o r i s m 
in I n d i a i s r e l a t e d t o the Sikh a g i t a t i o n in t h e S t a t e of 
Eas t Punjab f o r a s e p a r a t e homeland. Pakis tan has been 
vehemently denying t h e above Indian cha rge . I n d i a i s 
a l s o apprehensive about P a k i s t a n ' s n u c l e a r programme. 
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198, HAMLYN (Michael) . India blames Pakistan for arming Sikhss 
ca r luce i seeks to calm border tens ion . Time? 1988,4, 7 , 
The US secretary expressed Washington* s concern 
over cross-border tension between India and Pakistan. The 
Indian Government i s apparently carrying on a campaign to 
persuade world and local opinion tha t much of the problem 
in Punjab i s to be blamed on the a c t i v i t i e s of the Pakis-
tan Govt in encouraging Sikh s e p a r a t i s t s . The Pakistan 
Govt has been unable to prevent these from f a l l i n g in to 
the hands of bandi ts in the southern province of Sindh, 
Mr Carlucei declined to accept tha t Washington was respon-
s i b l e for increasing tension through i t s moves to supply 
more arms to Pakistan. 
199, JDSHI (VT) . indo-Pak t a lks begin on i l l i c i t arms t r ade . 
T l ; 1987, 9, 9 . 
New bortieff guidel ines are to be framed to deal with 
problems re la t ing to smuggling, i l l e g a l border crossing and 
i l l i c i t arms t rade between India and Pakistan. The hal t ing 
pace of normalisat ion, a lapse of jus t ninemonths should 
not be a su rp r i se . The need for evolving new and effec t ive 
ru les had arisen in view of the changed s i tua t ion in the 
wake of the Punjab problem and the Indian Govt's charge 
against Pakistan of harbouring and aiding Sikh t e r r o r i s t . 
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200. KATYAL (KK) . Indo - Pak r e l a t ions in deep-freeze, Hindu; 
1988, 8, 6. 
Plagued by many a snag the Indo-Paklstan r e l a t ions 
have been put in a deep-freeze as a resu l t of the l a t e s t 
Govt Statement in Parliament on Islamabad's complicity 
in t e r r o r i s t violence in Punjab. The two countr ies have 
been in a no-contact syndrome af ter the abortive d iscuss-
ion of t h e i r Foreign s e c r e t a r i e s . There could be some 
hope of ending the stalemate in the b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i ons 
in case Pakistan responds pos i t ive ly to I n d i a ' s repeated 
p leas fo r the handing over the t e r r o r i s t s - 10 to 15 of 
them — operating from i t s t e r r i t o r y . 
201. KATYAL (KK) , Stalemate continues in indo-Pak t i e s , Hindu; 
1988, 6, 22. 
Indo-Pakistan re la t ions continue to be stalemated 
a f t e r the none too productive t a lks of Foreign s e c r e t a r i e s . 
There i s no more for any s igni f icant contact from e i t h e r 
s ide and even the plans for the meetings of the jo in t 
coironission or sub-commissions are not mentioned any more. 
A pa r t from the Punjab fac tor , the current Stalemate had 
i t s or igin in the beginning of 1986 when Pakistani Ministers 
took a hawkish l i n e on Kashmir and the t rade i s s u e . 
Logical ly, the departure of Mr Junejo and Mr Noorain should 
have had a pos i t ive impact on Indo-Pakistan r e l a t ions but 
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i t has not happened tha t way. 
202. MALHOTRA (Avtar Singh) , Need fo r wider debate on Punjab. 
Pat r io t? 1988, 12, 28. 
The prospects of improvement in indo-Pak r e l a t ions 
i s making Punjab extremists j i t t e r y . After the a i r crash 
of Gen 2ia they were feel ing orphaned and apprehensive 
about the successor. If India and Pakistan come c loser 
and on the bas i s of b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s . The extretnists 
t r a in ing camps and the most convenient channel of arms 
supply would be in jeopardy, 
203. MARWAH (Bhushan) , PM blames Pak for tens ions . HT; 
1988, 4, 24; 1. 
Pakistan was solely responsible for aggravating 
tens ions on the sub-continent by ba la t an t ly convi ing 
with the Punjab t e r r o r i s t s and as s i s t ing the l a t t e r in 
t h e i r attempt to subvert the peace and s t a b i l i t y of t h i s 
countiry. I t was unfortunate tha t Pakistan had been 
unresponsive to a l l moves made by t h i s country to improve 
b i l a t e r a l t i e s , Rajiv Gandhi has made i t c l ea r tha t if 
Pakistan was honest about normalisation of r e l a t ions with 
India , i t should abandon i t s nuclear pretensions and cease 
forthwith h o s t i l e postures on Siachen. 
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}4. PAK INVOLVS^EN,T,editorial. TI, 1986# 8, 16; 8 . 
The report on the iaterro^atioos o£ 173 Sikh Youth 
elsewhere in this issvie can not leave the s n a l l e s t scope 
for doxibt texTorist can^aign in Punjab. An Indian agency 
engaged in such a £abricati(Xi would tend to exaggerate 
Pakistan's involvement and not to represent i t as t l ^ 
low^cast and low-risk operation i t i s . The interrogators 
shoxxld look for i t in the oiaterial a t the ir d isposal . 
35. SALAMAT ALI. Behind the barbed wire t Ptinjab sea l s the 
Pakistan border to contain Sikhs. Far East Econ. Review 
140, 15; 1988« 4« 14; 36-7. 
Terrorist attacks in India's north-western s tate of 
Punjab, bordering Pakistan* have escalated into a guer i l la 
war %rith Sikh separat ists arabushing paramilitary forces 
and mounting rocket attacks on se lected t a r g e t s . In a 
high-level night long meeting on Punjab. In while decided 
on what i s widely touted as a three-pronged s trategy . The 
f i r s t part i s t o cut off the t error i s t foreign l inks by 
sealing off the border with Pakistan. The second element 
i s t o devise a t ighter Interanl intelligence system. The 
thrid i s t o muster p o l i t i c a l suppoxrt to solve the problem. 
, role of CHINA 
206. VERM^ ( S p), India* pakistaaa nd China t A study of regional 
imbalances* Soiit)! Asian Studies 6« 2; 1971, July; 1-29. 
A Study of the triangiilar relationship developed 
iaetween the three Asian g nts during the last qtiarter of 
a century* covering the evaluation of bilateral relations 
or adversity and their ideological* territorial and his-
torical origins. The role played by the two superpowers, 
the USSR and the USA in the region is considered inasmuch 
as their respective policies led to the rearrangement of 
alliances• 
# r o l e o f INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 
207, SAINI (Mahander Kinar). Role of multinational coirporations 
in lndo->Pak re la t i ons . In Seminar on Indo-pak relat ions 
(Mew Delhi) (1984)• Studies in Indo-PaX relat ions t papers. 
Ed by V D Chopra, 206-14. 
An analysis of role of multinational corporations in 
Indo-pak re lat ions w i l l not be coB(>lete without a brief 
review of developments which took place in third world due 
to the operations of MNCs in these covintries. Equally 
important i s the trend in Pakistan's foreign trade with 
1 : O 
the other coxmtrles; and with India In the l a s t few years. 
In 1979 when talks for in^roving the relat ions between 
India and Pakistan were a t the peak« people's Democratic 
Front accused that the leading MMCs operating in Pakistan 
were worried over these developiMn'ts, 
* role of SAARC 
208. IMDIA-PAKIS^N Relations* Democratic World 15«47; 1986» 11» 
23; 4 . 
The prospect looked dismal before the SAARC submit 
jri Bangalore^ but in|>roved a wee b i t af ter tt. This i s the 
only assessment possible in the study of the current phase 
of Indo-^akistan relat ions as i t has emerged from Banglore^ 
which was the venue for some b i la tera l exchanges between 
the Prime Ministers of the two countries . In regard to 
the statement in the normalisation process« Mr. Gandhi 
ppinted out that the main questicm coming in the way of 
concluding a no*war pact or friendship treaty was the 
locatJ.on of foreign bases. The fac t that misunderstandings 
can arise in such hic^- level exchanges by i t s e l f t e s t i f i e d 
to the tenuous natture of Indo-pak re la t ions . Al l these 
indicate that relat ions be-tween the neighbours w i l l tend 
to worsen more and more before they can or w i l l get better. 
/ J 
209. NilUlOTRA ( lader) . P o l i t i c a l Coosneatary : New Phase in 
Indo-Pak t i e s , TI 152, 11# 61; 1989, 3 , 2; 6. 
A democratic Governraeot in Pakistan w i l l be 
fr iendl ier to India than the preceeding rnllitary 
dictatorship, MS Bhutto gave an exce l lent s t a r t to 
the new phase in India-Pakistan relat ions during the 
SAARC sunxait a t Islamabad a t the end of 1988. To dwell 
on these circumstances i s not a plea for in action in 
Indo-4>ak re la t ions . The most encoxiraging development 
in Indo-Pak relat ions has been the return to the Simla 
s p i r i t , 
210, NIHAL SINGH, SAARC Crisis. HT 66, 190; 1989, 7, 10; 11. 
SAARC started timoroiisly with modest agenda. 
Keeping out the core sectors of economic and trade and 
bilateral political issues. A beginning was made at 
the Islamabad summit at the end of the year 1988 to look 
at the economic and trade issties within an agreed time 
frame, Pakistan as also some of the smaller neighbours, 
are still obsezrved with fean of Indian he emony. 
The great value of SAARC has been to provide a nuetral 
setting cor resolving bilateral political 
problems out side the strict framework of organisation. 
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The only element of hope lies in the measured steps 
being taken by India and Pakistan to iiqprove relations, 
211. SAIAMAT ALI. Gandhi-Bhutto rapport may end the hostility: 
A hint of hope. Far East Econ. Revew 143, 2; 1989, 1,12; 
10-11. 
Although, Palcistan and India signed a treaty 
not to attack each other's nuclear facilities, and 
have agreed to spare each others airlines from dotible 
taxation and cooperate on cultural and education matt-
ers, some outstanding problems remain with the indo-
Pakistan thaw, however, hopes have risen for the first 
time that the SAARC coxild become an effective regional 
organisation, especially in economic affairs. The 
Indians have how decided to leave it entirely to Pakis-
tan to select the items for bilateral trade and the 
fields of other econcmiic cooperation. 
212. SAREEN (Rajendra) SAARC Sumnit at Dhaka. Tribune; 1985, 
12, 11. 
By the time the summit came to conclusion, it 
was clear that it had succeeded beyond the expectations 
of both the participants and those who watched it from 
the sidelines, it is a major step forward for these 
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seven nations to proclaim themselves as belonging to 
an area %fhlch has a distinct; Identity and an over all 
connionallty of Interests, The cllraate o£ fellow -
feeling and good will among the Heads of State and 
Government helped make a nuniber of far reaching changes 
to give added substance to SAARC* The problem of 
inhibitions-arising out of disparities in the size of 
the seven countries« there resources and levels of 
development is not to be under estimated. 
,—, REGIONAL 
213. tCMOM (N C). problems and promise of SAARC. HT; 1985«11«11 
SAARC is designed to promote self-reliance and 
contribute to mutual trust* understanding and apprecia-
tion of one anothers problems. Basically« emphasize 
regional cooperaticm in economic« social« cultural, 
technical and scientific fields among the seven member 
states. SAARC has no such adversarial groxip focus-
which coxild be a problem* but might also be a promise of 
better results* slower perhaps« but a lot steadier. 
With the best of regional cooperation cannot really 
taXe off* unless there is common political will to 
add the necessary momentum. 
173 
# role of SUPER POWERS 
214* A6HA SHAHI. pak i s taa - Ind ia r e l a t i o n s a i ^ super powers* 
p o l i c i e s * JSAMES 1 0 ( 4 ) ; 1987 Svmt 3 -16 . 
Pakis tan and India are the i n h e r i t o r s of two of 
the r i c h e s t cu l tures and c i v i l i z a t i o n s of the world. 
The three i s s u e s namely Pak i s tan ' s stand on the Jaramu 
and Kashmir d i s p u t e , i t s a c q u i s i t i o n of American arms« 
and i t s unwi l l ingness t o acknowledge i n e x p l i c i t have 
been seen by India as major o b s t a c l e s t o normal r e l a -
t i o n s with Pak i s tan . The h i s t o r y of India-pakis tan 
r e l a t i o n s i s not e x c l u s i v e l y a record of wars §nd 
t e n s i o n s . The S o v i e t Union has made common caxise with 
lindi^ and warned t h a t i t would not t o l e r a t e a Pak i s tan i 
nuclear c a p a b i l i t y * The danger stems fr<xn I s r a i l ' s 
nuclear arsena l and the radius of i t s d e l i v e r y capabi-
l i t y tiiat extends -be the deep i n t e r i o r of the USSR. 
I t i s imperative t h a t Pakis tan should look beyond the 
immediate s i t u a t i o n and view i t s s e c u r i t y predicament 
i n the p e r s p e c t i v e of the next few y e a r s . 
215. MOHAMMED AYOOB. India* Pakis tan and super power r i v a l r y . 
World Today , 38 , 5 ; 1982 May; 194-202 . 
I n d i a ' s preocT;pation with leverage and manoeuvrabi-
l i t y even towards an avowedly f r i e n d l y power l i k e USSR i s 
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a re f lec t ion o£ India's basic foreign pol icy concerns. 
However, in the context of a renewed or an iinainent 
mil i tary confrontation with Pakistan,India need for 
Soviet ass istance to neutralize a US-supported Pakis-
tan might outweigh more long-tezm considerations, 
although neither India nor Pakistan would emerge as 
the real v ic tor in such a war. 
t role of U K 
216. SHMUA (P). Benazir, Howe hold talks on Indo-Pak t i e s . 
HJ ; 1989, 7, 7. 
Indo-pak relations were discussed when Brit ish 
Foreign Secretary S ir Jeoffrey Howe cal led on v i s i t i n g 
Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. The Brit ish 
reaction to th i s i s boxind to be p o s i t i v e . But i t i s 
surprising that the question of Indo-Pak relat ions 
cropped yxg between MS Bhutto and Sir Geoffrey. I t was 
thoxight that the overall s i tuat ion in the Indian 
subcontinent may be discvissed. I t shows what in^ortance 
MS Bhutto gives to the Indo-Pak relat ions even 
thougpi the question was disctissed without going into 
the d e t a i l s . 
^- '^3 0 0 
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—•-# role of U S A 
217. ABRAHAM (A S ) . Indo-Paklstan - US t i e s . TI? 1984«10«19. 
Indo-pakistan relations« never very cordial of 
the best o£ tiraes, have In recent weeks been deter io-
rating precipitoi is ly . The peace dialogue between them 
has s t a l l e d as a resi i l t of number of developoients. The 
recent* sporadic clashes in Kashmir's snowbotind border 
regions between India and Pakistan* troops« the fai-> 
lure of US S a t e l l i t e tracking stat ions to detect two 
Indian Air Force squadrons recently and demand for an 
array of sophist icated weapon^ ry frcn the US on the 
ground that Pakistan needed to "defend" i t s nuclear 
ins ta l la t ions are these developmental US cannot even 
hope to make India party of any "strategic consensus" 
Domestic cr i ses or wide-spread communal r io t ing are 
g r i s t t o Pakistan's diplomatic mil ls and i t w i l l not 
lose any opportunity* to put India on the spot . 
218. ABRAHAM (A). Pakistan as America's a l l y : Bid to a l t er 
US perceptions TI 149, 203; 1986* 7* 26; 8. 
Indo-Pakistani re lat ions have not inipioved as 
.18:^  
a result o£ Paldstaa's recent^ Intensified efforts 
to cozy rxp to the United States. The US would be 
well advised to distance itself from India in the 
realisation that its interests are better served by 
strengthening its links with Pakistan, American 
policy is to keeping Pakistan happy by aiding it 
generously« but also maintaining close links with 
India in the hope that Indo-US ties will warm up 
eventually into an effect gaunt gUows of amicability. 
219* KAPUR (P C)« India, Pakistan and the USA : An American 
perceptJ6tu Democratic World 17, 10; 1988, 3, 6j 9-11. 
Hot with standing Pakistan's attempts under 
American pressure to sabotage Soviet initiative to 
solve the Afghan problem, there is xreasonable ground 
for caution optimism that the tragic episode may in-
deed soon come to an end. This possibility has raised 
important questions for India. The impact of US military 
balance and the impact US military assistance on 
regional nuclear proliferation. It seems clear from 
such an analysis that a strong US aid plan is vital to 
countering growing Soviet political and military pre-
ssure on India and Pakistan. It would need an extra 
ordinary amount of na vty on the part of any Indian 
Ib'S 
analyst of nurtxire h(^es of an early end to American 
commitment to bolster tip Pakistan as a counter balance 
to an independent and non-aligned India. 
220. MMJHOTRA (Inder). Dialogue witii Pakistan - promise and 
p i t f a l l . TI? 1980, 3 , 13 . 
Pakistan's reject ion of the US package of economic 
and military aid creates a promising atmosphere for the 
continuation of the India-Pakistan dialogue that began 
with Mr. R.D. Sathe*s recent v i s i t to Islamabad. There 
are a t l e a s t two factors which should be taken note of 
while I n i t i a t i n g any Indo-Pakistan dialogue at this 
s tage . Firsts what Pakistan has rejected i s the s i ze 
of the US package^ second the more the people of Pakis-
tan wants good relat ions with India. There i s yet 
another p i t f a l l , whatever t r i e s to befreind Pakistan 
a t this stage autoraatically shores vp the unpoptilar 
mil i tary regime and thus xnins t^e risk of al ienating 
the people of Pakistan. 
221. PANT (Girijesh C). Major Developments in India's 
Foreign Pol icy and Relations January-Jxine 1981. Interna-
t ional Studies 22, 1; 1985, Jan-Mar; 59-77. 
The process of normalisation of re lat ions between 
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India and Pakistan was stymld by the decision o£ the 
US to supply F-16 air craft and other advance military 
hardware to Pakistan, This created doubt and apprehe-
nsion in India about Pakistan's sincerity about norma-
lization o£ its relations with India. 
222. RAJIV'S GANDHI'S tour abroad. Cxirrent Topics 11, 9; 1985 
Aug; 529-30. 
States that the Reagan Rajiv talks have failed 
to resolve the differences over the Americans tilt 
towards Pakistan. The talks helped in forging a better 
understanding of the two countries perceptions on 
global and bilateral issues. 
223. REDOY (O K). Moves to end drift in Indo-Pak ties. Hindu. 
1985, 10, 24; 
The United States is making some moves behind 
the scenes to persiiade and prod India and Pakistan to 
strive for a detente in the subcontinent with a broad 
measure of understanding on frac ious issues that 
continue to generate frictions and produce tendons 
between them. The US - president, Mr. Ronald Reagan 
is e^ qpected to urge the prime Minister Mr. Rajiv Gandhi 
and the president of Pakistan, Gen Ziaul Haq, when he 
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meets them separately in New York to end the current 
d r i f t in Indo-Pak relat ions with some meaningful 
i n i t i a t i v e s to create an atmosphere of mutual for-
bearance • 
224. SAMINA YASMBEN. India and Pakistan : Why the l a t e s t 
excercise in brinloaanship• Australian Joxirnal of P o l i t i c s 
and History 34, 1; 1988; 64-72. 
States that in early 1987 India and Pakistan came 
close to f ighting the ir fourth major war in l e s s than 
forty years . The sxidden worsening of Indo-Pak relat ions 
was a l so related to the US administrations decisions to 
seek authorization fron congress for another s i x year 
aid package worth 4 ^ b i l l i o n s for Pakistan. India was 
using the p o s s i b i l i t y of a war with Pakistan to convey 
to the US congress the inherent dangers of arming a 
South Asian s t a t e . Pakistan, on the other hand was 
\ising the same incident to quletendoraestic opposition 
t o the US-pakistan s trateg ic re lat ionship. 
225. SETH (J D) . Dangerous vacuum. Trib\ine ; 1989. 7, 12. 
Indo-Pak relat ions have entered a rather curious 
phase of xincertainity. The heightened arms race between 
the two countries xioder US tutelage points de f in i t e ly 
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towards some kind of a morbidly entasgled puzzle. 
Besides arming the two nations« Washington is fully-
backing both Rajiv and Benazir and has given them large 
economic and technological aid. It is dangerous to 
believe, that the terroristsare on the run. The 
hardcore terrorists are slowly moving away from political 
objectives to wide spread criminal activities. 
226. VENXATASUBBAIAH (H) • Pakistan : Politics of guns and 
butter, Hindi, 1975, 2, 14. 
It is but natural that India views with concern 
the recent turn of Pakistan-US relations. India is 
having economic and cultural relations with USA. The 
developing countries should have the political will to 
take steps may some times even prove to be a threat 
to "middle class democracy ** sof countries like India 
and contribute to the growth of illiberal authorita-
rianism. India planners however, feel that the rich 
peasent will willingly cooperate in bringing about 
social transformation. India does not view with 
delight the relative priorities the Americans have 
given to aims - aid and economic aid. Arms aid is used 
as an instrument of foreign policy. 
.1 c^ c 
227. YADAVA (Leela) . India ' s react ion to%mrds US m i l i t a r y 
a id to Pakistan, Punjab Journal of P o t i t i e s 4, 1; 
1980« Jan - June; 28-49. 
There i s fear in India that American arms to 
Pakistan w i l l distxirb the s t r a t e g i c balance and e s c a l a t e 
the arms race in the sub-cont inent , India has always 
opposed the American s t ra tegy to use Pakistan as a buffer 
to prevent Soviet expansion into the Indian ocasan., 
India considers that the natureof the arms aid provided 
by the US to Pakistan was such that i t could notbe use 
against China or Russia* thus these arms vtere meant to 
be used against India. 
—-' role of WEST ASIA 
228» PASRICHA (PM)• Indo-Pak arm races Image and r e a l i t y . 
Mainstream 12, 17; 1983, 12, 24; 7-12. 
The Indo-Pak war of 1971 can be reQarded as a 
watershed in Indo-Pak r e l a t i o n s , l^e need to l i v e with 
India as a stronger and b e t t e r endowed neighbour came 
as a slow, re luctant and even painful r e l a t i o n to the 
e l i t e of Pakistan. The mutual d i s t r u s t between India 
and Pakistan did not diminish to any appreciable ex ten t . 
Pakistan becoming part of s t r a t e g i c consensus vdth the 
US to safeguard the Gulf need not come as a surpr i se . 
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One must a l s o appreciate US Saudi Arabian i n t e r e s t in 
the improvement of Indo-Pak r e l a t i o n s , India f e e l that 
Pak's success in an armed c o n f l i c t in West Asia would 
enhance i t s image to bur deterLment. In these circums-
tances i t w i l l be a misnomer to c a l l the Indian defence 
preparedness as p a r t i c i p a t i o n in an arms race . 
, SPORTS, ATHLETICS, PAKISTAN 
229. MCHAN (KP)• Times are changing in Pakistan. Sports Star 
12, 46; 1989, 11, 18; 26-7 . 
Time might be changing in Pakistan as far as 
%fom«n and sports go . However, general ly every one was 
in agreement that i t was high time the Pakistan women 
were g ive t h e i r due in sports arena. Hussain Shah of 
Pakistan the ult imate winner in middle-weight seweats 
i t out aga ins t tenacious Mukund k i l l e r of India in SAF 
games in Islamabad. 
, - , CRICKET, FIVE DAY PAKISTAN 
230. HUSAIN (Sultan F ) . Tradit ional r i v a l r y . Howzzat ;184. 
Wienever mention i s made of t r a d i t i o n a l t i v a l r y 
on the c r i c k e t f i e l d , the names which come most eadi ly 
to mind are oxford and Cambridge. England,Avistralia 
j ^ ^ e 
crescent versxis Mandot and quite a few o thers , 
Pakistan and India f a l l in to the same category. The 
two top teams from the Asian Sub-continent have 
somehow come to be regarded as o ld or t r a d i t i o n a l 
r i v a l s , even though t h e i r h i s t o r y i s not hal f as 
o ld as that of England and Austra l ia for the 
mythical Ashes. 
, - , - , - , - , FAISLABAD 
231. MOHAN (R). Yet another close call. Sports Star 
12, 49; 1989, 9; 6 - 8, 
Given the circumstances in which the tour began 
with Pakistan on an unprecedented high and India 
at an unplumbed depth uhat India has achieved so 
far is a near miracle. If a draw against Pakistan 
is to be deemed a victory theti this team has done 
very well indeed. The Faislabad Test between India 
and Pakistan draw, there is no result between them. 
190 
, - , - , - , - , KARACHI 
232. MDHMl (R) Encounter with a f a n a t i c . STx>rt3 Star 12, 48; 
1989, 12, 2; 10-11. 
Ind ia ' s f i r s t Test at t h i s National Stadium in 
Karachi, i t i s p o s s i b l e that some day the t r a g i c f igure 
may end up somewhere e l s e other than a h o s p i t a l . The 
f a n a t i c Ziauddin who macfeit to the playing arena and the 
threatened the Indians, i s being whisked away. He was 
t ry ing to provoke Indian cr i cke ter s i n t o r e t a l i a t i n g 
mouthing a l l kinds of stupid comments about Hindustan and 
Pakistan. 
233. MOHAN (R) . Salvaging some p r e s t i g e . Sports Star 12, 48, 
1989, 12, 2; 6-9. 
The v i s i t to the National Stadium was not an i n t i -
midating experience. The l a s t time out i t has been a 
d i f f e r e n t s tory f o r the Indian team , The team did 
manage in one of the two Karachi Test of the 1982-83 
season but the defeat there was the worst drubbing India 
had had in years . There wasn't enough spectator support 
to make the match more successful in terms of s e l l i n g 
India - Pakistan cr i cke t bqt at l e a s t here was a crowd 
that second to appreciate the f i n e r points of the langer 
]91 
version of the game. The Karachi Test was also draw 
between them* 
— , -, -, -, -, LAHORE 
234, MOHAN (R) . Runs in s lumber land . Spor t s S t a r 12, 50; 
1989, 12, 16; 6 -9 , 
Tes t matches a r e saved o r won on t h e s t r e n g t h 
of b ig i n n i n g s . Tti& l e s sons have p robab ly b e a i t augh t 
t o them e a r l y because of t h e i r c r i c k e t i n g background. 
But in a world t h a t i s going erazy with t h e one->day 
game t h e r e i s a t l e a s t some so l ace t h a t t h e r e a r e 
indeed some p l a y e r s l i k e t he se v^o a re more happy do-
ing vAiat they can in t h e Tes t match a r e n a . The t h i r d 
t e s t of Ind ia Vs Pak i s t an a t Lahore a t t h e Gadaffi 
Stadiixn was draw, 
— , - , - , ONE-DAY, NEHRU CUP INDIA, CALCUTTA 
235. R M, Pseud. Middle o r d e r c o l l a p s e . Spo r t s S t a r 12 ,45; 
1985, 11 , 11 ; 14-5 . 
At C a l c u t t a October 28th Nehru Cup one-day 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l c r i c k e t match was p layed betweoi Ind ia 
and P a k i s t a n , In which Pak i s t an was winner by 77 
rtrns over I n d i a , 
}-:'2 
, - , - , - , PAKISTAN 
236, MOHAN (R). Farcical one-day s e r i e s . Sports Star 
12, 52; 1989, 12, 30; 8-10. 
I t was the non-event of the year . The teams 
rushed from centre to centre in the winter only to 
f ind the condit ions inlraical to t ru ly compet i t ive 
l imited over c r i c k e t . The one-day in ternat iona l 
c r i c k e t matches s e r i e s between India and Pakistan was 
held a t the Gujranwala, Karachi and Lahore. The 
Karachi match was abandoned and s e r i e s was wone by 
Pakistan, 
, -, -, -, SHARJAH 
237, ASIF IQBAL. Malik on the rampage. Sports Star 12, 44; 
1989, 11, 4; 19-20. 
Pakistan had got its act together so well in 
the early part of the tournament itself that it was 
certain to beat India in the last game in the league 
Matches between India and Pakistan are a very vital 
part of the economy of cricket in Sharjah. Where 
would we be without them? A good close contest may 
ensure the trend of maximum attention being focxised 
on these mat&hes being maintained. Malik had a fine 
1 -. '^• 
run in the champions Trophy and these could be no 
argu ment over his becoming the man of the tournament. 
— , SUMMIT 1972 
238. GUPT2^  (S ) . Issues for the Indo-Pak Sutimit. India 
Quart 28, 2; 1972, Apr-June; 126-31. 
No Indo-Pak summit meeting was ever c a l l e d 
upon to deal with as many chal lenges and opportxinities 
and reso lve as com;lex a s e t of i s sues as the proposed 
Indira- Bhutto meeting in June 1972. 
, SUMMIT 1982 
239, DUA (HK). An hour's summit. IE ; 1982, 11, 11. 
At the i r meeting in Delhi recent ly , both Prime 
Minister Indira Gandhi and President Zia-ul-Haq 
shared the view that a l a s t i n g peace was that the people 
of the two countries needed most. They agreed to s e t 
V5> a j o i n t commission and to resume the secretary l e v e l 
ta lks on Pakistan's draft for a no-war pact and India ' s 
draft for a t reaty of peace, fr iendship and cooperation 
These are p o s i t i v e s igns but ma^ydifferences continue 
to e x i s t . Differences have arisen on the scope of the 
proposed j o i n t commission. A major negot ia t ing problem 
J ^ 4 
w i l l be the contents of the peace drafts the two Govts 
have exchanged. As on Kashmir* the d i f f erences on the 
quest ion of bases and f a c i l i t i e s are bound to s t a l l 
the progress of the Indo-Pcikistan dialogue* 
240, THAW IN,India - Pakistan r e l a t i o n s . Commerce 145, 
3726; 1982, 11, 6; 677-8. 
The f i r s t sumnit meeting on November 1 between 
Pakistan Pres ido i t , Gen 2ia-ul-Haq, and the Prime Minis-
t e r , Mrs Indira Gnadhi has brought some concrete r e s u l t s , 
though they might not be termed as a breakthrough t o -
wards normalisation of r e l a t i o n s between the two neigh 
bours of t h i s sub-cont inent , "Rxe hxirdleshave been 
formid able and no ear ly way-out could be expected in 
s e t t l i n g a l l the d i f ferences that have soured the Indo-
Pak r e l a t i o n s . These are wide areas and nromalisation 
of trade and economic cooperation i t s e l f could bui ld 
xsp a good foundation for healthy Indo-Pakistan r e l a t i o n . 
, SUMMIT 1984 
241. CLASP HANDS, ed i tor ia l? IE; 1985, 12, 16, 
P r e s i d ^ t Zia6meeting with Mr Rajiv Gandhi w i l l 
deteimine the future course of Indo-Pakistan r e l a t i o n s . 
1''5 
long embittered and punctuated with mutual suspic ion 
t o the common detriment of the two neighbours and of 
South Asia *«hich i s anxious to promote i t s c o l l e c t i v e 
wellbeing through SAARC, More than any agreement, the 
f i r s t r e q u i s i t e for improved Indo-Pakistan t i e s i s 
confidence-bui lding and the creat ion fo mutual t r u s t . 
Relat ions between the two countries have been conspi -
cuos ly accident prone with r e l a t i v e l y minor inc idents 
or s l i p being given ecaggerated importance thus leading 
t o avoidable overreact ion. The groundwork for economic 
and c u l t u r a l cooperation has been l a i d in previous meet-
ings and i t should be p o s s i b l e to announce an agreement 
in Delh i . 
, SUMMIT 1986 
242. MC»iAMMAD SARVIAR. India 's Foreign Relat ions with s p e c i a l 
reference to South Asian countries July-Dec 1986: Indo-
Pakistan, South Asian Studies 4, 1; 1987,Jan; 103-21, 
During the period under review a general s t a l e -
mate continued in Indo-Pakistan r e l a t i o n s . The Indian 
leadership was conceivably unwil l ing to l e t Pakistan 
g e t any good p u b l i c i t y at such a large g thering of 
Third World Nations and a l s o used the NAM summit to 
I b G 
make her parochial point about Indo-Pakistani r e l a t i o n s . 
Rajiv-Junejo ta lks were held in Banglore he discussed 
the problem areas to the process of normalisation b e t -
ween Pakistan and India , 
— - , SUMMIT 1988 
243. CHAKRA VARTTY (Nikhi l ) , Indo-Pakistan suramitJ Improved 
t i e s now in r igh t . TI; 151, 359; 1988, 12, 28; 6. 
Gandhi's br ie f encovinter t h i s week with Ms Bhutto 
opens \xp a new v i s t a of Indo-Pak r e l a t i o n s . The new 
in ternat iona l environment e i t h e r India nor Pakistan can 
afford to ignore the winds of change that are blowing 
in a l l comers of the g lobe . This imposes upon us the 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of f i r s t redesigning Indo-Pak r e l a t i o n s . 
Benazir has rejected Gen Zia ' s s tunt o f f e r of a no-war 
pact to India, pref ering adherence to the Simla agree-
ment ins tead . 
244, PAL (Samir). Rajiv, Benazir t o work for new phase of 
r e l a t i o n s . HT; 1988, 12, 31. 
B i l a t e r a l ta lks between Prime Minister , Mr Rajiv 
Gandhi and Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto have 
c l e a r l y brought forth t h e i r earnest d e s i r e to werk 
-i 1 '"I 
towards a new phase of relationship between the two 
coxintries. This will set in motion a process of improve-
ment of relations to build mutual confidence and trust. 
Work will be initiated on both sides on matters that 
make for lessening of tensions. The discussions between 
the two leaders also covered international issues, 
—-, SUMMIT 1989 
245. GUPTA (Rakesh), Indo-Pak t i e s a f t er Islamabad meet. 
Pa tr io t ; 1989, 1, 7, 
The recent b i l a t e r a l ta lks between the two Prime 
Ministers of India and Pakistan are s i g n i f i c a n t . They 
are so because a f t er the Simla suntmit. Prime Ministers 
of the two countries have met. In term of tendencies 
of changing s t y l e and form of in ternat ional r e l a t i o n s , 
b i l a t e r a l i s m i s the order of the day. The b i l a t e r a l 
issues between India and Pakistan can be tackled at both 
the l e v e l s . Both countries need to draw up measures in 
the conventional areas . I t i s p o s s i b l e that the u S 
may increas ing ly induce China to help Pakistan and 
e s t a b l i s h a tr iangular re la t ionsh ip which may cause 
delays in the Indo-Pakistan process . 
Ib8 
246, INDO - PAK iUSIATIONS: Rajiv in Islamabad. Currant 
Topics 15, 10; 1989 Sep; 586 - 7, 
Ms Bhutto said i t was d i f f i c u l t t o see a dramatic 
transformation in Indo-Palc re la t ions and asserted that 
"the s tep-bystep approach* adopted by the two countries 
to improve t h e i r r e l a t i o n s . The need to normalise r e l a -
t ions to end a host i le re la t ionsh ip with Pakistan and 
usher in peace so that the two count t i e s could reduce 
t h e i r expenditure on armaments. The t a l k between two 
leaders show that a thaw has s tar ted ^n Indo-Pak r e l a -
t ions and two countries could be reasonal^l^y expected 
to i n i t i a t e confidence bui ld ing up i^ich reduce tens ions 
along border and a l s o improve b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s . Ms 
Bhutto was reported to have made i t c l e a r t o Mr Gandhi 
and the India t^at improving re la t ions between India and 
Pakistan had to be long winded process and they had 
Just s t a r t e d on the long Journey, 
247, NIHAL SlNOi. Indo-Pak reconc i l i a t ion* Raj ivbv i s i t a 
s t ep forward. HT; 1989, 1, 10. 
I t i s t yp i ca l of the tangled web of Indo-Pakistani 
r e l a t i o n s that popular Pakistani expectat ions from the 
Rajiv Gandhi v i s i t were pitched at an impossible l e v e l . 
Ib9 
Beyond a po int , gestures have a l imited ro le to play 
in Indo-Pakistani r e l a t i o n s . The constant aspects of 
Indo-Pakistani r e la t ions has been the propensity of 
agreements to disappear i n t o thin a i r . The n o n - f u l f i l -
ment of agreements a r i s e s from new s t r a i n s in r e l a t i o n s . 
Perhaps the new winds of change blowing across the world 
w i l l he lp the process of Indo-Pakistani r e c o n c i l i a t i o n , 
A real improvement in Indo-Pakistani r e l a t i o n s i s for the 
long haul* 
248. PARTHASARTHY ( M i l i n i ) , After euphoria realism i n : Indo-
Pak r e l a t i o n s , Hindu; 1989, 4, 24. 
After the meeting of the Prime Ministers of 
India and Pakistan in Islamabad both Govts have been 
averring that b i l a t e r a l r e la t ions have now been placed 
in a br ighter context character ised by mutual good w i l l 
and c o r d i a l i t y . The eagerness to impart a new tone to 
the r e l a t i o n s had been couched with real ism r ight from 
the s t a r t , India must be seen as responding to Pakistani 
concerns and the new Govt perceived as having achieved 
something siibsta n t i a l from the new s t r a t e g i c approach 
t o b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s , 
249. RAJIV MEETS Benazir. Current Topics 15,3?1989, Feb; 136. 
Discusses that the v i s i t of the Prime Minister 
2lM-' 
Rajiv Gandhi in Islamabad caught the headl ines in news-
papers a l l over the world for the high hopes i t generated 
of the dawn of a new era in Indo-Pak r e l a t i o n s . The 
foxmal talksbetween the two countries were the f i r s t 
major attempt in three decades to put b i l a t e r a l r e l a -
t ions on a new foo t ing . The aim of two countr ies to 
f a c i l i t a t e and oicourage cooperations in the f i e l d of 
Arts , cu l ture . Archeology, Education, Mass-Media and 
Sports , 
- — , TREATIES 
250. ALI (M) Simla and Tashkent Agreements, Pakistan Horizon 
25, 3; 1972; 53 - 74. 
Like the Tashkent Declaration, the Simla accord 
also puts off the basic disputes for future negotiations. 
In so far as Kashmir was concerned, the Tashkent Agree-
ment was not a step forward (but a sharp retreat to the 
pre-war, situation). The Simla accord, on the other 
hand, is a step forwards in t» a n%m ^ti^ction, 
251. INDO-PAK accord and divergences. Mainstream 11,8,1983; 
1, 1; 3 - 4. 
The Indian side has no reason to feel dissatisfied 
with the out come of the ti*oday*s ta lks with Pakistani 
o f f i c i a l s . The ta lks were held in persusnce of mandate 
from Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Pakistan's mi l i t ary 
ruler Zia-ul-Haq to f i n a l i s e the s t a t u t e s of the proposed 
Indo-Pak j o i n t commission and to consider sim ultaneously 
the Pakistani proposal for no-war pact and the Indian 
proposal for a t reaty of peace, fr iendship and coopera-
t i o n . This was the f i r s t time the Indian proposal 
formed a subject of d i scuss ion at an Indo-pak meeting. 
India might wel l l i k e to keep the ta lks going without 
being in a hurry to s ign any treaty that may only enhance 
Zia 's p r e s t i g e . 
252. HASAN AKHTAR. India and Pakistan work towards a peace 
t r e a t y . Times; 1986, 1, 8. 
Several rounds of formal high l e v e l meetings 
between India and Pakistan are planned in the next 
for tn ight to improve r e l a t i o n s and with the o b j e c t i v e 
of s igning a peace treaty l a t e r t h i s year . The f inance 
Ministers of the two countr ies w i l l a l s o open ta lks in 
Islamabad today t o examine the p o s s i b i l i t y of increasing 
trade and economic c o l l a b o r a t i o n s . 
2 '^ 
253. NAYAR (Kuldip). India to o f f e r peace treaty to Pak. 
Tribune; 1985, 11, 10. 
India i s to o f f e r a comprehensive fr iendship 
treaty to Pakistan a f t er i t l i f t s martial law. The 
treaty w i l l include Pakis tan's no-war draft pact . The 
two object ions voiced by Pakistan against India ' s peace 
and fr iendship treaty and De lh i ' s i n s i s t e n c e that 
Islamabad w i l l not r a i s e the Kashmir i s s u e ou t - s ide 
India - Pakistan forums and w i l l not o f f e r base to any 
foreign power, and secondly, the presence of any third 
power in the sub-continent w i l l n u l l i f y the proposeino-
war pac t . Gen Zia ' s o f f e r f o r mutual inspect ion of 
nuclear i n s t a l l a t i o n s has gone down wel l even in India 
India s t i l l s ees Pakistan behind cross f r o n t i e r i n f i l -
t ra t ion in Kashmir and punjab, 
254. NOORANI (AG). Beyond an Indo-Pakistan t r e a t y , IE; 
1982, 12, 18. 
Indo-Pakistan d i f ferences are ewlTiently so lvab le 
and are based on more than d i s t r u s t bred by estrangement. 
The two major points of disagreement between the two 
countries in f i n a l i s i n g the t e x t of the proposed treaty 
a r i s e from India's proposal that the Simla formula of 
b i l a t e r i a l i s m be so defined as e x p l i c i t l y to rule out 
2 
any resource to an outside, agency for resolution of 
diffem ces, India's diplomatic leverage with Great 
power and with Pakistan will be a more effective 
deterent than any treaty provision. In its quest for 
better relationship, India will have to show greater 
regard for Pakistani susceptibilities. There is an 
unlimited scope for econcxnic as well as cultural coo-
peration between the two countries, 
, TREATIES OF SIMLA 
255, BHUTTO (2A). Simla Accord. Pak Horizon 25,3;1972;3-16, 
It is for the people of India to decide the kind 
of relationship they want between themselves. From 
that point of view the Simla Accord between India and Pak-
istan is important; it is the starting point and a 
starting point one can turn into any direction; in the 
direction of peace, temporary, peace or in the direction 
of immediate confrontation, 
256. CHOPRA (Surendira), Indo-Pakistan relations* A study of 
new challenges and opportunities, Pttnlab Journal of 
Polities 4, 1; 1980, Jan-June; 193-237, 
Indo-Pak relations which had been marked by 
conflict and discord, mutual distrust and suspicion 
2 1 1 
entered a new phase a f t e r the Simla Agreement thereby 
reducing perceptual d i s tance . Ihe democratic regime in 
Pakistan f a\bured nonnalizat ion and President Bhutto 
supported peace and b i l a t e r a l i s m with India . India 's 
nuclear explosion at Pakistan in May 1974 impeded the 
process of nozmalization. The much talked of b i l a t e r a -
lism or "benef ic ia l b i la tera l i sm" has y e t t o take root , 
, - , SIMLA AGREEMENT, 1971 
257. NARSIMHA RAO (PV). India and Pakistan* A framework for 
f r i endsh ip . Pak Horizon 34, 2; 1981; 12-22, 
Both India and Pakistan acknowledge that the 
Simla agreement provides a framework for expanding 
re la t ions betvreen the two countries and for encourag-
ing a common endeavor for peace and s t a b i l i t y in the 
region. India's des i re for c l a s s and fr i end ly re la t ions 
with Pakistan i s founded on a r e a l i s t i c appreciation in 
India of Pakistan's inherent s trength . Already, scores 
of Pakistani writers and p o e t s , j o u r n a l i s t s and commen-
t a t o r s , musicians and other a r t i s t s have been received 
in India . 
2 -^  
, TREATIES, SIMLA 
258. ROY (RT). Some foreign p o l i c y problems of Pakistan, 
Pak Horizon 25, 3? 1972; 17 - 22. 
The Simla agreement accepts the p r i n c i p l e s that 
India-Pakistan problem should be reso lved by peaceful 
means. I t Looks forward to a f i n a l se t t l ement of the 
Kashmir dispute , without prejudice to the p o s i t i o n s of 
the e i t h e r s i d e . Despite i t s pre-occupation with Pak-
i s t a n ' s external r e l a t i o n s , the Government had moved 
s w i f t l y in the domestic f i e l s to change the inequitous 
socio-economic and p o l l t i c o l e g a l s tructu£«s , and i n t r o -
duced a s e r i e s of socio-economic reforms designed 
primarily to eradicate mass poverty in Pakistan. 
259. TAHIR KHELI (Shir in) . B i la tera l i sm in South As ia . World 
Affairs 136, 1; 1973 sum; 74-87. 
The s igning of Simla accord by the leaders of 
India and Pakistan opened 19 a new dimension of Indo-
Pakistan r e l a t i o n s s The agreement was h a i l e d as one 
that had been reached without interference frcxn outs ide 
powers and one that was expected to be only a prelude to 
the s e t t i n g up of machinery to deal with a hos t of mutual 
problems. Bi la tera l i sm in the a f f a i r s of the subcontinent 
J 
is a relatively new phenomenon. It deserves close 
analysis* both in its historical perspective and in 
its future implications. 
, _, TASHKENT 
260, JHA (DC), Indo-Pakistani re la t ions s i n c e the Tashkent 
Declarat ion. Ind J p o l i t Sci 32, 4; 1971, Oct-Dec;502-21. 
This paper attempts to analyse Indo-Pakistan 
r e l a t i ^ i s by div iding them broadly i n t o t*io periodss 
f i r s t , r e l a t i o n s s i n c e the Tashkent ta lks to March 1971 
and second, re la t ions s i n c e the u n i l a t e r a l declarat ion 
of independence by East Pakistan as a sovereign republic 
of Bangladesh and continuance of t h e i r s t rugg le for 
independence frora the ru l e of West Pakistan. 
261. MUKHTAR ZAMAN. Thoughts on Indo-Pakistan re la t ions in 
the Tashkent era. Pak Horizon 22, 2;1969,Jan-Mar;127-34, 
The year 1965 marks the climax of a long legacy 
of s t ra ined re la t ionsh ip between India and Pakistan ever 
s i n c e t h e i r energence as two independent c o u n t r i e s . In 
the Tashkent declarat ion of 10 January 1966 the President 
of Pakistan and Prime Minister of India reaffirmed t h e i r 
ob l iga t ions under the UN charter not to have recourse 
to force and to s e t t l e t h e i r disputes through peaceful 
means. I t should be remembered that the Tashkent 
Decleration did not precede but fol lowed the e a s e f i r e 
Which was agreed xapon e a r l i e r in the s e c u r i t y counc i l . 
2 ''• {) 
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